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ICONS OF VALUE: A STUDY OF THE EPISTEMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF 
EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE 
Brian Ballard, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2017 
The relation between emotion and value is one of the great longstanding issues in value 
theory. Anti-realists often have ready accounts of the nature of this relation. For instance, 
some anti-realists hold that emotions somehow construct evaluative facts. However, it is 
less obvious how a realist should understand the emotion-value relation. Some realists 
leave emotions out of the picture altogether, while others regard them as pernicious 
influences. The present work seeks to address this. My goal is to characterize the 
emotion-value relation in a way that is amenable to a robust form of value realism, and 
which gives emotions an indispensible epistemic role. The key theses I argue for are (1) 
that emotions provide epistemic benefits with respect to value but that presently no 
account succeeds in saying how they do this and what those benefits are; (2) that 
emotions represent evaluative properties, and that each emotion represents a unique 
evaluative property; and (3) that emotions represent evaluative properties in a distinctive 
way that can be modeled after pictorial styles of representation. 
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PREFACE 
 
 
 
 
I first started to think about emotions as an undergraduate at UC Santa Cruz in 2008. 
Jesse Prinz visited campus for a talk, and I was fortunate enough to have been able to 
arrange a coffee, where we discussed emotions and metaethics. Back then I had a clear 
idea that I wanted a shamelessly robust realism that took seriously the importance of 
emotional experience. This I struggled to convey to Jesse, who, with his equally 
shameless anti-realism, described it as a “neat disgusting project.” I was very much 
drawn to two ideas then, which I carry with me still. The first is that we know about 
values through a kind of direct experience. The second is that this evaluative experience, 
whatever it is, is not metaphysically neutral about the values it conveys. It somehow 
conveys them as being mind-independent. I thought then, and think now, that this is a 
feature of sense perception as well. Samuel Johnson once kicked a rock and claimed to 
have refuted Berkeley. But perhaps his refutation isn’t as feeble as it seems. Perhaps the 
point is that, when you kick the rock, this experience makes it feel as though you were 
encountering an object that exists independently of your mind. I wanted to be able to say 
something similar about the experience of value. In encountering the beauties of nature or 
the horrors of a war, it feels as though one were kicking the proverbial rock.  
I thought it would be powerful to combine these ideas with a third one. G. E. 
Moore and Thomas Reid both took an approach to skepticism that I found captivating. 
 ix 
They thought it so obvious that we have perceptual knowledge, that any philosophical 
premises implying otherwise must be treated in the form of a modus tollens. I liked the 
idea that our everyday experiences enjoy a powerful default warrant that philosophical 
considerations do not have the strength to overturn. (As an undergraduate, I had the good 
fortune of discussing these Moorean-Reidian ideas with John McDowell and Crispin 
Wright, who, I note with pleasure, sit on the committee of this dissertation presently.) 
Now, the way that this third idea combines with the first two is obvious. Our everyday 
experiences acquaint us with values which we encounter as mind-independent, and so 
philosophical doubts about the mind-independent reality of value must perish along with 
skeptical doubts about perceptual knowledge. 
These were the ideas I felt in my guts, that dark place where philosophy begins. 
But it’s quite another thing to draw them out into the light in a way that will convince. 
This dissertation attempts a very modest beginning.  
My work on these ideas has been developed throughout many conversations and 
correspondences, and I wish to thank those who have been so generous with their time 
and wisdom, including Mikio Akagi, Bob Audi, Tim Bayne, Salim Berker, Bill Brewer, 
Dan Brudney, Alex Byrne, Agnes Callard, Elizabeth Camp, Dave Chalmers, Robert 
Cowan, Jennifer Corns, Tim Crane, John Deigh, Kit Fine, Matt Frise, Ronald de Sousa, 
Alan Gibbard, Camil Golub, Anil Gupta, Joshua Greene, Stephen Grimm, Chris Hill, 
Paul Horwich, Mark Johnston, Thomas Kelly, Chris Korsgaard, Joseph LeDoux, Barry 
Maguire, Joe McCaffrey, Michael Milona, Jerry Neu, Richard Nisbett, Graham Oddie, 
Derek Parfit, Adam Pautz, Jesse Prinz, Duncan Pritchard, Jim Pryor, Hilary Putnam, 
Robert Roberts, Tim Scanlon, Kieran Setiya, James Shaw, Daphne Simeon, Jay Van 
 x 
Bavel, David Velleman, Stephen Yablo, Jona Vance, and Linda Zagzebski. Parts of this 
dissertation were presented at the Speculative Ethics Forum at St. John’s University, the 
Edinburgh Epistemology Reading Group, and the University of Glasgow. I especially 
wish to thank the members of my committee, Karl Schafer, John McDowell, Jim 
Woodward, and Crispin Wright, and above all, Edouard Machery, who was on all counts 
an excellent dissertation director.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
1.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE 
 
 
We can understand the importance of emotions by considering what life is like without 
them. In his work on autism, Oliver Sacks writes about his trip through the Rockies with 
Temple Grandin, the autistic scientist. The following passages are worth quoting at 
length: 
 
We pulled off the road, and gazed toward the Rockies—snowcapped, outlined against the 
horizon, luminously clear even though they were nearly a hundred miles away. I asked 
Temple if she did not feel a sense of their sublimity. “They’re pretty, yes. ‘Sublime,’ I 
don’t know.” When I pressed her, she said that she was puzzled by such words, and had 
spent much time with a dictionary, trying to understand them. She had looked up 
“sublime,” “mysterious,” “awe,” and “numinous,” but they all seemed to be defined in 
terms of one another. 
 
“The mountains are pretty,” she repeated, “but they don’t give me a special feeling, the 
feeling you seem to enjoy.” After living for three and a half years in Fort Collins, she 
said, this was only the second time she had been to them. 
 
 
 
Later, as they watched the sunset, Grandin remarked:  
 
 
 
 “You get such joy out of the sunset,” she said. “I wish I did, too. I know it’s beautiful, 
but I don’t ‘get’ it.” Her father, she added, often expressed similar sentiments. 
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And again, while walking under the night sky: 
“When I look up at the stars at night, I know I should get a ‘numinous’ feeling, but I 
don’t. I would like to get it. I can understand it intellectually. I think about the Big Bang, 
and the origin of the universe, and why we are here: Is it finite, or does it go on forever?” 
“But do you get a feeling of its grandeur?” I asked. 
“I intellectually understand its grandeur,” she replied, and continued, “Who are we? Is 
death the end? There must be reordering forces in the universe. Is it just a black hole?” 
(Sacks 1995, pp. 293-294) 
Clearly, Grandin is missing something with respect to the aesthetic quality of the 
mountains, the sunset, and the night sky. Aesthetics is not entirely alien to her, as she can 
recognize that these things are ‘pretty’ and ‘beautiful’. Still, she seems to be, in a sense, 
blind to the more dramatic aesthetic qualities of grandeur and sublimity, and her 
‘blindness’ here seems to be at least partly explained by her lack of emotional 
experiences such as awe and wonder. The Grandin example makes plausible, then, at 
least the very generic claim that emotional experience is in some way crucial to 
judgments of aesthetics.  
In fact, this goes beyond aesthetics. Imagine the moral analogue of Grandin:1 
Sacks: Can you believe those hoodlums were about to poor gasoline on the poor cat? 
Isn’t that just horrible? 
1 It is sometimes argued that psychopaths are real-life examples of this (Prinz 2008, pp. 42-47), although 
how to understand the nature and significance of emotion deficits in psychopathy is a complicated matter, 
as is no doubt the case with autism as well. 
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Moral Grandin: ‘Horrible’, I don’t know. It was certainly wrong and they deserve to 
be punished. 
 
Sacks: But don’t you get a feeling of the wrongness? 
 
Moral Grandin: I intellectually understand the wrongness. We ought to treat animals 
with respect, and it is bad to enjoy the pain of another.  
 
It is natural to say something similar about this case. If one is not distressed by the 
hoodlums’ act, then one does not fully grasp its badness. It is when you feel appalled that 
you really ‘get it’. Plausibly, then, we may expand our generic claim: emotional 
experience is in some way crucial to judgments of value. 
 In what way exactly? Just what is Grandin missing on account of her emotional 
deficits? This is the guiding question of my dissertation. By way of preview, my central 
claims will include the following: (1) that emotions are representations of value; (2) that 
emotions are not beliefs or judgment but are instead experiences that are largely 
encapsulated from beliefs, much like perception is; (3) that as evaluative experiences, 
emotions furnish epistemic benefits that purely intellectual states cannot; (4) that current 
work on emotion is unable to explain why emotional experience is so epistemically 
valuable; (5) that the thing that sets emotion apart from intellection is that emotions 
represent iconically, by replicating aspects of the values they represent; and (6) that 
emotions are iconic in virtue of their distinctive phenomenal character.  
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In the rest of this introduction, I will describe the issues that form the landscape of 
these ideas, and end by offering a preview of each of the three chapters of the 
dissertation, which can be read independently of each other. 
 
 
 
1.2 EMOTION AND VALUE THEORY 
 
 
Many metaethical theories emphasize that there is a deep connection between emotion 
and value, and offer ready explanations of what Grandin is missing. For non-cognitivists, 
what Grandin is missing is the emotional life that forms the real substance of evaluative 
judgment, and so she lacks genuine evaluative judgments with respect to the values in 
these specific cases (Blackburn 1993, 1998; Gibbard 1990, 2003). Of course, on this 
view, there are no evaluative properties, and our evaluative judgments are not trying to 
describe them, not in anything more than a deflationary or minimalist sense; and so it is 
more apt to say that her evaluative judgment is deficient, rather than saying her grasp of 
an evaluative property is. (Of course, quasi-realist views make things complicated here, 
since such views are willing to talk of evaluative properties and even say that they are 
mind-independent.)2  
In contrast, sentimentalist theories accept that there are evaluative properties, but 
hold that they are in some way dependent on our emotional responses. This is true of 
response-dependence theorists, who think that values can be fully explained in terms of 
the emotional responses they tend to cause (Hume 1738-40/1975, 1742/2006; Hutcheson 
1724/2004; Johnston 1989; Lewis 1989; Prinz 2008). It is also true of fitting attitude 
                                                
2 On the increasing unrecognizability of non-cognitivism as an alternative to realism, see Dreier (2004). 
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theorists, who think that values can be fully explained in terms of the emotional 
responses they make fitting (D’Arms 2013; D’Arms and Jacobson 2000, 2006; 
McDowell 1985, 1998a, 1998b; Wiggins 1976, 1987). Note, however, that the way 
D’Arms and Jacobson develop this position should be distinguished from the way 
McDowell and Wiggins develop it. We can see the difference by considering how they 
answer the Euthyphro question, which Crispin Wright has shown to be a useful way of 
contrasting metaphysical positions in the vicinity here.3 We can all agree that an act is 
pious iff loved by the gods. The question is whether the gods’ love is detecting piety or 
instead constructing it. In the present case, D’Arms and Jacobson hold that emotions are 
metaphysically prior to values, and so emotions are in some way constructing values. In 
contrast, McDowell and Wiggins hold that emotions and values are metaphysically or 
explanatorily symmetrical.4 The beautiful is that which merits admiration, and admiration 
is that which the beautiful merits, a circularity which proponents of this view embrace. 
To keep this distinction in mind, I will call McDowell and Wiggins’ approach the 
sensibility theory, and reserve the label ‘fitting attitude theory’ for D’Arms and 
Jacobson’s approach. The sensibility theory is more realist in spirit, especially in 
McDowell’s presentation, although it is a subtle issue just how to classify sentimentalist 
theories in relation to realism (Dancy 1986; Pettit 1991; Tollefsen 2000). 
Sentimentalist theories appeal to an analogy with color, taking it for granted that 
color must be understood as a secondary quality. Indeed, for some reason, just about all 
of metaethics seems to regard this as the only possible view about color. That is odd, 
                                                
3 For details, see Wright (1987), pp. 42-46, (1988), pp. 14-25, and especially (1993), pp. 108-139. 
4 In response to Blackburn’s distinction between realist views on which values are “the parents of our 
sentiments”, and anti-realist views on which they are “their children”, McDowell remarks that values and 
sentiments are siblings (McDowell 1998b, p. 159). See Blackburn (1981), pp. 164-165.  
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since there are as many views about color as there are about value.5 Consider, for 
example, Thomas Reid: 
 
All people who have not been tutored by modern philosophy understand by color, not a 
sensation of the mind, which can have no existence when it is not perceived, but a quality 
or modification of bodies, which continues to be the same whether it is seen or not (Reid 
1872, p. 137).6 
 
 
  
Here, the idea is that the reality of color is metaphysically and explanatorily prior to our 
color experiences. This is accordingly a deeper form of realism than the secondary 
quality view of color, since it makes color even more independent of our minds. And like 
sentimentalist theories of value, I, too, wish to appeal to an analogy with color, only I 
understand color as Reid describes it, and not on the secondary quality model. 
Accordingly, one of the aims of my dissertation is to show how a robust form of realism 
about value can explain what Grandin is missing: Values are metaphysically prior to 
emotion, but emotion is a way of detecting values, and it is a way of detecting values that 
is epistemically better than non-emotional ways of doing so. 
I think of values as being like color in yet a further respect: their manifold 
diversity and determinacy. Just as visual experience makes subtle discriminations among 
a vast range of highly determinate colors, so does emotional experience make subtle 
discriminations among a vast range of highly determinate values (Johnston 2001). In 
                                                
5 For instance, Parfit writes, “Though some such response-dependence theory must be correct when applied 
to colours, … there are strong objections to response-dependent accounts of morality” (2011, p. 379). 
However, a huge volume of contemporary work on color rejects response-dependence accounts. There we 
find a diverse range of realist views, including reductive views (Byrne and Hilbert 2003; Hilbert 1987; 
Jackson 1998, 2007; Matthen 1988; Tye 2000) as well as non-reductive primitivist views (Allen 2010, 
2017; Campbell 1994, 2005; Gert 2008; Hacker 1987; McGinn 1996; Watkins 2002).  
6 In fact, although tempting, the question of what is there when no one is looking is the wrong question for 
contrasting primary and secondary quality views of color, since an object can have the disposition to cause 
certain color experiences, even when hidden away at the bottom of the sea. 
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emotional experience, we encounter the austere majesty of the Alps, the terrible beauty of 
the Pacific, the sacred beauty of wild horses, the cuteness of puppies, the crisp goodness 
of early autumn in New York, the creepiness of abandoned houses, the bitter injustice of 
police brutality in the US, the other-worldly evil of the things serial killers do to their 
victims. This list is long but not nearly long enough. Every value admits of a vast range 
of determinates.  The canyons of Utah and the sea cliffs of California are both sublime, 
but each in its own way, and someone who can’t see this would make a lousy novelist. 
Moreover, these determinates are reflected in emotional phenomenology. The fear one 
feels walking past a graveyard is not the same as the fear one feels having stumbled upon 
a rattlesnake. This is partly a phenomenal difference. We emotionally sense the distinct 
ways we are vulnerable in each scenario.  
To be a realist about so many values is to offend against the preference for 
parsimony that prevails in much of philosophy today. This picture of a world haunted 
with values is certainly not Quine’s taste for desert landscapes. No doubt, parsimony 
considerations have been brought against value realism even of a less extravagant kind 
(e.g., Harman 1977, Ch. 1). It is, however, difficult to say just what parsimony is, let 
alone what its value is (Sober 2001, 2015). Indeed, much of history has had the “taste” 
opposite to Quine’s, expecting every nook and cranny of the universe to be filled with 
something (Lewis 1964/2012, p. 56; Lovejoy 1936). A related ‘principle of plenitude’ has 
sometimes been appealed to in physics (Dirac 1930, p. 71, n5), and continues to be 
discussed in metaphysics (Hawthorne 2006; Inman 2014; Leslie 2011). So, we should not 
be naively optimistic about the damage parsimony can do to the lavish realism I endorse. 
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I submit, moreover, that my picture at least takes emotional experience at face 
value, as many have observed. For instance, McDowell remarks, “Aesthetic experience 
typically presents itself, at least in part, as a confrontation with value: an awareness of 
value as something residing in an object and available to be encountered” (1998a, p. 
112).7 What to do with this observation is partly a matter of one’s approach to 
philosophy. While some are happy to cast aside such appearances as illusory (Mackie 
1977), I’ll note that many regard them as furnishing a powerful default justification 
(Kelly 2005; Lemos 2004; Lycan 2001, 2007; Moore 2013, essays VII, IX, and X; Reid 
1872, Part A, Ch. I). 
At any rate, in my dissertation, although I will not attempt an all-out defense of 
realism, my project is a kind of defense, albeit indirectly. This is so in two respects. First, 
one of the great advantages of sentimentalist theories of value is their ready account of 
the deep connection between emotion and value.8 Realists have a harder time achieving 
such an account, and many realists do not seem concerned to try (e.g., Huemer 2005; 
Nagel 1986; Parfit 2011). Yet that is just what my dissertation seeks to provide. Thus, if I 
am successful, it will dull the anti-realist’s edge, or at least, this particular edge. I wish to 
show, in other words, how even a lavish form of realism can give emotional experience a 
central place with respect to value and judgments of value. 
Second, I will argue that emotions are representations of value, and while some 
non-cognitivists may be able to say this, the way that I get to this claim is not compatible 
with a minimalist or quasi-realist treatment of representation. What this claim ends up 
being, then, is in a sense the deepest way of rejecting non-cognitivism. Not only do we 
                                                
7 McDowell, of course, does not think this objective phenomenology requires us to be realists in any sense 
more robust than the sensibility theory he adopts.  
8 This advantage is emphasized, for instance, in Blackburn (1998), Ch. 4. 
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have evaluative beliefs, but even our emotions are evaluative representations. Our 
evaluative psychology is representational all the way down. Just imagine Ayer’s chagrin 
if evaluative utterances expressed feelings, yet feelings themselves turned out to have 
evaluative content. 
 
 
 
1.3 EMOTIONS AS SOURCES OF EVALUATIVE JUDGMENTS 
 
 
If emotional experience is an epistemically important way of detecting values, then it 
must be that emotional experience is upstream of our evaluative judgments. One line of 
emotion research, however, regards emotional experience as taking place downstream. 
You decide what is beautiful, and your longings merely reflect this prior judgment. You 
decide what is unjust, and your indignations merely reflect this prior judgment. If this is 
right, then emotions have a less interesting epistemic role to play (Bagnoli 2011; Sinnott-
Armstrong 1991). For instance, plausibly they could not serve to justify the evaluative 
beliefs they reflect, since that would seem to license a kind of objectionable 
bootstrapping—the beliefs cause the emotions, which justify the beliefs.9 
In the case of aesthetics, however, this picture is manifestly implausible. A child 
does not need to have a prior conception of aesthetic value in order to be moved by a 
sunset or a cello sonata, anymore than one needs a prior conception of culinary value in 
order to enjoy a glass of water. Of course, one needs the conceptual sophistication to 
understand certain works of art before one can be moved by them. But such concepts are 
                                                
9 An analogue of this issue is found in older debates about the “theory ladenness of observation”. If 
observation (perception) is as theory laden as some have argued (Kuhn 1964, p. 113-114), then this would 
limit its role as a source of information about the world, as critics have noted (Fodor 1983, 1984). A similar 
issue arises in more recent debates about the epistemic impact of the cognitive penetrability of perception 
(Siegel 2017, Ch. 3). 
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not evaluative. The concepts needed to understand Shakespeare are not BEAUTY and 
SUBMLIMITY, but IAMBIC PENTAMETER and TRAGIC THEATRE. And that is 
unsurprising. In order for emotion to evaluate something, we must have some sense of 
what it is (although apparently that “sense” can be as minimal as subcortical processing 
early in perceptual systems (Zajonc 1980; LeDoux 1996, Ch. 6)). 
The relevant question, then, is the extent to which emotions depend on prior 
evaluative cognitions, since it is evaluative cognition for which I am claiming emotional 
experience to be epistemically important. To be clear, one of the background assumptions 
of the present work is that emotions play a substantial role in influencing evaluative 
judgment, that often we judge something to be valuable or disvaluable partly as a result 
of emotional experience. This is plausible in aesthetics, and there is significant evidence 
that it is plausible in ethics as well (Haidt 2001, 2012).10 For instance, in one of Jonathan 
Haidt’s famous studies, participants who sat at disgusting desks were likely to pass more 
severe moral judgments (Schnall et al. 2008). Importantly, this effect was modulated by 
the extent to which subjects were sensitive to their bodily feelings, which suggests that 
conscious affect is playing a role. Beyond ethics, furthermore, emotions seem to 
influence cognitions of other values as well, such as judgments of overall wellbeing 
(Clore et al. 2001; Schwartz and Clore 1983).  
The idea that emotions are sources of evaluative judgments, rather than mere 
reflections of them, also explains two further facts, namely, that (a) emotional 
experiences may lead us to revise our evaluative judgments, and (b) emotional 
experiences may conflict with our evaluative judgments. Accordingly, given that 
                                                
10 But see Huebner et al. (2009) for a contrary take on this evidence. 
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emotions influence evaluative judgments as antecedents, plausibly they have a more 
robust epistemic role to play. At the very least, it raises the question of whether the 
influence of emotion is something we should welcome.  
 
 
 
1.4 SKEPTICISM ABOUT EMOTION 
 
 
Certainly, there are those who think we should not welcome it. They regard emotion as a 
distorting influence likely to lead us away from evaluative truth. The many disparate 
traditions of such emotion skepticism, as we may call it, form an impressive roster. 
Most (in)famously, there are the stoics. As Cicero remarks, “all emotion springs 
from the roots of error: they should not be pruned and clipped here and there, but yanked 
out” (2002, p. 60). Similarly, Kant often discusses emotions in a way that views them as 
interruptions in the moral life, rather than central features of it: 
 
The true strength of virtue is a tranquil mind with a considered and firm resolution to put 
the law of virtue into practice. That is the state of health in the moral life, whereas an 
affect, even one aroused by the thought of what is good, is a momentary sparkling 
phenomenon that leaves one exhausted (1996, p. 516).11 
  
 
More recently, there are three contemporary brands of emotion skepticism worth 
mentioning. The first are those ethical intuitionists who regard cognitive intuitions as the 
primary source of ethical knowledge, and emotion as a distorting influence (Huemer 
2008). The second are those who regard emotion’s allegedly more prominent role in 
deontological judgments as a debunking argument against deontological approaches to 
                                                
11 Interpreting Kant’s actual view of emotion is doubtless a more complicated affair, one that requires 
discussion of his aesthetics as well. 
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ethics (Greene 2003, 2008; Singer 2005, p. 347-348).12 The third are researchers in the 
heuristics and biases tradition who have, it seems, discovered patterned ways the 
emotions can mislead us (Kahneman 2011; Nisbett and Ross 1980; Slovic 2007).  
 How can we overcome such a venerable community of emotion skeptics? 
Obviously, I cannot systematically address all of this work, but there are general 
considerations to bring against emotion skepticism. For starters, the Grandin case from 
earlier is relevant. Without being awed by the night sky, Grandin seems unable to fully 
register its aesthetic value, even though she has an intellectual understanding of its 
grandeur. We should regard emotions as epistemically beneficial in at least this respect. 
Moreover, it is plausible that we have some kind of default warrant to trust in our 
natural ways of forming beliefs. This approach is advocated by proponents of bounded 
rationality (Gigerenzer and Selter 2001; Simon 1957), as well as many epistemologists 
(Alston 1989, 1993; Conee and Feldman 2004, Ch. 1; Plantinga 1967; Wright 1991, 
2004). If that is correct, then we do not need to earn a warrant for believing emotions are 
reliable. Rather, provided that emotions are one of our basic sources of evaluative 
judgments, we start out getting to trust in them. 
Of course, such a default warrant would be defeasible, and some emotion skeptics 
are confident there are defeaters. For instance, Slovic (2007) exhibits evidence that 
emotions are most sensitive to information that is concrete and vivid, and so pallid 
statistics about, say, mass genocides tend not to be registered in the emotions. However, 
as an argument for emotion skepticism, this makes the mistake of confusing sensitivity 
with reliability. Here, a belief source is insensitive iff it fails to represent the information 
                                                
12 See Berker (2009) for sustained criticism of the relevance of Greene’s findings for any normative 
conclusions. 
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that is there; unreliable iff it misrepresents the information that is there.13 The blind 
person’s vision is insensitive, the hallucinating person’s unreliable. With this distinction 
in view, it is clear that the mere fact that emotions only produce verdicts in response to 
certain kinds of data doesn’t show that the verdicts they do produce are unreliable.  
Indeed, even setting that point aside, the claim that emotions are unreliable is 
intrinsically problematic. It assumes there is such a thing as the reliability of emotion, as 
though all people had the same emotions. We can speak of the reliability of perception in 
a global way since most humans tend to have relevantly similar perceptual faculties. But 
the same cannot be said for emotions. Emotions depend heavily on training and 
refinement to a far greater degree than perception. There is no such thing as the global 
reliability of emotion, any more than there is such a thing as the global morality of the 
will. The real question is: When emotions have been adequately trained and refined, 
what, then, is their epistemic impact? And as the Grandin case suggests, when emotions 
get things right, their epistemic impact is indispensible.  
 
 
 
1.5 THEORY OF EMOTION 
 
 
If emotions are to play an important role in value theory, we must address, What are 
emotions? Here is an oversimplified story of emotion theory in the last hundred years. 
First came the feeling theory. On this view, emotions are just certain kinds of bodily 
feelings (Damasio 1994; James 1884; Lange 1885). This view respected the salient role 
of feeling in emotion, but, it was thought, had difficulty accommodating other things 
                                                
13 For a more precise characterization of the sensitivity-reliability distinction, see Sober (1994), pp. 51-52. 
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about emotions, such as their intentionality, and the way they can be assessed as fitting. 
Then there came the cognitive theory. This view hoped to fix these problems by saying 
that emotions are evaluative beliefs or judgments (Foot 1978a, 1978b; Kenny 1963; 
Nussbaum 2001; Solomon 1976). After all, judgments are intentional. And judgments can 
be true or false, so perhaps the fittingness of emotion is just a kind of truth or falsehood. 
This theory, however, was vulnerable to obvious counterexamples from so-called 
recalcitrant emotions. You can fear the insect even when you judge it to be harmless. 
Thus, there came the perceptual theory, which holds that emotions are perceptions of 
value (Döring 2003; Prinz 2004; Roberts 1988, 2003; Tappolet 2012). This theory 
seemed to have it all. Perceptual states are intentional. Perceptual states can be assessed 
for accuracy, and this can explain the fittingness of emotion. Moreover, perceptual states 
can come apart from judgments. Thus, perhaps recalcitrant emotions are like visual 
illusions, persisting even as they conflict with our better judgments.14  
 There are of course many other theories of emotion, but this story is a useful 
oversimplification. And the perceptual theory is still the view to beat, although at present 
it faces a challenge that it has not yet entirely come to terms with. Emotions admit of 
normative assessments that do not comfortably apply to paradigmatic perceptual states 
(Brady 2007, 2009, 2011, 2014, Ch. 3; Helm 2001, 2015). For instance, emotions can be 
irrational, but it is awkward to say that a visual state, even a hallucination, is irrational 
(but for a contrary view, see Siegel 2017). This is currently the main problem to 
                                                
14 What about moods that apparently lack intentional objects? I think we should compare these to ganzfeld 
experiences in which the visual field is pervaded with a single uniform color. On one view, the ganzfeld 
experience represents a plane as colored. On another view it represents an unattributed color property. Both 
views are possible with respect to moods. Perhaps depression represents things as bad, or perhaps it 
represents unattributed badness. See Mendelovici (2014) for a more detailed view.  
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overcome for the perceptual theory, and naturally, several solutions have been put forth 
(Döring 2015; Milona 2016; Tappolet 2012; Vance forthcoming). 
 In the present work, while I proceed in a way that is cozy with the perceptual 
theory, nothing I say depends on the claim that emotion is literally a form of perception. 
Instead, the claims I rely on are (a) that emotional experiences are largely encapsulated 
from evaluative beliefs, (b) that emotional experiences are often causally and 
epistemically prior to evaluative beliefs, (c) that one of the functions of emotion is to 
register values, (d) that emotional experience presents its evaluative content as being 
correct, and (e) that emotional experience is a source of epistemic goods with respect to 
values. Although these claims highlight perceptual features of emotion, they do not 
strictly entail that emotions are perceptual states.  
 
 
 
1.6 PREVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
 
 
Here I offer a brief summary of the three chapters.  
 
1.6.1 CHAPTER ONE: EMOTIONS AS SOURCES OF EPISTEMIC GOODS 
 
 
I argue that emotional experience furnishes epistemic benefits with respect to value, but 
that current work on emotion is unable to fully explain this. I argue this by offering a 
series of evaluative Mary cases, in which someone shares our evaluative judgments but 
forms them without emotion. Like Grandin, such a person seems to be epistemically 
worse off with respect to value. But how exactly? I consider whether this can be 
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explained in terms of attention, perception, or understanding, and find that none of these 
notions are entirely adequate. 
 
1.6.2 CHAPTER TWO: EMOTIONS AS REPRESENTATIONS OF VALUE 
 
 
Many authors have claimed that the fittingness of emotion directly supports the view that 
emotions have evaluative content. However, this inference is mistaken, since actions can 
be fitting, but they do not have evaluative content. In this chapter I fix the inference by 
showing how the fittingness of emotions can figure in a more complex argument for the 
evaluative content of emotion. I argue that each emotion has a unique set of fittingness 
conditions and a unique phenomenal character. All things being equal, it would be 
preferable to have an explanation that unifies these two features, rather than having two 
unrelated explanations of each. But the best unifying explanations, I argue, commit us to 
the claim that emotional experience represents evaluative properties.  
 
1.6.3 CHAPTER THREE: EMOTIONS AS ICONS OF VALUE 
 
 
I develop a novel semantics for the evaluative content of emotion, and I do so in three 
steps. First, I introduce the notion of arbitrariness. Here, a representation is arbitrary to 
the extent that we can change its format without changing its meaning. English words are 
highly arbitrary in this sense, but realistic pictures are not. Second, I argue that emotional 
experience is non-arbitrary. If we alter certain aspects of emotional phenomenology, such 
as its pleasantness or painfulness, we alter its evaluative content. Third, I introduce the 
notion of iconicity, and argue that this notion can help us explain why emotional 
experience is non-arbitrary with respect to value. Here, a representation is iconic to the 
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extent that it represents in virtue of replicating certain properties of its object. Plausibly, 
iconic representations are highly non-arbitrary, and so if emotions are icons of value, this 
would explain their non-arbitrariness.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Ballard, Icons of Value - 18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.0 EMOTIONS AS SOURCES OF EPISTEMIC GOODS 
 
 
 
 
There are two kinds of value realists—those who think emotions give us a kind of 
epistemic access to the evaluative facts, and those who do not. The former view we may 
call sentimentalist realism. This view has gained a serious following in recent years 
(Audi 2013; Brady 2014; Cowan 2015; Cuneo 2006; Dancy 2014; Deonna and Teroni 2012; 
Döring 2003; Johnston 2001; Milona 2016; Oddie 2005; Pelser 2014; Roberts 2013; Tolhurst 
1991; Wedgwood 2007). For instance, Mark Johnston regards emotional experience as a 
way of sensing “patterns of appeal and repulsiveness there in the environment itself” 
(2001, p. 186). Similarly, Robert Roberts remarks that, when an injustice is observed, 
 
one who feels the injustice for himself, by way of his indignation, has an epistemically 
higher-quality judgment than the emotionless person. The [emotional] experience of the 
injustice gives him deeper understanding and more intimate cognitive contact with this 
moral reality (2013, p. 52). 
 
 
Notice that as Roberts puts things, emotional experience is both necessary and sufficient 
for the relevant epistemic good. The idea is that there is a distinctive epistemic benefit 
arising from emotional experience, not attainable otherwise. There is, of course, a weaker 
version of sentimentalist realism, which holds that while emotional experience provides 
an epistemic good, it can be attained in some other way as well, perhaps through 
cognitive intuition (Audi 2013; Cowan 2015; Dancy 2014; Wedgwood 2007).  
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Sentimentalist realism contrasts with sentimentalist non-realism on which 
emotions construct values, rather than disclosing them (D’Arms and Jacobson 2000, 
2006; Lewis 1989; Mulligan 1998; Prinz 2008). Both views agree that emotions and 
values have an important explanatory connection, but they disagree about whether it is 
emotion or value that has the explanatory priority. In this chapter, I will set non-realist 
views aside, and focus entirely on realist views. My aim is to address how realists should 
conceive of the relation between value and emotion, given that realists hold values to be 
in no way metaphysically dependent on emotion (or any other mental state). This is 
relevant to the dialectic between realists and non-realists, since non-realists often claim to 
have a better account of the emotion-value relation (e.g., Blackburn 1998).  
The kind of realism I am addressing here regards value as metaphysically prior to 
emotion and other human responses. This excludes some views that count as realist on 
other taxonomies, such as the sensibility theories of McDowell (1985) and Wiggins 
(1976). On these views, values are understood in terms of the emotions they merit, and 
emotions are understood in terms of the values that merit them, a circularity which 
defenders of the view regard as benign. These views can be construed as realist in a 
certain sense: Sunsets can be objectively beautiful, because it can be an objective fact that 
they merit admiration. But these views can be construed as non-realist with respect to 
how they answer the Euthephro question: neither values nor emotions have metaphysical 
priority, but both are explained in terms of the other. Accordingly, in this chapter, I will 
regard such views as non-realist, since I am interested in stronger forms of realism on 
which values have metaphysical priority over emotions. It is with respect to these realist 
views that the problem arises of explaining the relation between value and emotion. 
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Not all realists think that emotions give us a kind of epistemic access to value. 
This is especially so with respect to moral realism. Indeed, across the full spectrum of 
moral realist views, emotions are often left out entirely (Boyd 1988; Brink 1989; Enoch 
2011; Jackson 1998; Nagel 1986; Parfit 2011; Scanlon 2014; Shafer-Landau 2003). Other 
moral realists argue positively that emotions cannot play certain significant epistemic 
roles, for instance, as sources of foundational justification for moral beliefs (Brogaard 
and Chudnoff 2016). Still others regard emotions as positively hindering epistemic access 
to ethical truths (Huemer 2008).15 Let non-sentimentalist realism include both the view 
that emotions hinder epistemic access to value, as well as the view that they simply play 
no significant epistemic role with respect to value. 
Sentimentalist realists can admit that emotions sometimes hinder our epistemic 
access to value, and non-sentimentalists can admit that emotions sometimes help it. The 
question is, rather, the extent to which emotions have a general, favorable role in the 
epistemology of value. The non-sentimentalist will say this takes place at most in isolated 
cases.  
In this chapter, I want to address both kinds of realism. To the non-sentimentalist 
realists, I will argue that they are mistaken: emotional experience provides some manner 
of epistemic benefit with respect to value, and does so with regularity. To the 
sentimentalist realists, I will argue that extant accounts fail to capture just what the 
epistemic benefit of emotional experience is. 
 
                                                
15 Parfit has also communicated this view to me in conversation, remarking that—and I paraphrase here—
“if emotion influences moral belief to the degree the moral psychologists say, then I would regard that as a 
debunking explanation of moral belief.” 
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In section 2.1, I argue that emotional experience provides some manner of 
epistemic benefit. What exactly is this epistemic benefit, and why does emotional 
experience provide it? The rest of this chapter addresses potential answers. In section 2.2, 
I consider the view that emotions have important attentional effects. In section 2.3, I 
consider the view that emotions are perceptual experiences of value that provide 
immediate justification for evaluative beliefs. In section 2.4, I consider the view that 
emotions provide evaluative understanding, where understanding is distinct from 
justification and knowledge. 
While this chapter is largely negative, emphasizing the ways that extant theories 
fall short, this negative work is useful at present, given the proliferation of views 
concerning the epistemic significance of emotion. Note, however, that this chapter is not 
entirely negative. I will argue for the positive thesis that emotional experience provides 
some kind of epistemic good. While this thesis is often either taken for granted (Brady 
2014, Ch. 1), or dismissed out of hand (Huemer 2008), it is important to see that it can be 
argued for. I turn to that task now. 
 
 
 
2.1 THE BENEFITS OF EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE 
 
 
In this section, I will present a series of what I call evaluative Mary cases. In these cases, 
it is intuitive that there is some benefit being provided by emotional experience. I will 
argue that the benefit cannot be fully explained as a moral benefit, and so we should 
think it is epistemic. 
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2.1.1 EVALUATIVE MARY CASES 
 
 
Imagine that you are hiking in the mountains with your friend, Dud. You can see a 
meadow through the trees ahead. As you approach, you realize that you are not alone: In 
the meadow is grazing a herd of wild horses. You watch from the tree line unnoticed, 
their manes rustling in the wind, the strength of their haunches defined in the midday 
light. What do you feel when you see this?  
 I would feel something like reverent awe, the sort of longing that is also a kind of 
pain. One might also feel simple joy, or amazement, or gratitude if one believes in God. I 
assume you, too, would feel something in this vicinity.  
 Dud, however, seems to feel nothing at all. He fidgets with his compass. “Dud,” 
you say, “are you seeing this?”. 
 “Yeah.” 
 “Isn’t it amazing?” 
 “Yeah.” 
 But his response, cold and aloof, leaves you vaguely unsatisfied. You want him to 
feel the thrill that you feel, to encounter these wild horses as you encounter them.  
 If you were to describe your dissatisfaction, to say just what is wrong with Dud’s 
response, you might mention a number of things. The point is first to notice that there is 
something Dud is missing, some sense in which you are better off than Dud, although I 
say nothing yet about what that is.  
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 This is an evaluative Mary case because it depicts the difference between 
experientially responding to a certain property, and merely knowing about that property; 
then the case invites us to explain just what the difference is.16  
 It is worth seeing that such cases can be constructed for a range of values. Here 
are three further cases. 
 
Baby example: You and Dud finally see your mutual friend’s newborn baby. As you 
watch the baby, she gives you and Dud a big smile. You feel that familiar cooing 
feeling. Dud, however, feels nothing, but he agrees the baby is cute. 
 
Thin ice example: You and Dud are snow shoeing together, and you both slip and fall 
onto a frozen lake. Naturally, you feel terrified. Dud, however, feels nothing, but he 
agrees the situation is dangerous.17 
 
 
 
                                                
16 There have been two other explicit attempts to construct an evaluative analogue of the Mary case from 
Jackson (1982), each being restricted to moral value. First, in Prinz (2008), a moral Mary case is used to 
argue that certain emotional experiences (disgust, shame, etc.) are the sources of our ordinary moral 
concepts. I’ve set up my evaluative Mary case to neutralize this verdict, since Dud is not generally devoid 
of emotional experiences, and so he possesses whatever concepts they might provide. Second, in Yetter-
Chappell and Yetter-Chappell (2013), a moral Mary case is used to argue for an unbridgeable gap between 
moral and natural concepts. Their case does not explore the role of emotion. In contrast, my evaluative 
Mary case is set up deliberately to assess the role of emotional experience in value epistemology, just as 
one might use the original Mary case to assess the role of visual experience in color epistemology, an 
obvious application of Jackson’s thought experiment that has not yet been fully considered. It is nearly 
always assumed that Mary gains something regarding the look of red—but why not the red itself? If you’re 
a direct realist about perception, that just may be the thing to say. 
17 This is a variant of a case from Stocker (1983). 
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Genie example: You’re reading a book about the Genie Clark case, the worst recorded 
case of child abuse in US history. Horrified, you read passages out loud to Dud about 
how she was kept in a dark room and bound to her potty chair. You feel sickened and 
saddened. Dud, however, feels nothing, but he agrees it’s terrible what was done to 
Genie. 
 
I take it to be an obvious datum in each of these cases that there is some respect in which 
Dud is worse off than you are. I say nothing yet about how exactly he is worse off, only 
that he is. This is the intuitive starting point of my argument. If this much does not seem 
correct to you, if it seems instead that there is no way in which you are better off than 
Dud, then I have no argument to convince you otherwise.  
I assume, moreover, that in these cases Dud’s agreement expresses an evaluative 
belief. He really does think the wild horses are beautiful, etc. Some anti-realists will balk 
at this, rejecting the possibility of emotionless evaluative belief. I have said nothing to 
refute such anti-realist positions, as they are not my targets here. Instead, this chapter 
addresses how realists should assess the epistemic profile of emotional experience, and 
realists generally allow for the possibility of emotionless evaluative belief. Of course, a 
sentimentalist realist could in principle hold that occurrent emotional experience is 
required for evaluative belief. But I’m aware of no realists who actually hold this strong 
view. 
Barring anti-realist views, we seem to be able to make evaluative judgments 
without consciously feeling emotion. For instance, is it worse to kill 100,000 people, or 
1,000,000? Of course the latter. But when we consider crimes of that magnitude in terms 
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of pallid data, we often feel unmoved (Slovic 2007). So, I take it the Dud cases are 
familiar enough. After all, it isn’t that Dud is globally without emotional experience. He’s 
just gone cold in these specific situations. 
Plausibly, the way you’re better off than Dud arises from emotional experience, 
since that is the main difference between the cases. The question is, What exactly is the 
benefit you gain? Sentimentalist realists, of course, will say the benefit is in some way 
epistemic. But non-sentimentalists will have to explain it in some other way. After all, if 
in these four cases emotional experience provides an epistemic benefit, then plausibly we 
should think this about many other cases as well.  
Since these are evaluative Mary cases, one might think the most popular view 
about the original Mary case from Jackson (1982) will be applicable here, namely, that 
you and Dud know the same fact in different ways (Churchland 1985; Horgan 1984; 
Levine 2007; Loar 1990; Tye 1986). One might even think that’s all there is to it: neither 
of you know the fact better, only differently. Now, that may be, but in that case, this view 
wouldn’t explain the sense in which you are better off than Dud for having been 
emotionally moved. And that is just what we are trying to explain at present. If this view 
is to explain the sense in which you are better off than Dud, then it must be the case that 
the way you know the fact is somehow better than the way Dud knows it. This, however, 
would be to understand the benefit of emotional experience as epistemic. And that is just 
what I am trying to convince you of at present.  
 
 
 Ballard, Icons of Value - 26 
Let us begin by addressing non-sentimentalist realists who want to characterize 
the benefit as non-epistemic. If the benefit is not epistemic, what is it exactly? The most 
natural answer is that it is some kind of moral benefit. I’ll discuss the most natural 
versions of this view, and argue that none of them work. 
 
2.1.2 MOTIVATION 
 
 
Perhaps you are better off than Dud because you are more motivated to behave in the 
appropriate ways. This fits especially well with the baby and the thin ice examples. In 
these cases, there are behavioral responses that are important for you to be ready to carry 
out, say, caring for the baby, or escaping from the ice.   
But this fits awkwardly with the wild horses example. Sure, some motivation is 
provided by your emotional experience, but to do what? Perhaps to linger, or take a 
picture, or write a poem; but unlike the baby and thin ice examples, there is no behavior 
we think you really must do, such that the emotional experience gets its importance as 
something instrumental in getting you to do it. Granted, there are actions which your 
feelings towards the wild horses motivate you not to do, such as harming them, or even 
just scaring them off for fun. But we needn’t suppose you were in danger of doing these 
things, were it not for your feelings of longing.  
The same is true of the Genie case. There is nothing you need to do, since the 
thing has already happened. Sure, perhaps the motivated behavior is a future one, say, to 
give your own children a good life, or to care for the vulnerable and oppressed. Good 
things to do, no doubt, but even if your being moved by the Genie case didn’t lead to any 
change in your life projects, it still seems better to have been moved by the story.  
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2.1.3 FITTINGNESS 
 
 
Perhaps the difference is simply that you have a fitting emotion and Dud lacks one. 
However, on most accounts, the fittingness of emotion arises from the evaluative content 
of emotion (Döring 2003; Greenspan 1988; Helm 2001; Kenny 1963; Neu 1977; Prinz 
2004; Roberts 2003; Solomon 1976; Tappolet 2012). It is fitting to be angry at injustice 
because anger represents injustice. Of course, some sentimentalist non-realists might 
resist this (D’Arms and Jacobson 2000; Gibbard 1990), since this makes values prior to 
emotions. But these are not the targeted views at present.  
Given that fittingness comes from evaluative representation, the fittingness of 
your emotion can’t be the whole story. After all, Dud has a correct evaluative 
representation—his evaluative belief. So, it must be that there is something special about 
the way emotional experience represents values. This may indeed be a good way to go, 
but notice that now it isn’t mere fittingness that’s doing the work.  
Notice as well that, if we go this route, then plausibly we will end up describing 
an epistemic good, since we will be describing a good that arises in virtue of a distinctive 
kind of representation. It will be an epistemic good at least in the sense that accurate 
representation is an epistemic good. 
  
2.1.4 VIRTUE 
 
 
Perhaps the difference is that Dud lacks certain virtues. For instance, maybe your being 
saddened by the Genie case reflects your compassion. But this can’t be the right story. 
Dud might have the relevant virtue as well, even if it doesn’t manifest on this occasion 
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for some accidental reason. More plausibly, the difference would be that Dud doesn’t feel 
what the virtuous person would feel qua virtuous person. 
 It is certainly true he doesn’t. But what the virtuous person would feel is the 
fitting emotion. And it is plausible that the virtuous person feels it because it is the fitting 
emotion. This is especially plausible, given that fittingness arises from evaluative 
representation. Consider an analogy with virtue epistemology. Perhaps the virtuous 
cognizer would tend to hold only true beliefs. But that is not what makes the beliefs 
true.18 Now watch the explanation play out: Why would the virtuous person be saddened 
by the Genie case? Because sadness is fitting. Why is sadness fitting? Because sadness 
accurately represents it as bad. But if sadness represents it as bad, then plausibly what we 
have here an epistemic good, that is, the good of accurate representation. We end up with 
the same dialectic we had with the appeal to fittingness.  
 
2.1.5 CONCERN 
 
 
Perhaps the problem is with Dud’s concerns. In the wild horses example, perhaps he is 
not adequately concerned with natural beauty, even though he is able to recognize it. 
However, as with virtue, Dud might possess the relevant concern, if it simply fails to 
manifest on this occasion for some accidental reason. Similarly, you might be 
unconcerned with natural beauty. Perhaps being moved by the wild horses is a fleeting 
isolated incident for you. Even so described, the intuitive betterness of your having the 
emotional experience doesn’t go away. We don’t think the emotional experience is better 
simply in so far as it reflects your prior concerns. 
                                                
18 But for a contrary view, see Blackburn (2001). 
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2.1.6 MORALITY 
 
 
More generally, it is implausible that Dud is only morally worse off than you are, given 
the range of cases. It isn’t natural to think of his lack of emotion in the wild horses 
example, for instance, as subject to moral assessments, such as blame and punishment, 
and we don’t think your being moved by the wild horses is morally praiseworthy. It isn’t 
a matter of duty, for instance. Same with the thin ice example. Assuming you and Dud 
both try to escape, and thus fulfill any duty to preserve your lives, it doesn’t seem that 
you are morally admirable for having been afraid, or that Dud is morally reprehensible 
for having not been. This sort of language doesn’t fit. 
 
2.1.7 FINISHING THE ARGUMENT 
 
 
To recap, the non-sentimentalist realist rejects the claim that emotional experience 
provides any special epistemic access to values. But in the evaluative Mary cases, it is 
intuitive that your emotional experience provides some benefit. So, the non-sentimentalist 
will have to explain it some other way. The most natural answer is that it is a moral 
benefit, but we have seen this cannot entirely explain the difference between you and 
Dud.  
 If we were to sum up the argument, it would look like this: 
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1. The benefit from your emotional experience is either moral or epistemic. 
 
2. It is not moral. 
 
3. So, it is epistemic. 
 
I’ve argued for 2, but what about 1? Admittedly there are other kinds of benefits besides 
moral and epistemic ones. However, we can quickly see they fail to provide the 
explanation we need. For instance, perhaps the benefit is pragmatic. In the ice example, 
perhaps you are more likely to escape given your fear. Sure, but this is does not 
generalize, since there doesn’t seem to be any pragmatic benefit in being moved by the 
wild horses. Indeed, if I offered a million dollars to the person who is unmoved by the 
wild horses, Dud would be pragmatically better off, but this does not erase the other 
sense in which he is worse off than you.  
Alternatively, you might appeal to norms of biological function. Perhaps Dud’s 
emotions are not functioning right, and that’s what’s worse about him. However, it seems 
too strong to say that Dud is unmoved because his emotions are malfunctioning. That 
could be why, but needn’t be. 
In that case, perhaps emotional experience provides a sui generis benefit. But we 
should regard this as a last resort. If the benefit can be understood as epistemic, then we 
should resist postulating a sui generis normative status. 
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Are there problems with the idea that the benefit of emotional experience is 
epistemic? One might object here that emotions are downstream of the epistemically 
important stuff. When you experience the right emotions in the evaluative Mary cases, 
this merely reflects your prior evaluative understanding. So, you do have better epistemic 
access to values than Dud has, but your emotions merely evidence this rather than 
generating it.  
 However, it isn’t correct that emotional experience only ever reflects one’s prior 
evaluative understanding. Consider evaluative conversions. Imagine someone who is 
racist towards group X. But one day, when he sees a member of X in abject misery, he 
feels moved with pity, and this feeling brings home to him the humanity of X. If this 
leads him to abandon his racist attitudes, then his emotional experience would have 
altered his evaluative conception, generating new evaluative understanding.  
Of course, there may be other objections worth considering, and we can’t address 
them all here. Still, I take it a case has been made for the verdict that what you gain over 
Dud is epistemic. This verdict also resonates with the fact that we can describe evaluative 
Mary cases in terms that sound overtly epistemic. We can say that you better grasp or 
more fully register the beauty of the wild horses, for instance. This sort of language 
seems to fit. 
Assuming this is right, what exactly is the epistemic benefit furnished by 
emotional experience? Realists can appeal to a variety of answers here. I’ll consider three 
current accounts, and argue they do not fully explain the epistemic benefits of emotional 
experience. 
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2.2 ATTENTIONAL EFFECTS 
 
 
Some theories of emotion emphasize its attentional impact. For instance, Ronald de 
Sousa argues that emotions are “determinate patterns of salience among objects of 
attention, lines of inquiry, and inferential strategies” (1987, p. 196), and are thus capable 
of “guiding the processes of reasoning—or distorting them…” (p. 197). It is in this sense 
that “emotions set the agenda for beliefs and desires” (p. 196).  
More recently, Deonna and Teroni have emphasized this feature of emotion (see 
also Brady 2014, Ch. 5). They claim that “[g]iven the complexity of the environment 
through which we navigate, the prospects for detecting properties that could justify 
evaluative judgments without the aid of [emotional] sensitivity are not promising” (2012, 
p. 121). The idea here seems to be that not only do emotions direct attention, but that 
lacking emotions would seriously damage our ability to attend to the features relevant to 
making good evaluative judgments.  
Assuming this is correct, perhaps this explains what is wrong with Dud. Perhaps 
the epistemic benefit of emotional experience is that it makes us better able to attend to 
the evaluatively relevant features of the scenario.  
However, we should reject this explanation. It may be true that having the right 
emotions improves our ability to attend to the relevant features. But it is clearly false that 
we must have the right emotions in order to so attend. In the evaluative Mary cases, then, 
I stipulate that even though Dud is unemotional, he nevertheless does succeed in 
attending to the relevant features of the scenario—the apparent strength of the wild 
horses, their breath misting in the cool afternoon. He attends to these things, albeit coldly, 
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and it is on the basis of so attending that he forms the correct evaluative beliefs. Even so, 
this does not seem to erase the sense in which you are better off for feeling moved. 
Alternatively, perhaps it is a question not of success but ability. Perhaps it is that 
your ability to attend to the relevant features is better. However, we needn’t imagine the 
evaluative Mary cases in this way. Just suppose that you suffer from attention deficit, 
while Dud does not. The mere reduction in your attentional abilities does not seem to 
lessen the sense in which you are better off for having been moved by the wild horses.  
I conclude, then, that while emotions clearly have attentional effects, and while 
this is clearly one important aspect of their epistemic significance, it cannot fully explain 
the epistemic good that emotional experience provides. 
 
 
 
2.3 PERCEPTUAL JUSTIFICATION 
 
 
Recent philosophical work on emotion has been dominated by the so-called perceptual 
theory of emotion, the view that emotion is a form of perception. This suggests that the 
perceptual features of emotion can explain the epistemic difference between you and 
Dud.  
 The version of the perceptual theory we will consider holds that emotions are 
perceptual states with evaluative content (Döring 2003; Prinz 2004; Roberts 1988, 2003; 
Tappolet 2012). This view is preceded by the cognitive theory of emotion, which holds 
that emotions are evaluative judgments (Foot 1978; Nussbaum 2001; Solomon 1976). 
When you are afraid of something, you judge it to be threatening. However, many reject 
the cognitive theory in light of the possibility of recalcitrant emotions (see Roberts 2003, 
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pp. 83-105).19 You might fear the garden snake even though you know it is harmless. In 
such cases, far from being an evaluative judgment, your fear seems to conflict with your 
evaluative judgment. Instead, it is attractive to think of such cases as akin to known 
perceptual illusions. The mirage still looks like water, even when you judge it to be a 
mirage.  
 If emotions are evaluative perceptions, this is obviously of interest to the 
epistemology of value, and that has not gone unnoticed. As Sabine Döring writes: 
  
The fact that emotions have representational content opens up the possibility that the 
occurrence of an emotion can, in suitable circumstances, entitle a thinker to judge, and 
possibly to know, its content simply by taking its representational content at face value 
(2003, p. 229). 
 
 
 
As evaluative perceptions, it is natural to think emotions can justify evaluative beliefs. 
This epistemological upshot of the perceptual theory was noted early on as an attraction 
of the view. Roberts (1988) was one of the first versions of perceptual theory, and the 
epistemological significance of his view was noticed soon after by Tollhurst (1991). 
Since then, many have defended the idea that emotions justify evaluative beliefs on the 
model of perception (Cowan 2015; Cuneo 2006; Döring 2003; Johnston 2001; Milona 
2016; Pelser 2014; Roberts 2013). Of course, independently of the perceptual theory of 
emotion, virtue ethicists promoted the idea of moral perception (e.g., McDowell 1979), 
and accordingly, virtue ethics and the perceptual theory of emotion have a natural kinship 
(e.g., Roberts 2013). Indeed, Aristotle himself may have held a kind of perceptual theory 
of emotion (Dow 2011), and the same can be argued for Aquinas (King 2002).  
                                                
19 There are other reasons to reject the cognitive theory as well; see Deigh (1994) and Griffiths (1997). 
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 The idea, then, is that emotions are evaluative perceptions, and that this can 
explain the epistemic difference between you and Dud. However, I want to show that this 
idea is problematic. Indeed, I issue here a general explanatory challenge for the 
perceptual theory: the theory in its extant versions is unable to fully explain the epistemic 
significance of emotional experience.  
 The problem is this. Emotion may be a form of evaluative perception, but there 
may be other forms of evaluative perception as well, or perhaps ways of forming 
evaluative beliefs that share all the epistemically relevant features of perception. Some of 
these might be entirely non-emotional. So, if the epistemic benefits of emotional 
experience derive merely from its perceptual features, then non-emotional forms of 
evaluative perception will in principle provide the same exact epistemic benefits. But this 
is a problem for two reasons. First, many proponents of the perceptual theory hold that 
emotions provide epistemic benefits that are not otherwise attainable. Recall the Roberts 
passage from the start of this chapter, in which he claims the evaluative judgment of “the 
emotionless person” is epistemically worse. Second, as I will argue in a moment, merely 
intellectual states do not provide the epistemic benefit that emotions do, even when the 
intellectual states share the perceptual features of emotion. 
 Sense perception justifies in virtue of certain of its features rather than others. For 
instance, my visual experience does not justify in virtue of the fact that my eyes are 
above my nose. What, then, are the justification-making features of perception, the 
features in virtue of which sense perception provides the justification it does? Many 
perceptual theorists of emotion are neutral on that point, and assume that whatever the 
story is in the case of sense perception, it will transfer to emotion, provided that emotions 
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are perceptions. As Döring puts it, how it is emotions justify will be explained “by 
analogy to the entitlement in sense perception” (2003, p. 229). Other perceptual theorists, 
however, are more explicit about what they take to be the justification-making features of 
perception. Using these more explicit views, I’ll develop my challenge to the perceptual 
theory. 
 
2.3.1 EMOTIONS AS RELIABLE INDICATORS OF VALUE 
 
 
Cuneo (2006) adopts a kind of indicator reliabilism about the justification we get from 
emotions. Cuneo uses the word “feelings” instead of “emotions”, but he has in mind 
“feelings of aversion, disgust, repulsion, uneasiness, distress, guilt, attraction, pleasure, 
relief, delight and the like” (2006, p. 70). So, he seems to have in mind emotions as well 
as states with similar affective phenomenology. Cuneo holds that in many cases, such 
feelings  
 
play a special sort of role in generating … value judgments. … If we assume that in cases 
such as these, feelings reliably indicate value, then they also function as signs or 
indicators of evaluative features of the world (2006, p. 69-70). 
 
 
For Cuneo, then, feelings justify because they are reliable signs of value. (Of course, 
sometimes they are unreliable.)  
Notice, however, that just about anything can in principle be a sign of value. 
According to Livy, a chicken refusing to eat is a sign of ill things to come (1912, X 40). 
We can imagine a world where such things are reliable omens. To use a more grounded 
example, many philosophers hold the view that cognitive intuitions, seemings, or 
appearances justify a range of moral and other beliefs (Bealer 1998; Huemer 2005; 
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Chudnoff 2013).20 These intuitions are usually taken to be states that can be experienced 
without any accompanying affect. And many proponents of the perceptual theory of 
emotion are happy to grant this. They are willing to say that both intuition and emotion 
are sources of evaluative justification.  
But in that case, let us imagine that Dud forms his evaluative beliefs on the basis 
of cold intuition. Let us stipulate, moreover, that Dud’s cold intuitions are as reliable as 
your emotions. Both you and Dud are using reliable signs of value. However, this does 
not erase the sense in which Dud is missing something. Just imagine that as you watch 
the horses, you and Dud continue your dialogue: 
 
“Dud, do you find these horses amazing or what?” 
“Yeah.” 
“Well you seem unimpressed.” 
“Look, I’m a bit tired. But I can tell they are beautiful.” 
“How can you tell?” 
“Well, they just seem beautiful.” 
 
Even when their beauty is intellectually apparent to Dud, you somehow more deeply 
appreciate their beauty when you are moved by it. This means that, even if Cuneo is 
right, and emotions justify as signs of value, this doesn’t fully explain the epistemic 
benefits of emotional experience, since intellectual intuitions can also be reliable signs of 
value without conferring the same benefits. Now, if there were something special about 
                                                
20 A different notion of intuitions regards them as beliefs that are somehow self-justifying (Audi 2005).  
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the kind of signs that emotions are, things could be different. But that of course requires 
further theorizing. 
At this point, some perceptual theorists of emotion may want to deny the 
existence of cold intuition, and go in for the strong view that emotion is the only form of 
evaluative perception. But this view faces serious challenges from cases in which we 
seem to make unemotional evaluative judgments in an immediate way. For one, consider 
judgments about permissibility: when you judge an act to be permissible, this is often 
enough an immediate moral judgment formed without emotion (Dancy 2014, p. 796). 
Moreover, consider judgments about distant situations. Imagine that you could stop a 
careening trolley in a distant country by pressing a button on your computer that would 
drop a human being on the tracks. Should you? It seems to me No, but I don’t feel 
especially worked up about it. Concreteness, physicality, proximity, particularity—these 
factors hold great sway over our emotions, but our immediate moral judgments can often 
break free from them.  
Further, even if you deny that our actual psychology is equipped with cold 
intuitions, it’s enough if such intuitions are possible. After all, I just need Dud to have 
intellectual seemings in my imaginary examples. So, if the intuition skeptic wants to 
resist my argument, she has to go in for the stronger view that intuitions are not even 
possible. 
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2.3.2 EMOTIONS AS APPEARANCES OF VALUE 
 
 
So much for reliable indication. Many perceptual theorists of emotion, however, think 
that emotions provide justification in virtue of being appearances or seemings, regardless 
of their reliability. Many think this about emotions or affective experiences, even if they 
do not identify as a perceptual theorist of emotion. For instance, Jonathan Dancy defends 
the claim that emotions are “practical seemings” or “presentations of reasons” (2014, p. 
796). Here, the key features of seemings are the following: 
 
Belief independence: It can seem to you that p, even if you believe not-p.  
 
Representation: Seemings have representational content, and can therefore be 
assessed in truth terms (e.g., as true or false, accurate or inaccurate). 
 
Presentation: Seemings present their representational content as how things really 
are. This is a phenomenal quality. When you shut your eyes and imagine a pair of 
hands, it doesn’t feel as though the hands are really there. But when you open your 
eyes, and see your hands, it feels as though the hands are real. Your visual experience 
presents hands. 
 
Some authors describe additional features of seemings, but these are the key features for 
our purposes. The notion of presentation is especially important. For those who wish to 
eschew externalist conditions on justification, presentation is often cited as the 
justification-making feature of perception. Huemer calls this feature “assertiveness” 
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(2001, p. 53), and Pryor “phenomenal force” (2000, n37), but they are referring to the 
same aspect of perceptual phenomenology, and they both consider it to be the 
justification-making feature of perception. Plausibly, this phenomenal feature is also 
present in other states as well, such as cognitive intuitions and some memories. 
 As noted, many perceptual theorists hold that, since emotions are evaluative 
perceptions, the justification-making feature of perception, whatever it is, will be had by 
emotions as well. Thus, if Huemer and Pryor are right about the justification-making 
feature of perception, then it wouldn’t be enough to say, as Döring does, that emotions 
represent evaluative properties; emotions would also need to present their evaluative 
content. 
As with Cuneo’s view, the problem here is that it is plausible we can also have 
purely cognitive intuitions. I’ve motivated this view briefly in 3.1, and anyways, many 
will find it unattractive to resist the view, even those who defend the epistemic 
importance of emotion. Now, intuitions—on the view relevant for our purposes—are 
understood to be appearances or seemings that have no essential link with emotion or any 
affective phenomenology. Thus, intuitions, as appearances, don’t simply have 
representational content; they also present their content (Bealer 1998; Huemer 2005; 
Chudnoff 2013). Accordingly, we may again imagine Dud enjoying purely intellectual 
seemings in each of the evaluative Mary cases. As we saw in 3.1, it is clear there is still 
something he is missing, some way in which you more deeply appreciate the relevant 
values. 
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When the perceptual theorist tries to explain the epistemic benefit of emotion in 
terms of its status as evaluative appearance, she offers no way of saying what the 
distinctive epistemic contribution of emotion is. She offers no way of saying why it is 
epistemically better to have emotions rather than cold intuitions. Graham Oddie, for 
example, is open to this charge: 
 
An experience of the goodness of P … would be the state of P’s seeming (appearing, 
presenting itself as) good, where this seeming is an experiential, non-doxastic take on the 
value of P. If there is such a state as an experience of the goodness of P, then, by analogy 
with the perceptual case, it would give me a reason to believe that P is good (2005, p. 40). 
 
 
Oddie settles on desire as the relevant kind of evaluative experience, where he has in 
mind a kind of rich affective experience, rather than motivational states as such (personal 
communication). But if presentation is the justification-making feature of evaluative 
experience, then it doesn’t matter what the evaluative experience is, not from the point of 
view of justification.  
I conclude, then, that current articulations of the perceptual theory fail to provide 
resources for characterizing the distinctive epistemic significance of emotional 
experience.  
 
 
 
2.4 UNDERSTANDING 
 
 
There has been recent interest in the idea that emotions provide evaluative understanding 
(Roberts 2013, p. 46; Deonna and Teroni 2012, Ch. 10; Brady 2014, Ch. 4). Here, 
understanding p is not the same as knowing p or having a justified belief that p. I know 
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that Rome collapsed in the 5th century, and so do historians of Rome. But they understand 
this much better, and therefore their overall epistemic relation to the proposition ‘Rome 
collapsed in the 5th century’ is better than mine. Indeed, there is something initially 
plausible about the idea that the notion of understanding can explain what emotional 
experience provides. After all, it was natural to say that, compared to Dud, it’s you who 
truly grasps the relevant values, that it’s you who really gets it. I’ll consider two versions 
of this view, and argue that both are lacking. 
 
2.4.1 BRADY’S ACCOUNT 
 
 
The view that emotional experience provides evaluative understanding is most 
thoroughly developed in Brady (2014). According to Brady, emotions promote evaluative 
understanding “through the capture and consumption of attention” (p. 118). The crucial 
epistemic feature of emotions is that they “can motivate us to search for reasons or 
evidence that bear on the accuracy of our initial emotional responses” (p. 129). To use 
Brady’s example, imagine you awake to a noise in the middle of the night and feel afraid. 
Your fear motivates you to determine whether there is any genuine danger, and thus to 
determine whether you have reason to be afraid and to judge that you are in danger. 
Importantly, on Brady’s view, when emotions motivate us to search for reasons, this 
often yields evaluative understanding. 
What does Brady mean by ‘understanding’? For starters, Brady writes that 
“achieving an understanding of emotional objects and events involves more than 
knowing that the objects and events have the evaluative properties that they do” (p. 139). 
Rather, understanding involves “a grasp or awareness of connections or links between 
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various items; it involves seeing how things fit together, how features are related, how 
facts support and explain other facts” (pp. 139-140). 
Here, Brady follows the dominant view in the recent literature on understanding. 
For instance, consider Kvanvig: 
 
Understanding requires the grasping of explanatory and other coherence-making 
relationships in a large and comprehensive body of information. One can know many 
unrelated pieces of information, but understanding is achieved only when informational 
items are pieced together by the subject in question. … [U]nderstanding requires, but 
knowledge does not, an internal grasping or appreciation of how the various elements in a 
body of information are related to each other in terms of explanatory, logical, 
probabilistic, and other kinds of relations… (Kvanvig 2003, p. 192). 
 
 
Thus, the idea here is that emotions motivate us to search for reasons, and this search 
typically reveals not merely that we are in danger, but why. When you hear the noise and 
fearfully search for signs of danger, you see the masked face in the window and thereby 
ascertain not only the danger but the danger-making features of your situation. And it is 
your fearful experience that facilitates this process. 
 Now, I grant that this is one epistemic benefit that emotions provide. But this 
view cannot fully explain the epistemic significance of emotional experience. The 
problem here is that Brady’s view gives emotions a merely instrumental role, one that 
makes them dispensable. On this view, emotions are epistemically beneficial because of 
the results they tend to produce. Those results, however, can be achieved without 
emotions. Imagine that you are already awake and you see the masked face in the 
window. Imagine that you feel no fear. You merely intellectually recognize that you are 
in danger, and since you see the masked face and know what that means, you understand 
why you are in danger. It is still the case that when you become afraid, this makes the 
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dangerousness of your situation vivid to you. In your fear you somehow more fully 
register or appreciate the dangerousness.  
 Consider the evaluative Mary cases in light of this. We may suppose that Dud 
already fully understands what makes Genie’s childhood a bad one. He can have this 
understanding as the result of careful reflection, without being motivated by his emotion 
to search for the relevant reasons. His careful reflection could have been motivated by 
any number of things—money, prestige, the love of wisdom. Regardless of what 
motivated him, we may suppose he does possess the relevant understanding. But this kind 
of understanding doesn’t seem to fix Dud’s limitation: 
 “Dud, you agreed Genie’s childhood was terrible.” 
 “Of course.” 
 “But do you truly understand this?” 
 “Of course. It was terrible because of the isolation, the neglect, and so on.” 
Even though he understands why Genie’s childhood was bad, you more fully register the 
badness in light of your being moved by the details of her childhood.  
 
2.4.2 ROBERTS’ ACCOUNT 
 
 
I conclude that the instrumental role of emotion in acquiring understanding cannot fully 
explain the epistemic significance of emotional experience. This leaves open, of course, 
the view that emotional experience directly confers evaluative understanding, and not in 
virtue of motivating the search for reasons (Roberts 2013, Ch. 3). According to Roberts, 
sense perception often provides a similar benefit:  
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I can be told that the double-crested cormorant has a longer gular area than the 
neotropic cormorant, and, once I have learned what the gular area is, I have the 
wherewithal of a judgment. But I will certainly understand this judgment better if 
given the opportunity to see examples of the two species side-by-side (2013, p. 
39). 
 
 
And just as perception can deepen one’s understanding of physical facts in this way, 
emotional experience deepens one’s understanding of value (p. 52). 
However, this view faces two challenges. The first is that in current epistemology, 
understanding it is always taken to be holistic. As in the Kvanvig passage from earlier, 
understanding requires grasping explanatory relations within a body of information (see 
also Grimm 2006 and Zagzebski 2001). But the sort of understanding Roberts describes 
here does not seem to be holistic in this way. Thus, an account is needed as to what kind 
of understanding this is, and why it is not holistic as other forms of understanding are 
taken to be. 
The second problem has to do with why it is that emotional experience provides 
understanding. To see this, consider that Roberts thinks it is in virtue of their perceptual 
character that emotional experiences provide understanding, and he emphasizes their 
status as appearances. However, the same problem arises here as did for the perceptual 
theorist who emphasizes justification. After all, Roberts holds that the “emotionless 
person” does not enjoy the same evaluative understanding. However, we can imagine the 
emotionless person having intuitive seemings, where these are a kind of intellectual 
appearance. So, saying that emotional experience is a form of evaluative appearance can’t 
explain why it provides understanding that is not otherwise available. Instead, it must be 
something about the way in which emotional experience is a form of evaluative 
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appearance. Plausibly, it would be something about the distinctive affective character of 
emotional experience, its thrills and chills. A full account should explain what exactly. 
 I conclude, therefore, that current accounts of emotions as sources of 
understanding cannot fully explain the epistemic significance of emotional experience. 
 
 
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
 
 
In sum, I have argued that emotional experience generates some kind of epistemic good. 
This is on display in evaluative Mary cases. However, while numerous theories have 
been recently advanced, none of them are capable of fully explaining the epistemic good 
that you have but Dud lacks. I conclude, therefore, that there is a crucial aspect of 
emotional experience that remains unexplained. Of course, I have not addressed every 
possible or even every extant view, but we have seen that this explanatory failure bears 
out in examining several of the most influential recent accounts.  
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3.0 EMOTIONS AS REPRESENTATIONS OF VALUE 
 
 
 
When you see a basket of puppies, you feel that familiar “melting” adoration. When you 
witness a police officer accepting a bribe, you feel shocked and appalled. But suppose 
things were switched around. You see a basket of puppies and feel shocked and appalled. 
You see a police officer accepting a bribe, and feel that melting adoration. Something is 
wrong with emotions that are switched around in this way, but what is it?  
These examples make clear that at least some emotions can be assessed as correct, 
appropriate, or fitting. Feeling shocked and appalled is not a fitting response towards a 
basket of puppies. But what exactly is it for an emotion to be fitting or unfitting? 
Recently, many have answered as follows: When you are appalled by something, your 
emotional experience represents that thing as bad in some way. So, when you are 
appalled by a basket of puppies, your emotional experience is representing something as 
bad when that thing is in fact good. Conversely, when you experience adoration for 
something, you represent it as good in some way. So, when you adore police corruption, 
your emotional experience represents something as good when that thing is in fact bad. 
More generally, the idea is that emotional experience has evaluative representational 
content. Emotional experiences attribute evaluative properties to their objects. 
Accordingly, emotional experiences can be correct or incorrect, in the same way that 
beliefs, perceptual experiences, and indicative sentences can be correct or incorrect. Call 
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this the Evaluative Content Thesis. Here, the content of a state is whatever that state 
represents. A state has evaluative content iff that state represents an evaluative property 
such as goodness or badness. The goal of this chapter is to offer a novel argument in 
favor of the Evaluative Content Thesis. 
The Evaluative Content Thesis has gained adherents in recent decades. In the 
theory of emotion, many have claimed that emotions have evaluative content, although 
there is dispute about whether emotions are beliefs (Foot 1978a, 1978b; Green 1992; 
Kenny 1963; Nussbaum 2001; Solomon 1976), thoughts (Greenspan 1988; Neu 1977), 
perceptual states (Döring 2003, 2009; Prinz 2004; Roberts 1988, 2003; Tappolet 2012; 
Johnston 2002), or sui generis mental states (Montague 2009).21 In the philosophy of 
mind, representationalists should find the Evaluative Content Thesis attractive as part of 
their program for explaining phenomenal experience in terms of content (Byrne 2001; 
Dretske 1981, 1995; Hill 2009; Lycan 2003; Mendelovici 2014; Tye 1995, 2008, 2009). 
In metaethics, there is growing interest in the idea that, given that emotional experience 
has evaluative content, it can play a leading role in the epistemology of value, serving as 
a source of foundational justification for evaluative beliefs on the model of sense 
perception (Cuneo 2006; Dancy 2014; McDowell 1979, 1985; Pelser 2014; Tolhurst 
1990). 
However, in spite of its broad appeal, the Evaluative Content Thesis has been the 
object of recent criticism (Brady 2014; Deonna and Teroni 2012; Schroeter et al. 2015), 
and three alternative views are worth noting here. First, the most austere alternative to the 
Evaluative Content Thesis is the claim that emotional experience has no representational 
                                                
21 A related view is the claim that desires have evaluative content (Oddie 2005; Stampe 1986, 1987; 
Schafer 2013). I will mostly set this view aside in this chapter, except for in section 3.1.1. 
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content whatsoever. This view, which we may call the No Content Thesis, can 
reasonably be attributed to Hume.22 Second, a more modest view is that emotional 
experience has some content but that its content is merely about one’s bodily states (such 
as a racing heart or a surge of adrenaline). This view, which we may call the Body 
Content Thesis, was famously held by William James.23 Finally, a third alternative to the 
Evaluative Content Thesis we may call the Propositional Content Thesis. Notice that 
emotions often take propositions as their objects. One can be happy, sad, angry, or 
amused that p. According to the Propositional Content Thesis, whatever representational 
content an emotion has is exhausted by the proposition that is the object of the emotion.24 
This view has recently been defended in Deonna and Teroni (2012; 2015; forthcoming).  
This chapter offers challenge to both proponents and critics of the Evaluative 
Content Thesis. As concerns its proponents, I will show that an influential argument for 
the Evaluative Content Thesis is not in fact persuasive. Many proponents of the 
Evaluative Content Thesis have held that the fittingness of emotion directly favors their 
view. I’ll show that this is not correct. On the other hand, against the critics of the 
Evaluative Content Thesis, I will argue that there is a way in which the fittingness of 
emotion does figure into an argument for the Evaluative Content Thesis, a novel 
argument that it is the goal of this chapter to develop. By way of preview, my argument 
will run as follows: 
 
                                                
22 “A passion is an original existence, … and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a 
copy of any other existence or modification. When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and 
in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than 
five foot high” (Treatise 415). The details of Hume’s actual view are, of course, controversial. 
23 James (1884); Damasio (1994). 
24 This view will need to say something about emotions that are on the face of it not about propositions, 
such as one’s fear of the growling dog.  
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1. Emotions can be individuated by their fittingness conditions. For instance, fear is 
fitting iff it is directed at potential harms or threats, while grief is fitting iff directed at 
losses. 
 
2. Emotions can be individuated by their phenomenal character. For instance, when 
you experience fear, you are not likely to mistakenly judge that you are amused. 
That’s partly because there are signature differences in how fear and amusement feel. 
 
3. The fact that both fittingness conditions and phenomenal character can differentiate 
emotions is an implausible coincidence, unless there is some explanatory link 
between fittingness conditions and phenomenal character. 
 
4. The best accounts of this explanatory link commit us to the Evaluative Content 
Thesis. 
 
5. So, we should accept the Evaluative Content Thesis. 
 
Let’s call this the Argument from Massive Coincidence. What we may call the 
Massive Coincidence is the fact that, as fittingness conditions vary from one emotion 
type to another, so does phenomenal character; as phenomenal character varies, so do 
fittingness conditions. I’ll show that the neither the No Content Thesis, the Body Content 
Thesis, nor the Propositional Content Thesis can successfully explain the Massive 
Coincidence.  
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The rest of this chapter is divided up into four sections, each of which defends one 
of the four premises of the Argument from Massive Coincidence. 
 
 
 
3.1 FIRST PREMISE: THE FITTINGNESS OF EMOTION 
 
 
In this section, I’ll show that the fittingness of emotion does not directly establish the 
Evaluative Content Thesis, as many authors have held. After that, I will begin the 
Argument from Massive Coincidence by arguing for premise 1. 
As we saw at the outset, emotions can be assessed for fittingness. Furthermore, 
we may now observe that the fittingness of an emotion in some way depends on whether 
the object of the emotion instantiates the relevant evaluative property. For instance, anger 
is fitting when directed at the offensive, fear when directed at the dangerous, and 
admiration when directed at the admirable. Being repulsed by a cute baby, or afraid of a 
pencil, or proud of one’s evil deeds, would be unfitting (barring special contrived 
circumstances), since these objects do not instantiate the relevant evaluative properties.25  
By fittingness, I mean a generic notion of appropriateness or correctness. There is 
a debate about whether emotions have their own proprietary species of fittingness 
(D’Arms and Jacobson 2000), or whether the fittingness of emotion is always moral 
fittingness (Roberts 2003, according to D’Arms and Jacobson). For instance, for D’Arms 
and Jacobson, amusement at an offensive but funny joke is fitting even though morally 
inappropriate, and perhaps inappropriate overall. In this chapter, I mean to use a notion of 
                                                
25 I grant that sometimes the fittingness of an emotion also depends on non-evaluative facts. If you are 
angry that John deleted your manuscript, this is fitting only if John actually did this. Whether this is 
generally a requirement on the fittingness of emotion is complicated by the fact that we can have fitting 
emotions towards non-real objects, such as fictions and the contents of imaginative states.  
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fittingness that is neutral on that issue. I mean to invoke a generic notion of correctness. 
My starting point is simply the observation that to be appalled by a cute puppy is 
inappropriate or incorrect in some way. Any more specific notion of emotional fittingness 
has to be argued for. 
Many authors seem to hold there is a simple, direct inference from the fittingness 
of emotion to the Evaluative Content Thesis. If that’s so, then the Argument from 
Massive Coincidence is completely superfluous. Thus, before arguing for premise 1, I 
want to argue that there is no direct inference. Rather, the fittingness of emotion can only 
form part of an overall case for the Evaluative Content Thesis. 
 
3.1.1 THE DIRECT INFERENCE: WHY IT FAILS 
 
 
Many hold that the fittingness of emotion directly supports the Evaluative Content 
Thesis:  
  
Fear is a response to one’s situation being of a certain kind: something is dangerous. As 
such, the rational appropriateness of fear depends on the situation’s really being that way: 
fear is in part a cognitive state with mind-to-world direction of fit. Yet fear is also 
evaluative…. The content of fear is not merely that something is about to be destroyed or 
harmed, but that this is a bad thing (Helm 2001, p. 6). 
 
 
 
[Fear’s] negative evaluative content is needed to explain … why fear amounts to a 
reasonable reaction in certain situations (Greenspan 1988, p. 3). 
 
 
 
We are prone to assess our emotions with respect to how they fit evaluative facts. We 
criticize our fears when they are about things that are not fearsome, for instance. This 
practice suggests that the object of fear is represented as fearsome (Tappolet 2012, p. 
210). 
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However, the mere fact that emotions can be fitting or unfitting does not show they have 
evaluative content. Actions can be fitting or unfitting, appropriate or inappropriate, etc., 
but actions do not have representational content. If actions had representational content, 
then they could be assessed in alethic terms such as truth, accuracy, veridicality, etc. But 
actions cannot be assessed in alethic terms (except perhaps in special cases where actions 
– a code of gestures, for instance – have been artificially imbued with semantic value). 
For instance, if your house is on fire, it is fitting for you to rush out with your most 
treasured possessions. But rushing out with your most treasured possessions is not true 
(or accurate, veridical, etc.). So, the direct inference from fittingness to representational 
content fails, since actions can be fitting but do not have representational content.  
One could defend the direct inference by claiming that actions actually do have 
content: actions are partly constituted by intentions, and intentions have content. Suppose 
you are standing in the street and waving. Whether you are hailing a taxi or saying hello 
depends on your intention. The bodily motion is the same. Thus, actions have content 
since they are constituted by a state with content. 
However, the only non-controversial sense in which intentions have content is the 
following: when you intend to Φ, Φ is in some way the content of your intention. But 
this is not evaluative content. Now, one might appeal here to the so-called “guise of the 
good” thesis, the view that the desire to Φ represents Φ-ing as good (e.g., Stampe 1987). 
Using this thesis, one might reason as follows: Since desires partly constitute intentions, 
the intention to Φ represents Φ-ing as good; since intentions partly constitute actions, the 
act of Φ-ing also represents Φ-ing as good. Accordingly, one might hold that, when 
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actions are unfitting, it is because they have a false evaluative content. This defends the 
direct inference by showing that actions are not in fact a counterexample. 
However, what we have here is, if anything, a problem for the guise of the good 
thesis. If the guise of the good thesis ends up committing us to the claim that actions can 
be true or false, accurate or inaccurate, etc., then that is a problem for the guise of the 
good thesis, since we simply do not assess actions in any such alethic terms. Proponents 
of the guise of the good thesis need to resist the inference from the evaluative content of 
desire to the evaluative content of action.  Indeed, such an inference does seem mistaken. 
The mistake lies in the claim that, because actions are partly constituted by something 
with content, actions must also have content. We should reject this. If I upholster my 
chair with cosmological maps from the middle ages, this does not mean that my chair is 
inaccurate, even though it is partly constituted by something that is. 
In sum, since actions cannot be assessed in alethic terms, actions do not have 
representational content. So, actions have fittingness conditions without being 
representational. This shows that the mere fact that emotions have fittingness conditions 
does not entail that emotions have representational content. The direct inference from 
fittingness to content fails. 
 
3.1.2 FITTINGNESS CONDITIONS INDIVIDUATE EMOTIONS 
 
 
The discussion above shows the fact that emotions are assessable for fittingness does not 
directly support the Evaluative Content Thesis. However, the fittingness of emotion can 
form part of a case for the Evaluative Content Thesis. Here, I will argue for premise 1 of 
the Argument from Massive Coincidence: Emotions can be type-individuated in terms of 
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their fittingness conditions. This premise can be seen to be plausible just by considering 
examples. Fear is fitting when directed at the dangerous, disgust when directed at the 
foul, pride when directed at one’s achievements, envy when directed at the enviable, 
admiration when directed at the admirable, amusement when directed at the comical, and 
so on. Each emotion has a unique set of fittingness conditions that differentiates it from 
other emotions. 
Notice that neither does this directly support the Evaluative Content Thesis. For, 
emotions can be differentiated in terms of fittingness conditions, without saying that 
emotions represent their fittingness conditions. So, we should reject reasoning like the 
following: 
 
[Fear’s] negative evaluative content is needed to explain why it amounts to fear rather 
than some other reaction to an envisioned possibility, such as thrilled anticipation 
(Greenspan 1988, p. 3). 
 
 
It simply isn’t true that evaluative content is needed to differentiate fear from other 
emotions. Fittingness conditions alone can do this.  
 In sum, emotions can be type-individuated in virtue of their fittingness conditions. 
In the next section, I will show that there is a second way to type-individuate emotions, 
namely, in virtue of their phenomenal properties.  
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3.2 SECOND PREMISE: THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EMOTION 
 
 
William James writes that “the internal shadings of emotional feeling ... merge endlessly 
into each other. Language has discriminated some of them, as hatred, antipathy, 
animosity, dislike, aversion, malice, spite, vengefulness, abhorrence, etc., etc.”; but, 
James adds, those “internal shadings” are primarily distinguished from each other “by 
their conscious subjective tone” (James 1890, p. 448). Here, James is claiming that 
emotions can be type-individuated based on what it is like to experience them. Emotions 
have, we might say, phenomenal signatures that tell them apart. The strongest version of 
this view – and the most frequently discussed –  quantifies universally:  
 
The Uniqueness Thesis: All emotions can be type-individuated by their phenomenal 
properties.  
 
The Uniqueness Thesis has a venerable history of detractors (e.g., Lyons 1980; 
Nussbaum 2001; Ryle 1949; and Schachter and Singer 1962). However, in this section, I 
will show that the Uniqueness Thesis (which corresponds to premise 2 in the Argument 
from Massive Coincidence) is nevertheless plausible. First, I will offer two positive 
arguments in favor of the Uniqueness Thesis – an enumerative induction, and an 
argument from self-knowledge in the absence of other evidence. Second, I’ll address 
several influential objections against the Uniqueness Thesis.  
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3.2.1 THE ENUMERATIVE INDUCTION 
 
 
Everyone should accept that there are some emotions that can be distinguished from each 
other on the basis of their characteristic feelings. For instance, if you are enraged by 
something, you are not likely to mistakenly judge that you are experiencing amusement. 
These emotions have obvious differences in their phenomenal character. In general, we 
can distinguish between emotions that feel pleasant and those that feel unpleasant. In 
addition to pleasantness, emotions can also be assessed for felt intensity. And some 
emotions can simply be distinguished from each other on this basis. Rage, for instance, 
feels more intense than indignation. And if we consider in tandem the pleasantness and 
intensity of feelings, we can distinguish many more emotions from each other. For 
example:  
 
Elation – pleasant, high intensity.  
 
Contentment – pleasant, low intensity 
 
Terror – unpleasant, high intensity.  
 
Boredom – unpleasant, low intensity.  
 
Every emotional experience, it seems, can be located along these two dimensions 
(Russell 1980). However, pleasantness and intensity do not exhaust emotion 
phenomenology. Terror, rage, and despair are unpleasant, and each can be comparably 
intense, but still there are obvious qualitative differences between these states. Despair 
has a sinking, crushing feel. Terror has an intense, fluttery, focused feel. Rage feels hot 
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and dense. Of course, these descriptions inevitably fall short, as will any attempt to 
verbally characterize emotional phenomenology. But that is simply due to the limitations 
of language. In verbally characterizing emotional phenomenology, the best we can do is 
point to the feelings in question.  
These considerations show that many emotions can be distinguished on the basis 
of what they feel like. Accordingly, a straightforward enumerative induction supports the 
Uniqueness Thesis. Of course, such an induction is not wholly conclusive. There could 
nevertheless be an emotion without a phenomenal signature. But exceptions are possible 
on any enumerative induction. 
I grant, moreover, that some emotions do not admit of obvious phenomenal 
differences. For instance, consider shame and embarrassment, awe and wonder, and 
gratitude and admiration. These emotion pairs do not have obvious phenomenal 
differences. However, the Uniqueness Thesis does not claim that all emotions have 
obvious phenomenal differences. The phenomenal differences between the emotions in 
the above pairs are subtle, and therefore these emotion pairs are ill-suited as the basis of 
an inductive case. Nevertheless, their subtlety does not undermine the inductive case.  
 
3.2.2 THE ARGUMENT FROM SELF-KNOWLEDGE 
 
 
The enumerative induction can be supplemented by a further inductive consideration, 
namely, the argument from self-knowledge. When we experience an emotion, we often 
know what emotion we are experiencing. When I reach the mountaintop and I am moved 
by what I see, it is evident to me that I am experiencing longing rather than, say, grief or 
amusement. How do know that I am experiencing longing rather than some other 
emotion? It is natural to answer that I know this based on my feelings. What I am 
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experiencing manifestly feels like longing. It doesn’t feel like grief, amusement, or some 
other emotion. 
If this is correct, it would show that my emotion has a proprietary feeling, not 
shared by other emotions. Otherwise, the feeling of the emotion would not be sufficient 
evidence for determining that I am experiencing longing rather than some other emotion. 
So, if emotional self-knowledge is sometimes based on feelings alone, then this shows 
that in such cases the feeling of the emotion is type-individuating.  
An alternative explanation of emotional self-knowledge runs as follows. One’s 
feelings play only a limited evidential role. In the mountaintop case, perhaps the pleasant 
valence of one’s feelings alerts one to the fact that some positive emotion is underway. 
But in order to determine what specific emotion one is having, one must draw on further 
evidence. Gilbert Ryle was perhaps the most influential proponent of this view. As Ryle 
put it, “[p]ains do not arrive already hallmarked ‘rheumatic’, nor do throbs arrive already 
hallmarked ‘compassionate’.” And since the feeling of an emotion doesn’t “arrive 
hallmarked”, one must use other evidence to self-ascribe the emotion. Thus, “[w]hen a 
person reports a chill of disquiet or a tug of commiseration, he is not merely reporting a 
feeling; he is giving a diagnosis of it….”. And as each emotion shares its phenomenology 
with other states, it is easy to “diagnose as a twinge of remorse what is actually a twinge 
of fear”, or to “ascribe to dyspepsia a feeling which is really a sign of anxiety” (Ryle 
1949, p. 90).26 
26 Ryle’s view anticipates the famous study in Schachter and Singer (1962). In Section 3.2.3, I’ll discuss 
why I find no challenge in the results of that study. 
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In the mountaintop case, what further evidence might one be drawing on to 
“diagnose” one’s feelings as a state of longing rather than some other state? Two salient 
factors are, first, one’s environment, and second, one’s behavior. In the mountaintop case, 
one is in an environment in which longing is typical, even paradigmatic. Moreover, one 
can observe one’s own behavioral cues – one’s attention is fixed, one wants to stay put, to 
snap a photograph, and so on.   
Accordingly, a case that would decide between these two explanations would be a 
case in which the subject has a conscious emotional experience in addition to emotional 
self-knowledge, but lacks access to these further sources of evidence. Fortunately, such 
cases are available. One example comes from Michael Gazzaniga’s classic research on 
split-brain patients. One patient, V.P., was shown a video of violent acts, such as 
someone shoving a stranger off a balcony, or throwing a Molotov cocktail. But this 
footage was only shown to the right hemisphere, where V.P.’s linguistic abilities were 
almost entirely deficient. However, V.P.’s right hemisphere was still communicating with 
his linguistically competent left hemisphere:   
 
V.P.: I don’t really know what I saw. I think I just saw a white flash. 
 
Experimenter: “Were there people in it?” 
 
V.P.: “I don’t think so. Maybe just some trees, red trees, like in the fall.” 
 
Experimenter: “Did it make you feel any emotion?” 
 
V.P.: “I don’t really know why, but I’m kind of scared. I feel jumpy. I think maybe I 
don’t like this room, or maybe it’s you, you’re getting me nervous.” 
 
V.P. turned to female experimenter and in private said: “I know I like Dr. Gazzaniga but 
right now I’m scared of him for some reason” (Gazzaniga and Smiley 1984, p. 203). 
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V.P. identified his emotion as fear or nervousness, it seems, simply on the basis of what
he was feeling, even though he had no idea what he was afraid of. V. P. was not in a 
scenario typical of fear. He can be seen casting about to find a suitable object of fear to 
explain why he feels as he does. This suggests that he identifies his emotion as fear prior 
to ascertaining what his fear is about and whether fear is a typical response to his 
environment. Moreover, V. P.’s behavior is not especially salient in this case. He is 
neither fighting nor fleeing.  The primary behavior on display is that of searching for an 
explanation of one’s emotional state. But this is not a behavior distinctive of fear.  All 
V.P. has to go on, then, is what he feels.27
I conclude, therefore, that the feeling of an emotion is often sufficient evidence 
for knowing what emotion one is having. This provides inductive evidence, which, in 
addition to the enumerative induction, shows that the Uniqueness Thesis is highly 
plausible. Why, then, have so many rejected the Uniqueness Thesis? In the next section 
I’ll address several of the most influential objections. 
27 I take it that what I say here is compatible with a range of theories about the nature of self-knowledge. 
Even Carruthers (2011), who channels important aspects of Ryle’s view in holding that self-knowledge of 
propositional attitudes is always indirect or inferential, allows that phenomenal features of affective states 
can form the basis of emotional self-knowledge (see Carruthers 2011, Ch. 5). For Carruthers, the 
knowledge that one is afraid can be based on feelings, but the knowledge that one is afraid that p cannot 
(not fully, at any rate). Even Gallois (1996), who holds that self-knowledge of mental states is in some 
sense based on the standards of rationality for those states, allows that emotions can be individuated by 
their respective feelings, and that accordingly such feelings can sometimes serve as the basis of emotional 
self-knowledge. These two accounts are especially worth mentioning, since, out of all the accounts of self-
knowledge, these two seem to be the least likely to end up being friendly to the claim that feelings can 
serve as the basis of emotional self-knowledge. 
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3.2.3 OBJECTIONS TO THE UNIQUENESS THESIS 
 
 
In this section, I will address five influential objections against the Uniqueness Thesis, 
and show that their influence is underserved.  
First, one influential objection comes from the famous study in Schachter and 
Singer (1962). Allegedly, subjects induced with the same feelings self-ascribed different 
emotions based on environmental differences. However, this study failed to replicate on 
numerous occasions (e.g., Marshall 1976, Marshall and Zimbardo 1979, and Maslach 
1979).28 The study is therefore widely discredited and poses no empirical challenge to the 
Uniqueness Thesis. 
A second, perhaps tempting objection is that one can have an emotion without 
experiencing any feelings at all, as with non-conscious or long-term emotions. However, 
this objection has no traction with the Uniqueness Thesis. The Uniqueness Thesis doesn’t 
say that emotions are always conscious, but that when they are conscious, they have 
distinctive feelings. Instead, what this objection is relevant to is the feeling theory of 
emotion, which identifies emotions with their respective feelings.29 The feeling theory 
entails the Uniqueness Thesis, but not vice versa. In this chapter I remain neutral on the 
feeling theory. 
A third objection is that, if feelings provide sufficient evidence for self-ascriptions 
of emotion, then there is a puzzle as to how it is that people are sometimes mistaken 
about what emotion they are feeling. However, this is not difficult to explain, although 
we should not expect just one answer. In some cases, people have motivations for 
                                                
28 For more thorough discussion, see Prinz (2004, pp. 70-71). Failure to replicate aside, the Schachter and 
Singer study has also met with several devastating objections, notably in Griffiths (1994, p. 82-83), 
Levenson (2003, pp. 212-213), and Reisenzein (1983). 
29 For further criticism of the feeling theory, see Sizer (2006), which develops a novel line of objection. 
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actively ignoring the evidence of their feelings, as in cases of self-deception. In other 
cases, people are distracted or imperfectly attentive to their feelings. In still other cases, 
emotions have subtle differences in their phenomenal signatures, as in the case of wonder 
and awe. Awe involves a shrinking paralyzed feeling when compared with wonder, 
which is more like an outward-reaching fascination (Nussbaum 2001, p. 54, n. 53). But 
this phenomenal difference is subtle. So, people might easily be mistaken in such a case, 
if they are only judging on the basis of what they feel. Moreover, some individuals are 
just not skilled at classifying what emotion they are experiencing. The mere fact that two 
states are phenomenally different does not mean we will always be good at detecting and 
describing the phenomenal difference. 
A fourth objection is that emotions are distinguished on the basis of their logic, 
rather than their phenomenal properties. For instance, consider shame and 
embarrassment. Robert Solomon writes that “the feelings and sensations involved in the 
two emotions are of little relevance in discriminating between [them]”. Instead, we 
discriminate between shame and embarrassment based on “the ‘logic’ of the situation” 
(Solomon 1976, p. 98). In embarrassment, we are put in an awkward position but are not 
responsible for it, while in shame we are responsible for whatever the evil is that has 
arisen. However, it is compatible with the Uniqueness Thesis that there are other ways to 
individuate emotions besides their respective feelings. Moreover, there are phenomenal 
differences between shame and embarrassment, even though they are subtle. For starters, 
shame is typically more painful than embarrassment, and feels heavier. Embarrassment 
flushes the face while shame sinks in the guts. In embarrassment one feels stiff and 
squirmy; in shame one feels cowered down. 
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Fifth, and finally, it is often objected that some emotions share their bodily 
phenomenology with each other. For instance, Solomon writes that “feelings are never 
sufficient to identify or to differentiate emotions…”, since we can have “all the 
symptoms of emotionality, for example, flushing, pulsing” without having any emotion 
(Solomon 1976, p. 99; see also Nussbaum 2001, pp. 60-61). However, while emotional 
experience often co-occurs with bodily feelings, bodily feelings are not the only 
phenomenal properties the Uniqueness Thesis can appeal to. Here, I understand bodily 
feelings in terms of felt location: A feeling is bodily iff the feeling is in some way 
experienced as located in the body. So, a stomachache is felt to be located in the stomach. 
Even a fever, which doesn’t have a specific location, is felt to pervade the whole body. 
Following Stocker (1983), I’ll call non-bodily feelings psychic. So, psychic feelings are 
feelings that are not bodily, which means they are not experienced as being located in the 
body.   
While I can’t offer a systematic argument here, it is plausible that there are 
psychic feelings. For starters, there are a variety of psychological disorders that are best 
explained in terms of phenomenological disturbances that require some notion of psychic 
feelings. For instance, in depersonalization, many subjects report that the world as they 
visually experience it is unreal or dreamlike.30 These reports are extremely robust, and 
can’t be explained away as mere hyperbole (Guralnik et al. 2000; Hunter et al. 2004; 
Simeon et al. 1997; Simeon et al. 2000). Are these subjects simply reporting a judgment? 
That is implausible, since the subjects have ‘intact reality testing’, meaning they know 
                                                
30 These symptoms are called “derealization” (see Sierra et al. 2002). To date, there is no published, 
properly-thorough catalogue of derealized patients’ reports of their symptoms, but for some examples refer 
to the Cambridge Depersonalization Scale in Simeon and Abugel (2006), pp. 75-76. Helpful overviews of 
depersonalization can be found in Sierra (2009), Simeon (2004), and Simeon and Abugel (2006). Note that 
not all subjects with depersonalization report derealization symptoms. 
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they are experiencing a disturbed form of consciousness. They know they are not actually 
in an unreal dream-world. So, depersonalized subjects are reporting an experience.  
Plausibly, then, these subjects have either lost a feeling of reality that normal observers 
have, or they have gained a feeling of unreality. But there is no evidence suggesting these 
feelings of unreality are experienced as located in the body. For instance, there is no 
evidence that these subjects have abnormalities in the autonomic nervous system (which 
controls a range of bodily processes such as arousal). Indeed, it is difficult to see how 
such feelings could be specific to a bodily region.31 
Given that there are psychic feelings, a proponent of the Uniqueness Thesis can 
take the view that emotional phenomenology is at least partly constituted by psychic 
feelings. Thus, even if, as Solomon claims, some emotions share their bodily feelings, 
this wouldn’t rule out that those emotions can be individuated by their respective psychic 
feelings. 
In sum, I’ve offered two arguments for the claim that emotions have type-
individuating feelings, an enumerative induction and an inductive argument from self-
knowledge. I have also argued that the most influential objections against the Uniqueness 
Thesis can be overcome. Thus, it is plausible that emotions can be individuated by their 
phenomenal properties. And as we saw in the previous section, emotions can also be 
individuated based on their fittingness conditions. With these two claims in place, we 
now have the materials needed to press the Argument from Massive Coincidence. Why, 
after all, can emotions be type-individuated in these two ways? Is it a mere coincidence, 
31 For further examples of psychiatric disorders that warrant the notion of psychic feelings, see Bayne 
(2011), McLaughlin (2009), and Ratcliffe (2008). 
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or is there some explanatory relation between an emotion’s fittingness conditions and its 
phenomenal character? In the next section, I will argue the latter.  
 
 
 
3.3 THIRD PREMISE: IS THE MASSIVE COINCIDENCE A MERE COINCIDENCE? 
 
 
In this section, I’ll argue for premise 3. Could it just be a coincidence that both fittingness 
and phenomenal character differentiate emotions? Certainly, coincidences happen. But it 
is a stunning coincidence that all emotions can be differentiated by fittingness conditions 
and phenomenal character.  
Indeed, it is plausible that the Massive Coincidence is a necessary fact, and the 
fittingness conditions and the phenomenal character of an emotion co-vary across 
possible worlds. There is no possible world in which anger is a fitting response to, say, 
goods contained in one’s future (as such). There is no possible world in which hope is a 
fitting response to, say, the comical (as such). There is no possible world in which fear is 
the fitting response to, say, the achievements of one’s children (as such). Of course, there 
are possible worlds in which the achievements of one’s children happen to indicate 
danger. There are worlds in which children use their achievements to harm their parents. 
But that’s what the “as such” is for. Fear can be a fitting response to the achievements of 
one’s children as likely dangers but not as the achievements of one’s children. So, the 
fittingness conditions of an emotion are a necessary feature of it. Plausibly, an emotion’s 
phenomenal character is also a necessary feature of it. There is no possible world in 
which anger feels like amusement, or relief feels like terror, or grief like gratitude. As 
Tim Crane puts it, we should not accept “the possibility that there is a world in which 
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contentment feels to someone as anxiety feels to me” (Crane 1998, p. 9). So, not only do 
emotions have type-individuating phenomenal signatures, but they have them necessarily. 
So, in every possible world emotions can be differentiated both by fittingness conditions 
and by phenomenal character. We should expect an explanation of this.  
One might object here that necessary facts do not need to be explained. They are 
necessary! Or rather, if some fact obtains in the actual world, and we discover that it is 
necessary, that is the explanation of why it obtains. There is no further question as to 
what explains the necessity. So, the necessity of the Massive Coincidence removes, rather 
than intensifies, the need for an explanation.  
However, it is just not correct that necessities never need to be explained. The 
proposition (A) ‘2 + 2 = 4’ is a necessary fact. So is the proposition (B) ‘either 2 + 2 = 4, 
or pigs can fly’. But it is plausible that A in some sense explains B. Moreover, it is 
commonplace that there are explanations of mathematical facts.32  
Perhaps the more pressing question is why we should expect these two necessary 
properties of emotion to figure in the same explanation, rather than being fully explained 
by independent, unrelated factors. Why should we expect a unifying explanation? In 
response, I grant that there can be non-unifying explanations. However, it is plausible 
that, all things being equal, a unifying explanation is preferable to a non-unifying 
explanation. I take this to be a fact about explanation in general. That is why, for 
instance, the development of a unifying explanation of electricity and magnetism marked 
a feat of explanatory progress. As Michael Friedman remarks: 
 
                                                
32 See the conversation with mathematician Michael Atiyah in Gray and Wilson (2001), especially pp. 18-
20. 
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[S]cience increases our understanding of the world by reducing the total number of 
independent phenomena that we have to accept as ultimate or given. A world with fewer 
independent phenomena is, other things equal, more comprehensible than one with more 
(Friedman 1974, p. 15). 
 
 
To say this is not to endorse a unificationist theory of explanation (Friedman 1974, 
Kitcher 1981). It is simply to say that unification is one explanatory virtue among others. 
This allows that in deciding which explanation is best, we must consider other 
explanatory virtues as well, such as breadth or predictive power. But if two explanations 
are equal in these virtues, then a difference in unification can decide between them.  
Moreover, the virtue of unification does not simply apply to explanations of 
contingent causal phenomena, since necessities are similarly in need of explanation, 
albeit, perhaps, explanations of a different sort. Presumably, a unifying explanation of the 
Massive Coincidence will involve some notion of ontological or metaphysical 
dependence, rather than causation. For instance—and this is just an example—one 
unifying explanation would have it that both the fittingness conditions of an emotion and 
its phenomenal character are ontologically dependent on its evaluative content. Now, 
how best to understand the notion of ontological dependence here is as important as it is 
complicated. Perhaps it is best understood in terms of grounding (Fine 2001). However, 
for our purposes such matters need not be decided. At present, the question is why we 
should expect a unifying explanation of the fittingness conditions and phenomenal 
character of an emotion, and my response is just that unification is in general an 
explanatory virtue. The question is, then, are there plausible unifying explanations of the 
Massive Coincidence? In the next section I will turn to this. 
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3.4 FOURTH PREMISE: EXPLAINING THE MASSIVE COINCIDENCE 
 
 
There are three initially viable unifying explanations that are worth considering. The first 
two entail the Evaluative Content Thesis, while the third is totally independent of the 
Evaluative Content Thesis. I want to show that the unifying explanations that entail the 
Evaluative Content Thesis are better off than the unifying explanation that doesn’t. 
For starters, it is easy to see how, if emotions have evaluative content, this would 
explain their fittingness conditions. An emotion’s fittingness conditions would simply be 
accuracy conditions: an emotion is fitting iff it correctly attributes an evaluative property 
to its object. It is in virtue of attributing an evaluative property that an emotion becomes 
assessable for correctness. As is clear, on the Evaluative Content Thesis, the explanatory 
relation between evaluative content and fittingness is simple and direct. 
Importantly, in order for the representational content of emotion to determine its 
fittingness conditions, it would need to be evaluative content. Otherwise, it is difficult to 
see how an emotion’s content could explain its fittingness conditions. If, say, the Body 
Content Thesis is correct, and the content of anger is merely that my blood pressure is 
rising, etc., then this content wouldn’t explain why anger should be felt only in response 
to wrongs and offenses. Alternatively, if the Propositional Content Thesis is correct, this, 
too, would be unable to explain the fittingness conditions of emotion in terms of 
representational content. (It may be able to explain fittingness conditions in some other 
way, but not in terms of representational content.) After all, different instances of anger 
can have very different propositions as their objects, but the evaluative property in their 
fittingness conditions remains the same. One’s anger that Suzy took the last beer and 
one’s anger that Leo didn’t win the Oscar are both fitting only if these events are wrongs 
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or offenses. Thus, the Body Content Thesis and the Propositional Content Thesis are not 
able to explain the fittingness of emotion in terms of representational content, because 
they do not appeal to evaluative representational content. 
So far, we’ve seen that evaluative content can explain the fittingness of emotion. 
But in order to find a unifying explanation, there must also be an explanatory relation 
between evaluative content and the phenomenology of emotion. There are two possible 
views here, depending on whether evaluative content or phenomenology has explanatory 
priority.  
On the first view, evaluative content explains emotional phenomenology. Most 
representationalists, say, about perceptual experience hold a view with this structure. 
Content determines both the phenomenal character of perceptual experience, and its 
correctness conditions (e.g., Siegel 2011). On this view, then, it is in virtue of 
representing dangers that fear feels as it does, and has the fittingness conditions it does. 
Of course, more would need to be said to articulate the way in which content explains 
phenomenology. But accounts of this have been thoroughly developed by 
representationalists with respect to other aspects of consciousness, such as perceptual 
experience. Proponents of the Evaluative Content Thesis have the advantage of being 
able to draw on such accounts in characterizing the way in which the evaluative content 
of an emotion explains its phenomenology.  
An alternative view reverses the order of explanation, and holds that it is the 
phenomenal character of an emotion that explains its evaluative content. This account 
relies on the notion of phenomenal intentionality (Chalmers 2004, 2006; Kriegel 2007, 
2013; Horgan and Tienson 2002; and Loar 2003). A state has phenomenal intentionality 
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iff that state has intentional properties as well as phenomenal properties, and that state has 
(at least some of its) intentional properties in virtue of (at least some of its) phenomenal 
properties. Those who claim that some states have phenomenal intentionality typically 
have the following intuition: If there were a brain in a vat who was my phenomenal 
duplicate, it would also thereby share many of my intentional properties as well. Thus, 
advocates of phenomenal intentionality propose a break with the dominant view that 
content is determined by external, environmental factors.33 
Could emotional experience have phenomenal intentionality? Assuming that some 
states have phenomenal intentionality, it is plausible that emotions could as well. For 
instance, recall that emotional experience can be assessed in terms of valence and 
intensity. Perhaps the valence of an emotion determines whether it represents its object as 
good or bad, while the intensity of an emotion determines how good or bad the emotion 
represents its object as being. So, being slightly upset about F represents F as somewhat 
bad, but being enraged about F represents F as being very bad. That explains why, if F is 
only a minor infraction, rage is unfitting—even though rage correctly represents F as bad 
in some way, rage attributes too much badness. 
But an emotion’s fittingness doesn’t simply depend on whether and to what 
degree the emotion’s object is good or bad. Rather, emotions have more determinate 
fittingness conditions than that. Anger and disgust can be comparably intense, and both 
are negatively valenced, but they still have differing fittingness conditions. That’s why 
you should be disgusted by cockroaches but not angry with them. So, if an emotion’s 
fittingness conditions are determined by its content, then emotions must have highly 
33 Of course, advocates of phenomenal intentionality are not the only ones who believe in narrow content, 
content that isn’t determined by external factors. For instance, some hold that functional properties can 
determine content independently of one’s environment (e.g., Harman 1982; Block 1986).  
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determinate evaluative content, since an emotion’s fittingness conditions are highly 
determinate. It can’t be the case that emotions simply represent their objects as having 
some degree of goodness or badness.34 Thus, if an emotion’s phenomenal character 
determines its content, then it must be in virtue of suitably determinate features of its 
phenomenal character. Fortunately, as we have seen in Section 3.2, emotional
phenomenology is highly determinate. Each emotion has a determinate phenomenal 
signature. So, on the present account, it must be in virtue of an emotion’s determinate 
phenomenal “tone” that the emotion has the determinate evaluative content it does. So, 
when you are moved with longing by the view from a mountaintop, your emotional 
experience represents the scene as sublime. And it has this content in virtue of the 
distinctive qualitative character of felt longing. On this view, then, an emotion’s 
phenomenal character determines its evaluative content, and its evaluative content 
determines its fittingness conditions. 
We have seen two initially viable accounts that use the evaluative content of 
emotion to unify its fittingness conditions and phenomenal character. Are there unifying 
explanations that do not make use of evaluative content? Such an explanation has 
recently been developed in Deonna and Teroni (2012; 2014; 2015; forthcoming). Deonna 
and Teroni hold that emotions are “experiences of our body as ready or poised to act in 
various ways towards an object” (Deonna and Teroni 2012, p. 80). The claim here is that 
an emotion is constituted by the feeling of one’s body preparing to respond to what the 
emotion is about. In this sense, emotions are “feelings of action readiness” (Frijda 1986). 
Accordingly, emotions can be type-individuated by the sorts of actions they prepare the 
34 This opposes Tye (2008), which claims that emotional experience represents less determinate evaluative 
properties like good and bad (although Tye allows that fear represents dangers). 
 Ballard, Icons of Value - 73 
body for. For instance, with fear, the associated action type is that which will “contribute 
to the neutralization of what provokes the fear” (Deonna and Teroni 2012, p. 80). While 
one may take any number of specific courses of action towards the growling dog, there is 
a behavioral theme, namely, that of neutralizing the dog’s impact. Thus, Deonna and 
Teroni hold that the action types associated with emotions are (i) determinate enough to 
individuate emotions, yet (ii) open-ended enough to allow for the diversity of specific 
actions one might engage in while emotional. 
Crucially, for Deonna and Teroni, an emotion’s proprietary action type is what 
determines its fittingness conditions. They agree that, in fearing the growling dog, the 
fittingness of one’s fear depends on the dangerousness of the dog. But this is so, they 
claim, “precisely because [fear] consists in feeling the body’s readiness to act so as to 
diminish the dog’s likely impact on it…, and this felt attitude is correct if and only if the 
dog is dangerous.” Similarly, they agree that the fittingness of anger towards someone 
depends on her offensiveness. But this is so, they claim, “precisely because it consists in 
feeling the body’s readiness to act so as to retaliate one way or another, and this felt 
attitude is correct if and only if the person is or has been offensive.” These remarks are 
meant to explain “the fact that distinct emotions are correct only when their object 
exhibits a specific evaluative property” (Deonna and Teroni 2012, p. 81).  
The idea here is that the fittingness conditions of the action type associated with 
an emotion explain the fittingness conditions of the emotion itself. Emotions, we might 
say, inherit their fittingness conditions from their associated action types. And the 
phenomenology of emotion just is the phenomenology of preparing to engage in the 
relevant action type. So, the phenomenology of an emotion explains its fittingness 
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conditions, without any reference to evaluative representation. This view we may call the 
Motivation Thesis.  
However, there is good reason to reject the Motivation Thesis. It isn’t clear that 
the action types associated with emotions are fine-grained enough to track the fittingness 
conditions associated with emotions. For instance, consider fear and disgust. Fear is 
fitting when directed at the dangerous, disgust when directed at the foul. But both of 
these emotions seem to motivate neutralizing the impact of the emotion object. Against 
this, Scarantino (2014, p. 181) claims that in fear, one wants to avoid the object, while in 
disgust, one is concerned to remove the object. However, this distinction doesn’t seem to 
be genuine. When one encounters something disgusting in an open meadow, for instance, 
there is no urge to remove the object, but simply to avoid it. Likewise, when one 
encounters a dangerous snake in one’s apartment, one may well respond by removing it. 
In both emotions, it is neutralizing the impact of the object that forms the behavioral 
theme. Of course, the proponent of the Motivation Thesis might respond, “it turns out 
that fear and disgust have the same fittingness conditions then!”. But I take it this 
admission involves an explanatory cost, since fear and disgust do seem to have different 
fittingness conditions and are widely regarded as such. Immanent societal collapse is the 
appropriate object of fear but not disgust.  
For a further example, consider awe and gratitude. Awe is fitting when directed at 
the sublime, and gratitude is fitting when directed at undeserved benefits offered in good 
will. These are different emotions with different fittingness conditions, but it is hard to 
see the difference between their action types. In both awe and gratitude, one experiences 
oneself as small or shrinking or vulnerable, and one wants to celebrate the emotion 
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object, to acknowledge how great it is. It might be replied that in gratitude, one doesn’t 
merely want to celebrate the emotion object, one wants to offer payback. However, that 
desire is not universal to gratitude, but is in fact antithetical to it, since payback is a way 
of lifting the burden of being an undeserving beneficiary. Indeed, it is usually 
inappropriate—indeed, ungrateful—to offer payback to one’s benefactor for the gift she 
has given. So, payback behaviors are often inappropriate when gratitude is called for, and 
thus the fittingness conditions of payback behaviors cannot explain the fittingness 
conditions of gratitude. Of course, in gratitude it is usually appropriate to give something 
back, not as payment but as a symbol of the gratitude one feels. Often a warm ‘thank you’ 
will do. And yet the same symbolic desire is present in awe (and many other emotions as 
well). When awed by the sea, one searches for some way to express one’s awe. One 
wants to sing or dance or paint or take a picture or linger all morning. These are ways of 
acknowledging and celebrating the sublimity of the things that awe us. It seems, then, 
that awe and gratitude have clearly differing fittingness conditions, while their associated 
action type is difficult to distinguish.  
Now, one might respond to these cases by appealing to more specific behaviors 
typical of these emotions. However, it is implausible that the specific behaviors 
motivated by emotions can explain an emotion’s fittingness conditions. That’s because, 
when specific emotional behaviors are considered, the fittingness of the emotion comes 
apart from the fittingness of the behavior. First off, fitting emotions can motivate 
unfitting behaviors. Consider anger. Often enough, situations that call for anger, and thus 
call for some retaliatory response, are situations in which the specific course one’s anger 
motivates is inappropriate. One overreacts. One punishes too much or too little or too 
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publically or too late. A second example is disgust. One’s disgust for rodents might lead 
one to unwittingly kill the last member of an endangered species. The disgust was 
appropriate, as was some effort to neutralize the impact of the rodent, and yet the specific 
behavior the disgust motivated was wrong. Conversely, unfitting emotions can motivate 
fitting behaviors. One’s unfitting fear of ghosts might motivate one to avoid littering in 
the cemetery. One’s unfitting sense of pride and achievement might motivate one to help 
people younger in their careers.  
Accordingly, the Motivation Thesis faces a dilemma. On the one hand, the 
Motivation Thesis can appeal to more general action types, but in that case, the action 
types associated with emotions are not fine-grained enough to track the fittingness 
conditions of emotions. On the other hand, the Motivation Thesis can appeal to more 
specific actions, but then the fittingness of the actions comes apart from the fittingness of 
the emotion. Either way, it looks implausible that action types can explain the fittingness 
conditions of emotion. 
By way of rejoinder, one might consider the cognitive patterns that are associated 
with emotions. Scarantino (2014) and Frijda (1986) speak of such cognitive patterns as 
“mental actions”, including them in the behavioral profile of emotion; and Deonna and 
Teroni (forthcoming, n8) concede that they may need to appeal to such mental actions in 
order to individuate emotions. For instance, consider the impact of emotion on what one 
fantasizes about. In anger, one might fantasize about standing up to one’s boss. In hope, 
one might fantasize about just how nice it will be to live in California. However, the same 
dilemma from above will arise in the case of fantasies. For, such fantasizing is about 
some course of action or other. If the course of action is described in specific terms, its 
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fittingness will be divorceable form the fittingness of the emotion associated with it. If 
described in general terms, the course of action will not be fine-grained enough to 
distinguish the fittingness conditions of emotions.  
Alternatively, if one wants to make use of cognitive patterns, one might appeal to 
the impact of emotion on attention. In awe, for instance, one is transfixed on the emotion 
object.35 However, many emotions capture attention in this way, such as fear, disgust, 
grief, regret, resentment, amusement, hope, pride, and loving affection. Thus, the appeal 
to cognitive patterns does not seem promising as a way to make fine distinctions. 
I conclude, therefore, that the best unifying explanation makes use of the 
Evaluative Content Thesis. Without evaluative content, it is difficult to articulate a 
plausible explanatory relation between the fittingness conditions of an emotion and its 
phenomenal character. 
 
 
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
 
 
I’ve argued that each emotion necessarily has its own proprietary feel, and 
necessarily has its own proprietary fittingness conditions. We should not accept this as a 
brute coincidence unless all unifying explanations are implausible. Fortunately, there are 
some (prima facie) plausible explanations of the coincidence. However, all plausible 
explanations accept that emotional experience represents evaluative properties. If 
emotions merely represent their propositional contents, or bodily states, or if they 
                                                
35 Suggested by Fabrice Teroni (in conversation). 
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represent nothing at all, then we cannot explain how it is that the phenomenal character 
and the fittingness conditions of an emotion co-vary across possible worlds.  
This has implications for several other debates some of which I have mentioned at 
the outset. First, this directly constrains our theorizing about emotions. Second, this opens 
interesting prospects in the epistemology of value. Perhaps emotional experience is 
capable of justifying evaluative beliefs that affirm their content. Third, this is a victory 
for representationalists, since it establishes an explanatory relation between content and 
phenomenology.  
Yet a further implication is this: emotional experience has non-conceptual 
content, that is, content that is represented independently of the subject having the 
relevant concepts. For, the Argument from Massive Coincidence reiterates in the case of 
children. The emotions of children can be individuated by their fittingness conditions. 
And presumably the emotions of children can be individuated by their phenomenal 
properties as well, given that adult human emotions can be. So, the Argument from 
Massive Coincidence will apply to the emotions of children, at ages where it is plausible 
that evaluative concepts are lacking. So, a child’s experience of anger represents 
something as a wrong or an offense, prior to the child having concepts of those evaluative 
properties. Accordingly, those who claim that all content is conceptual must find a way to 
either reject the Argument from Massive Coincidence, or its extension to the case of child 
emotion. 
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4.0 EMOTIONS AS ICONS OF VALUE 
 
 
 
 
It is highly intuitive that there is a deep connection between emotion and value, between 
fear and harm, anger and injustice, disgust and foulness, shame and shamefulness, 
admiration and beauty, longing and the sublime. What exactly is this connection, and in 
virtue of what does it obtain? Many non-realist theories of value offer ready answers. For 
instance, according to sentimentalists, our emotions or sentiments in some way construct 
the evaluative facts (D’Arms 2013; D’Arms and Jacobson 2000, 2006; Lewis 1989; 
Mulligan 1998; Prinz 2008). If sentimentalists are right, it is easy to see what the 
emotion-value connection is. However, many reject sentimentalism, opting instead for 
realist theories of value. Here, a theory of value is realist iff it holds that the evaluative 
facts obtain independently of how we represent or respond to them, including how we 
emotionally respond (Audi 2005; Boyd 1988; Brink 1989; Enoch 2011; Huemer 2005; 
Jackson 1998; Nagel 1986; Parfit 2011; Scanlon 2014; Shafer-Landau 2003). 
 Importantly, it is less obvious how a realist theory can account for the emotion-
value connection. One option is the so-called sensibility theory (McDowell 1985; 
Wiggins 1976). This view provides an explicit account of the emotion-value connection: 
Values can be fully explained in terms of the emotions they merit, and emotions in terms 
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of the values that merit them.36 However, while this view has attractions, it faces 
challenges that make it reasonable to consider alternatives. First, the view embraces an 
explanatory circle that many will find unattractive, although defenders of the view regard 
it as benign. Second, this view faces the so-called “wrong kind of reason” problem (Crisp 
2000), and although there have been several attempts to address the problem, it remains 
unclear whether it can be put to rest.37 In light of these considerations, it is worth 
considering how realists might offer an alternative account of the emotion-value 
connection. 
Still, one might take a lead from the sensibility theory, and propose that there is 
an easy way the realist can explain the emotion-value connection that silences the need 
for any further theorizing: Values make emotions fitting (appropriate, reasonable, etc.). 
Fear is the fitting response to impending harm, anger to injustice, etc. This is not to say, 
as the sensibility theory does, that values can be fully explained in terms of the emotions 
they make fitting. That values make emotions fitting is just one thing about them. Indeed, 
this makes a fairly obvious claim about the emotion-value connection.  
However, this explanation raises the further question: What is it that makes it the 
case that, say, fear is the fitting response to impending harm? Why not disgust or 
admiration instead? After all, plausibly this is not a brute fact. We should expect there to 
be an explanation. 
36 Although this view makes reference to our emotional responses, it can be regarded as a realist position. 
Even if everyone were happy about some evil act, the act could still be an evil, as long as whether it merits 
happiness does not depend on how people actually respond to it.  
37 Crisp (2000) considers the example of a demon who will punish you unless you desire to swallow a cup 
of mud. Since this gives you good reason to desire this, such a desire seems to be merited, but clearly this is 
not the kind of reason the sensibility theorist had in mind. (This problem applies equally to sentimentalists 
such as D’Arms and Jacobson.) Thus, for those who wish to analyze values in terms of the emotions they 
give us reasons for (or merit, or make fitting, etc.), it is pressing to say what the right kinds of reasons are. 
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Fortunately, the dominant view of emotion at present affords us such an 
explanation. On this view, emotions are perceptual states that represent evaluative 
properties, and this is what explains their fittingness conditions (Prinz 2004; Roberts 
2003; Tappolet 2012; Tye 2008). The fittingness of emotion is thus understood as a kind 
of accuracy: fitting emotions are those that accurately represent evaluative properties. For 
instance, perhaps fear perceptually represents its objects as dangerous, and that is why 
fear is a fitting response to the dangerous. Call this the perceptual theory. The perceptual 
theory was preceded by the view that emotions are evaluative judgments, but the 
perceptual theory has gained favor largely because of the ways emotions seem to come 
apart from evaluative judgments, as when you fear an insect you know to be perfectly 
safe.   
If emotions are evaluative perceptions, then this furnishes an account of the 
emotion-value connection, and it even comes with an epistemological bonus: perhaps 
emotional experience provides evaluative justification or even knowledge on the model 
of sense perception. Recently, many realists have embraced the perceptual theory, or 
something like it, partly in light of this epistemological promise (Cowan 2015; Cuneo 
2006; Dancy 2014; Döring 2003; Johnston 2001; Milona 2016; Oddie 2005; Pelser 2014; 
Roberts 2013; Tolhurst 1991; Wedgwood 2007). As Mark Johnston remarks: 
[W]e desire other things and other people, we are struck by their appeal, we are taken
with them. This is part of how things are manifest to us: part of their appearing or
presenting is their presenting to us in determinate ways and to various degrees appealing
or repulsive. On the face of it, appeal is as much a manifest quality as shape, size, color
and motion (Johnston 2001, p. 188).
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The major difference between this view and the sensibility theory is that here, values are 
thought to be monadic properties out there in the world, and the role of emotional 
experience is simply the epistemological one of detecting them, much like the role of 
visual experience with respect to primary qualities.  
If emotions represent values, however, then here again we should expect an 
explanation as to why. Plausibly, this is not a brute fact, any more than the fittingness of 
emotion is. After all, a fundamental project in the philosophy of mind is to explain what it 
is that determines the contents of mental states. It is reasonable to expect some semantic 
theory or other to be able to explain the evaluative content of emotion.38 Indeed, the view 
that emotions are evaluative perceptions is not complete until coupled with such a 
semantic theory. However, I will argue that, on current semantic theories, emotions turn 
out to have evaluative content in a way that is extremely arbitrary (in a sense to be 
explained); and thus, the deep connection between emotion and value is fumbled mid-
field.  
Accordingly, realists face a dilemma, provided they wish to use the perceptual 
theory to explain the emotion-value connection. On the one hand, if we have no mental 
semantics for the evaluative content of emotion, then the perceptual theory remains 
underdeveloped. On the other hand, current semantic theories make the relation between 
emotion and value highly arbitrary, and so devastate the perceptual theory’s ability to 
explain the emotion-value connection (so I will argue).  
38 But for a skeptical view about the project of explaining mental content, see Stich (1996), Ch. 5. 
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In this chapter, I will address this problem by suggesting how we can understand 
the semantics of emotion without treating their evaluative content as arbitrary. My central 
claim is that emotions are icons of value. Emotions represent values in part because they 
resemble them.39 That is why there is a deep connection between emotion and value, and 
I will explain this connection in a way that is amenable even to the most robust forms of 
realism. 
Although I will explain iconicity later on, here I offer the following loose 
definition: A representation is iconic iff in order to fully explain its content we must in 
some way appeal to the fact that it replicates certain features of what it represents. 
Importantly, note that I do not claim iconicity is either necessary or sufficient for 
representation, only that it sometimes partly explains why a mental state has the content it 
does, and that in the case of emotion, it can get us very far indeed. 
In what follows, I will simply take for granted that emotions represent evaluative 
properties, and that they do so perceptually. I am not trying to establish the perceptual 
theory from scratch, only to enhance it with a semantics that can respect the emotion-
value connection. 
In section 4.1, I will discuss current semantic theories and show how it is they 
treat emotions as having an arbitrary link to the values they represent. In section 4.2, I 
will sketch the idea that emotions are icons of value, and show how this better respects 
the emotion-value connection. In section 4.3, I will bolster my view by specifying 
features of emotion that bear iconic relations to value.  
39 Nozick (1989) briefly discusses this idea (pp. 93-98), but to-date there is no version of the view brought 
into maturity. 
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4.1 THE PROBLEM WITH CURRENT MENTAL SEMANTICS 
 
 
If emotions represent values, there will be some explanation to why. The most developed 
answer to this is due to Prinz (2004), and accordingly I will focus on his account, and 
show that it fails to explain an important aspect of the way emotions represent values. 
Importantly, this is not a quirk of Prinz’ view. Since he offers a fairly direct application 
of informational semantics to emotions, my criticism will apply to informational 
semantics more generally. The upshot is that those who wish to hold the perceptual 
theory of emotion must find an alternative mental semantics. 
 
4.1.1 PRINZ’ SEMANTICS FOR EMOTION 
 
 
Following Dretske (1981, 1995), Prinz holds that “a mental representation is a mental 
state that is reliably caused by something and has been set in place by learning or 
evolution to detect that thing.” (2004, p. 54). Now, Prinz speaks of reliable causation 
here. Elsewhere he speaks of reliable co-occurrence, and I will use this term in order to 
respect the view that values are causally inefficacious. Accordingly, on Prinz’ view, for 
emotions to represent evaluative properties, it must be the case that they (a) reliably co-
occur with value, and (b) have the function of detecting values. For instance, fear 
represents threats because it reliably co-occurs with threats, and has the function of 
detecting them.  
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This much is typical information semantics, but the distinctive thing about Prinz’ 
view is that he claims emotions detect values by monitoring the subject’s bodily states:  
Each emotion is both an internal body monitor and a detector of dangers, threats, losses, 
or other matters of concern. Emotions are gut reactions; they use our bodies to tell us how 
we are faring in the world (2004, p. 70). 
Thus, emotions detect values by tracking changes in the body. The bodily changes in 
question, of course, are not simple processes like the mere racing of the heart. Rather, the 
idea is that each emotion has a unique and therefore suitably complex configuration of 
bodily symptoms. Each emotion has a somatic signature. (The plausibility of this is of 
course a controversy as old as the James-Lange theory itself.) 
However, I will argue that this approach to the content of emotion fails to explain 
something important about the way emotional experience represents values, and in what 
follows I will articulate just what that is. 
4.1.2 ARBITRARINESS OF REPRESENTATIONAL FORMAT 
Representations can have the same content but differ in format. I can warn you the 
bandits are coming by uttering this in English, but I can also use smoke signals—same 
content, different format. Some formats exhibit interesting differences. Consider the 
difference between linguistic and imagistic formats. The English word ‘duck’ refers to 
ducks, but ‘frog’ would have done just as well. In contrast, a drawing of a duck can be 
used to refer to ducks, but a drawing of a frog would not have done just as well. Of 
course, you can use an image of a frog to refer to ducks. But then you would be treating 
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the image as a word and not as an image. To capture this distinction, I will say that the 
relation between a word and its content is arbitrary,40 while the relation between an 
image and its content—when the image is used as an image—is non-arbitrary.  
This contrast between words and images has often been noticed. For instance, as 
Greenberg (2013) remarks, “The relationship between a drawing, photograph, or 
perceptual representation of a scene and the scene itself is one of intimate 
correspondence, nothing like the stipulative association between a word and its 
denotation” (p. 216). 
One might resist this. According to an influential view from the 20th century, 
pictures are governed by conventions in much the way that languages are, and so they are 
just as arbitrary as, say, English sentences41 (Bryson 1983; Goodman 1968;42 Robinson 
1979; Wollheim 1970). However, following Abell (2005), we should reject this view. If 
convention governed picture content, then it would have to do so by governing basic 
elements of pictures, such as color and shape. That’s because pictures are generative. We 
can recombine basic color and shape to depict a vast range of things. So, we have to 
understand convention as governing the meanings of these basic picture elements, as well 
as how they are combined. However, this runs into a problem when combined with a 
plausible view of linguistic convention. On this view, a convention is a widely adopted 
solution to a recurring coordination problem (Lewis 1969). Importantly, one aspect of 
this view is known as the salience condition: Those who adopt the solution must have a 
                                                
40 But there are two exceptions: onomatopoeia words and pictographic languages.  
41 I will often speak of specific languages, rather than language in general, since languages are extremely 
diverse. It seems a bit fast to assume that what we say about language, when it is logic and Latin that are 
foremost in our minds, will automatically apply, say, to the oracle bone script ancestral to modern Chinese 
(see Keightley 1996).  
42 It is tricky to classify Goodman as holding the conventionalist view, but for a defense of this 
classification, see Abell (2005), fn. 3. 
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salient conception of what the solution is (Schelling 1960). Roughly put, you can’t adopt 
a solution if you don’t know what it is and how it applies. The problem, however, is that 
when we consider the basic picture elements in isolation, we have no clue what they 
mean. For instance, in some pictures a black dot can represent an eye, but apart from the 
complete picture, we have no way of interpreting the meaning of the black dot. By itself, 
there is an indefinite number of things the dot could stand for. Thus, conventions for the 
meanings of basic picture elements cannot satisfy the salience condition, so any theory of 
convention that uses the salience condition or something like it will be incompatible with 
a conventionalist treatment of pictures.43 
It remains plausible, then, that ‘duck’ is arbitrary in a way that the duck image is 
not. But while the notion of arbitrariness is evident in examples, it is difficult to define it 
in precise terms, and it is worth getting a grip on the notion before we proceed. 
Here, convention is relevant in a different way. You might think that an arbitrary 
format just is one whose meaning is fully determined by convention. Certainly, this 
seems to be true for ‘duck’.44 However, many hold mental representation to be language-
like and therefore to involve an arbitrary format, yet it is implausible, to say the least, that 
mental content is determined by convention . Conventions themselves depend on 
intentional mental states. So, conventionally determined meaning does not provide a 
definition of arbitrariness, only an example, albeit a paradigmatic one. 
 
                                                
43 While admittedly the salience condition has its critics (Gilbert 1989; Skyrms 1996), it nevertheless 
continues to attract adherents as well (Binmore and Samuelson 2006; Sugden 1986/2004, 2011). 
44 Of course, this is not the story we find in the externalist semantics of Kripke and Putnam. But there is an 
obvious sense in which people knew what ‘water’ meant even before they knew that it referred to H2O (cf. 
Lycan 2006). This narrower kind of meaning is what I am discussing here. 
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In our example from earlier, the main difference between ‘duck’ and the duck 
image seems to be this: we can replace ‘duck’ with any other markings without in any 
way impacting the semantic content of the word. Any other markings could have just as 
well played the same conventionally determined role. In contrast, if we were to massively 
alter the image of a duck so that it more closely resembles a frog, this would seem to 
impact its semantic content. We can say, then, that arbitrariness is replaceability without 
semantic impact. To be more exact: 
 
Arbitrariness Definition: A format’s degree of arbitrariness = the degree to which we 
could alter the format without impacting its semantic value.   
   
A few remarks are in order. First, the idea of replaceability without semantic impact is 
probably not fundamental. More fundamental, probably, is the idea that, in part, format 
determines content. That would explain why we can impact semantic value by altering 
format. In virtue of which properties does the format partly determine content? What else 
must we add for full-blown representation? This gets us moving towards a substantive 
account of arbitrariness, and that is not our aim at present. We simply need to understand 
what arbitrariness is on a basic level, and how to assess the degree to which a 
representation has it.  
Second, in our definition, it is appropriate that we have degreed notions on both 
sides of the “equals” sign, since arbitrariness is degreed. A highly realistic satellite 
picture of a terrain is less arbitrary than a map that represents the locations of cities using 
dots. The dots on the map could have been anything else (empty circles, Xs, etc.) without 
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impacting the content of the map. If, however, we dramatically altered the spatial layout 
of the dots, this would impact the semantic value of the map. So, the dots are arbitrary but 
the spatial layout is not. Still, on the whole the map is less arbitrary than the English 
words. Of course, even realistic pictures admit of some arbitrariness. Whether someone’s 
hair is depicted as brown543 or brown544 will not make a semantic difference. 
Third, the notion of semantic value here is ambiguous between two very different 
interpretations: reference and accuracy. What it takes for an image to refer to a duck is 
not the same as what it takes for an image to accurately represent the duck. An 
inaccurate drawing of a duck may still refer to it. In what follows, I assume that some 
formats are non-arbitrary in both reference and accuracy. I assume that some formats are 
such that, were we to change certain features of them, they would not be inaccurate, but 
rather they would not even refer to the same object. There is a related debate here as to 
whether pictures must to some degree resemble their objects in order to refer to them in 
the first place. Hopkins (1998) and Abell (2009) hold this view, but Greenberg (2013) 
rejects it. He thinks a picture (qua picture) could refer to someone even if it in no way 
resembled her, as long as the artist intended it to, although it would be a highly inaccurate 
picture. Now, one wonders how seriously Greenberg means this. Suppose a blindfolded 
artist attempted a portrait of you, but benightedly failed to make even a single marking on 
the chapter. Does the blank sheet of chapter still refer to you? Plausibly, No. We would 
not say, “What an inaccurate depiction”. You might reply that this is because it is not a 
depiction in the first place. But I don’t see why not, since a blank sheet of chapter could 
be a depiction of something, say, a fresh sheet of snow. Of course, it also more closely 
resembles a fresh sheet of snow than it does a person, but that’s just the point.  
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A further issue is that Greenberg does not consider the example of pictographic 
languages. Pictographs seem to refer to things at least partly in virtue of resemblance, 
even though a pictograph by itself makes no claim and thus cannot be regarded as 
accurate or inaccurate. If resemblance plays no role in explaining reference, then 
Greenberg must treat pictographic languages in just the same way as non-pictographic 
ones. Plausibly, this would mean that the reference of pictographs is just as 
conventionally determined as the reference of English words. In fact, however, the 
reasoning from Abell (2005) will repeat here. In hieroglyphic Egyptian, the term for 
‘flamingo’ is a little image of a flamingo, and in drawing this glyph, one can use a dot for 
an eye (Selden 2013, p. 11), as in Figure 1:  
 
Figure 1. Flamingo hieroglyph. A representation of the Egyptian hieroglyph for ‘flamingo’. 
Here again, the dot by itself is something we have no idea how to interpret apart from the 
role it has in the complete image. So, while the dot is contributing to the meaning of the 
image, it can’t be doing so in virtue of conventions, assuming we endorse the salience 
condition.  
 
Ballard, Icons of Value - 91 
Now, make no mistake: convention obviously plays a significant role in 
hieroglyphic and other pictographic languages. They are languages, after all. For 
example, some ancient Egyptian texts use cryptograms, pictorial figures used to convey 
unexpected meanings that are nevertheless grounded imagistically. For instance, an 
image of a head can convey ‘head’, but can also convey ‘seven’. Why? It’s because a 
human head has seven openings (two ears, two nostrils, two eyes, and a mouth) (Selden 
2013, p.12). Convention guides how to interpret which meaning, ‘seven’ or ‘head’, is 
conveyed, but convention does so while cooperating with the image. Convention is not 
playing just the same role it plays in English. 
The upshot for arbitrariness is this: given that convention only partly explains 
pictographic reference, it is natural to think that resemblance also plays a role.45 And to 
the extent that pictographs refer in virtue of resemblance, they refer in a way that is non-
arbitrary. So, arbitrariness applies both to reference and accuracy. 
As is clear from our examples so far, many representational systems that exhibit 
non-arbitrariness are those that in some way rely on resemblance.46 The drawing of the 
duck resembles the duck, and that is why it is non-arbitrary with respect to ducks, while 
‘duck’ in no interesting way resembles a duck. However, resemblance and non-
arbitrariness are distinct notions. To see this, consider images that use curvilinear 
projection (or the “fisheye” perspective), as in Figure 2.  
45 I am aware of no philosophical work devoted to the semantics of natural pictographic languages. It is a 
striking omission, but one that I obviously cannot remedy here. 
46 The appeal to resemblance in explaining imagistic content is controversial (Goodman 1968), but recently 
there has been a resurgence of interest in the idea that resemblance plays an important role (Abell 2009; 
Hopkins 1998; Greenberg 2013; Kulvicki 2006; Peacocke 1987). I will discuss resemblance further when 
I turn to iconicity in section 4.2. 
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Figure 2. Curvilinear perspective. A picture of a railroad in curvilinear perspective. 
Recently, Greenberg (2013)  has argued that the accuracy of curvilinear pictures in fact 
depends on the ways they do not resemble what they depict. However, curvilinear 
pictures are nevertheless highly non-arbitrary. Even their distinctive failures of 
resemblance cannot be much altered without downgrading the accuracy of the picture. 
Accordingly, curvilinear pictures provide an example of non-arbitrariness without 
resemblance. 
Finally, whether a representation is arbitrary is not simply a matter of whether it is 
easy to use. For certain purposes linguistic representations are easier to use than imagistic 
ones. For instance, it is often easier to use linguistic representations when it comes to 
information involving logical operations like quantification and negation. This is so, even 
when the linguistic representations in question have an arbitrary relation to their contents. 
For instance, even if we could develop conventions to imagistically represent if there are 
ducks in the pond, then either it is summer time, or the zookeeper will lose his job, this 
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will be easier to represent using language (cf. Camp 2007, p. 168). This is so, even 
though each term of the sentence is arbitrary with respect to its referent. So, arbitrariness 
is not just about ease of use. 
Since ease of use comes apart from arbitrariness in this way, the notion of 
arbitrariness/non-arbitrariness here should not be equated with the notion of 
naturalness/unnaturalness that some authors use. For instance, Giardino and Greenberg 
(2015) write that 
 
A system is more or less NATURAL to the degree to which human nature— including 
relatively universal aspects of cognition, physiology, social behavior, and environmental 
interaction— rather than enculturation, makes that system easy to internalize and use. ... 
The system in which a left-hand blinking light indicates a left turn, and a right-hand 
blinking light indicates a right turn is especially natural in this sense: it is easy to 
internalize and use, presumably because it harmonizes with basic features of human 
cognition and body organization. The opposite system, where a left-hand light indicates a 
right turn is correspondingly unnatural (p. 8). 
 
 
The information if there are ducks in the pond, then either it is summer time, or the 
zookeeper will lose his job is easier to access in a linguistic representation, and it may 
well be that this holds in virtue of universal aspects of human cognition. There would still 
remain a sense in which the linguistic representation of this information is arbitrary 
compared to the more unwieldy imagistic representation of the same. So, arbitrariness is 
not naturalness in the sense above.47 
 In sum, the arbitrariness of a format is a matter of replaceability without semantic 
impact. The semantic impact in question includes both reference and accuracy. If a 
format is non-arbitrary, then by altering the format, we can alter its reference as well as 
                                                
47 Giardino and Greenberg (2015, p. 9) consider with sympathy the possibility that arbitrariness is the 
opposite of naturalness, where their notion of arbitrariness seems to be the same as mine, introduced with 
the same kinds of word-image contrasts. 
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its accuracy. Moreover, to say that a format is non-arbitrary is not to say that it resembles 
its content or that it is easy to use. 
 
4.1.3 EMOTIONS AS NON-ARBITRARY REPRESENTATIONS OF VALUE 
 
 
With the notion of arbitrariness in view, it is clear that Prinz’ informational semantics 
treats format as arbitrary. On Prinz’ view, emotions stand for values as arbitrarily as 
words stand for their referents. After all, consider that in principle just about anything 
could reliably co-occur with values. Indeed, Prinz’ theory wears this result on its sleeve. 
Referring back to Dretske, Prinz writes: 
 
Consider “fuzz busters,” which people place in their cars to determine when they are 
driving in zones monitored by police radars. A beep emitted from a fuzz buster represents 
the presence of a police radar. But the beep itself is utterly lacking in structure. It cannot 
be analyzed in to meaningful subbeeps. … [T]he beep emitted by a fuzz buster does not 
describe what it represents. It represents police radars because it is reliably caused by 
police radars, and it is set up for that purpose. Likewise, emotions can represent [values] 
without describing them (2004, p. 65). 
 
 
The beep represents police radar just as arbitrarily as ‘duck’ represents ducks. Indeed, the 
beep could just as well have represented anything else, even the absence of police radar. 
However, while this is true of beeps, it is highly objectionable in the case of emotions. 
Emotions are not arbitrary beeps of value that could have just as well represented 
anything else.  
 Now, the notion of arbitrariness is most clearly on display in contrast cases 
between words and images. Thus, to assess whether emotions are arbitrary with respect to 
values, we can try to construct similar contrast cases for emotions. One such case will 
contrast emotional with non-emotional representations of the same evaluative property. 
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To illustrate, consider that there is a possible world in which olfactory sensations, rather 
than emotions, reliably co-occur with values, and have the function of detecting them. 
Imagine that in this possible world, the smell of roses—the way that roses smell in our 
world—co-occurs not with roses but with dangers. Such a world could also be one in 
which the smell of roses has the function of detecting dangers, through some bizarre twist 
of evolutionary fate (maybe all the dangerous things in that world happen to smell as 
roses smell in our world).48  
Now, I am happy to grant that in some possible world olfactory sensations 
represent danger. I am not making a modal point. The point is rather that there seems to 
be an important difference between the way a random olfactory sensation might represent 
dangers in some possible world, and the way that fearful experiences represent dangers in 
the actual world. It seems to me intuitive that this difference is one of arbitrariness. As a 
representation of danger, the smell of roses is highly arbitrary in a way that the feeling of 
fear is not. 
If this is not intuitive to you, I offer the following argument. Consider our earlier 
definition of arbitrariness: replaceability without semantic impact. How does this bear on 
the case? Notice that in the imagined case the smell of roses could have been altered in 
any way, or even replaced with any other smell such as the smell of magnolia blossoms, 
and this would not have impacted what the olfactory sensation represented. In contrast to 
this, the feeling of fear is not replaceable without semantic impact. For instance, one 
salient aspect of the feeling of fear is its aversiveness. Imagine replacing the aversiveness 
of fear with, say, a mild pleasant tingling in the hands. If fear involved such a pleasant 
                                                
48 Kenny (1963) considers a similar thought experiment. 
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sensation,49 rather than aversiveness, would this impact the evaluative content of fear? Of 
course, I admit that any sensation, even a pleasant one, could represent danger, albeit in 
an arbitrary way, provided certain further conditions are met (whatever they are). But in 
our imagined case of “pleasant fear”, let us suppose these further conditions are not met.  
Here is a reason for thinking that to change the aversiveness of fear into 
pleasantness would impact the evaluative content of fear: It is generally unfitting to be 
pleased by dangers qua dangers. Of course, many people are pleased by dangers qua the 
opportunity for thrill seeking, or displaying physical prowess, or growing in courage, etc. 
And feeling pleasure in response to danger qua these things might be fitting. But it is 
unfitting to be pleased by danger—by potential harm—simply in itself. So, if fear were to 
feel pleasant, then this would affect the fittingness conditions of fear. It would no longer 
be fitting to fear dangers, since it is not fitting to feel pleasure in response to dangers.  
One might object here that pleasures cannot be assessed for fittingness in this 
way. However, we evaluate pleasures all the time for fittingness as well as other 
normative statuses. Most of us think there are fitting and unfitting objects of sexual 
pleasure, for instance. There are some things one simply should not enjoy looking at. 
This is true of other kinds of pleasure as well. Having to kill Old Yeller is one thing; 
enjoying it is quite another.50 
                                                
49 Those who think emotions are identical with certain feelings might regard this as impossible. Very well. 
Imagine then that we are talking about a state that is like fear in all respects except that it is accompanied 
by this pleasant sensation in place of the aversiveness. We can even imagine such a phenomenally pleasant 
state as motivating fight-or-flight behaviors, since feelings are not necessary for motivation. 
50 Note that I do not assume there is a single unitary mental state that answers to ‘pleasure’. Note also that it 
is not accurate to say these remarks beg the question against the hedonist. The problem of inappropriate 
pleasures is simply one of the classic problems facing hedonism (Brentano 1889/1969, p. 90; Moore 1903, 
sec. 56), and moreover, I do not assume the hedonist has no way of accommodating the badness of such 
pleasures (see Feldman 2004, Ch. 5). 
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The point remains, then, that to change the aversiveness of fear into pleasantness 
would change the fittingness conditions of fear, since it is unfitting to be pleased by 
danger qua danger. But recall that for our purposes, we are taking the perceptual theory 
of emotion for granted. On this theory, the fittingness conditions of an emotion are 
explained as a kind of accuracy condition that obtains in virtue of the emotion’s 
evaluative content. Thus, on this view, a change in fittingness conditions would plausibly 
mean a change in evaluative content. Accordingly, by replacing the phenomenal 
aversiveness of fear with phenomenal pleasantness, we have impacted the evaluative 
content of fear. The feeling of fear is not replaceable without semantic impact. 
Now, I can allow that from a pragmatic point of view, it is useful for emotions to 
represent the values they do. It makes good pragmatic sense for evolution to have chosen, 
say, fear as the detector for dangers, since fear motivates adaptive responses to dangers. 
As Prinz puts it, “our hearts race to increase blood flow, which prepares us for fleeing, 
fighting, or engaging in other kinds of behavior” (2004, p. 69). Certainly, it is interesting 
that emotions represent values while at the same time motivating adaptive or appropriate 
responses to those same values.51 However, this does not explain our reaction to the 
bizarro world. Imagine a bizarro world in which cooing feelings come to represent 
dangers. In the bizarro world, when someone stumbles upon a deadly creature, she feels 
that melting sensation that we feel when a baby gives us a big smile. Now, imagine also 
that in the bizarro world, the forests are filled with deadly creatures that will spare your 
life if and only if you find them adorable. In that case, cooing feelings are a highly 
adaptive response towards such dangers. But there remains a sense in which to use 
                                                
51 Of course, emotions do not always motivate adaptive or appropriate responses, even when the emotion 
itself is appropriate. 
 Ballard, Icons of Value - 98 
cooing feelings as representations of dangers is to use them in a highly arbitrary way, 
while to use them as representations of the adorable is to use them in a highly non-
arbitrary way.  
 
4.1.4 SUMMING UP 
 
 
In sum, we have seen that emotions have a non-arbitrary link to the values they represent. 
We cannot treat emotions on the model of linguistic representation. Emotions are in this 
way unlike the bell that indicates dinner but could have just as well indicated anything 
else. The bell has a totally arbitrary relation to dinner. In contrast, for emotions to 
represent values other than the ones they do would be to change their representational 
nature. Informational semantics, however, fails to respect this fact.  
Informational semantics is one of the two major programs for explaining content, 
and the other, computational semantics, fares no better. On this view, meaning is wholly 
or largely derived from computational operations. This view places even fewer 
constraints on representational format than informational semantics does. What is being 
operated on is largely irrelevant from a semantic point of view (Block 1986; Brandom 
1994; Harman 1973, 1987; Wittgenstein 1953).52 So, abandoning informational semantics 
and adopting computational semantics will only worsen things. Accordingly, we have 
reason to seek a new semantics for the evaluative content of emotion. At the very least, 
we must add something to existing semantic theories in order to respect the non-arbitrary 
link between emotions and the values they represent. In the next section, I will offer a 
positive proposal as to how we might go about this. 
                                                
52 Note, however, that Block develops a version of the view that allows for constraints on representational 
format (Stich and Warfield 1994, p. 103-104). 
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4.2 ICONICITY TO THE RESCUE 
 
 
In this section, I will introduce the notion of iconicity, and show how it gives us the 
resources for treating emotions as non-arbitrary representations of value.  
 
4.2.1 ICONICITY DEFINED 
 
  
To introduce iconicity, let us begin with paradigmatic instances of icons: public images, 
especially pictures, maps, and diagrams. These are distinct types of images, admitting of 
interesting differences, but what they have in common is that they represent what they do, 
and in the way they do, partly in virtue of replicating certain relevant features of the 
things they are images of.  
Consider pictures. Plausibly, a realistic portrait of Marilyn Monroe represents her 
partly in virtue of replicating, in certain respects, what she would look like if we were to 
see her in person. Even Warhol’s depiction of Marilyn Monroe, which massively distorts 
the color of her face, is a representation of Marilyn Monroe partly in virtue of replicating 
the shape of her face.53 
 
                                                
53 Here again, I take it that to be a picture of something is to have already achieved a certain degree of 
success in resembling it (Hopkins 1998). Greenberg (2013) rejects this, but I refer you to the dialectic in 
section 4.1.2. 
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Figure 3. Marilyn Dipytch. A square from Warhol’s Marilyn Diptych (1962). 
 
(Of course, the replication here need only be approximate.) Now, an artist might create a 
painting of Marilyn Monroe that involves distortions so dramatic that there is no 
interesting sense in which the painting replicates her features. Such a painting might still 
represent Marilyn Monroe, but the explanation of how it represents her would be a 
different one. Someone offering a theory of image content would owe us a story here, but 
that is not my aim. My aim is only to illustrate the notion of iconicity with respect to 
certain paradigmatic cases.  
With the example of pictures in mind, we may define iconicity in the following 
way:  
 
Iconicity Definition: a representation is iconic iff in order to fully explain its content, 
we must in some way appeal to its replicating certain relevant features of what it 
represents. 
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Notice several things about this definition. First, it is extremely schematic. I am not 
trying to give a substantive analysis of iconicity, only to define the notion with enough 
clarity to wield it. Second, this definition allows us to say, as we should, that English 
sentences are not iconic, since we can fully explain the contents of English sentences 
without appeal to any notion of replication. Third, this definition does not say that 
iconicity is sufficient for representation. Plausibly other conditions must be added, since 
many things replicate features of many other things without being representations of them 
or anything else for that matter. Fourth, this definition does not say that iconicity is 
necessary even for imagistic representation. Rothko’s squares might represent something 
besides giant squares, but perhaps not in virtue of replicating its relevant features, and so 
not iconically. Sixth, this definition does not tell us exactly how replication must figure in 
the explanation of the icon’s content. There are diverse views about this matter (Abell 
2009; Hopkins 1998; Hyman 2006; Kulvicki 2006; Peacocke 1987), and there is no need 
to settle on one at present.  
 The notion of replication here can plausibly be analyzed in terms of property 
sharing (cf. Cowling 2017). A picture replicates features of the scene it represents only to 
the extent that the picture and the scene share certain properties, which in this case will 
be properties pertaining to visual appearance such as shape and color. I take it this notion 
of iconicity is also what authors have in mind when they speak of resemblance. To the 
extent that a picture replicates the relevant features of what it represents, the picture 
resembles what it represents.  
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Some iconic representations share only a small number of properties with what 
they represent. For example, a mercury thermometer represents iconically. The mercury 
rises as the temperature increases.54 But since only this single property is shared between 
the thermometer and the temperature, the thermometer’s degree of iconicity is very 
small.55 This contrasts with pictures that share very many properties with what they 
represent in virtue of which they are the representations they are. For this reason 
Goodman (1968) refers to pictures as relatively replete compared with simple icons like 
mercury thermometers.  
 In explaining imagistic content, the use of iconicity is complex and controversial. 
Some authors reject the view that iconicity is explanatorily relevant (Goodman 1968; 
Lopes 1996, 2005). Others hold the very notion of iconicity to be suspect (Goodman 
1967; Quine 1969). Obviously, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to address these 
issues. Accordingly, it is best to understand my claim in this chapter as provisional: 
assuming that the notion of iconicity is in good standing, and assuming that iconicity is 
explanatorily relevant to the contents of images such as realistic pictures, iconicity might 
also be explanatorily relevant to the evaluative content of emotional experience.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
54 Well, this is a bit too simple. Thermometers do not directly replicate the temperature in the way that a 
photograph replicates a visual scene. It is rather that there is a homomorphic mapping from the 
thermometer to the temperature (see Mathews 2007). Even so, the shared relation to the relevant dimension 
can be understood as a shared property. 
55 Of course, thermometers share many other properties with temperature, such as being important to 
humans. So, we need a story about how to decide which properties are relevant to iconicity. For one option, 
see Kulvicki (2006), Ch. 4. 
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4.2.2 EMOTIONS AS PICTOGRAPHIC ICONS 
 
 
As we’ve seen, iconic representation is plausibly exhibited in the case of realistic 
pictures. Yet a further case is maps. Unlike pictures, maps only need to replicate the 
spatial structure of what they represent. For instance, the markers that stand for cities can 
be arbitrary, as long as they are structured to replicate the relative positions of the cities 
they stand for. Of course, there are many kinds of maps, from seating charts to 
topographic maps, but what each of these have in common is that they use spatial 
structure to represent spatial structure. In this sense, maps aim to be iconic only in their 
syntax, that is, only in the way they combine their semantic elements to convey meaning 
(cf. Camp 2007). In contrast, pictures aim to be iconic in both their syntax and semantics. 
Pictures use iconic spatial structure to combine their semantic elements, but those 
semantic elements themselves are iconic as well.   
In this sense, we approach the inversion of cartographic representation by 
considering pictographic languages such as hieroglyphic Egyptian, hieroglyphic Mayan, 
and some West African languages such as Nsibidi (but note that these languages contain 
many semantic elements that are non-pictographic as well). Modern Chinese script is an 
interesting case, because it exploits iconicity in certain respects but is not 
straightforwardly pictographic.56 For instance, the Chinese character for mud is the visual 
combination of the characters for water and soil. Even though the character does not have 
any strict resemblance to mud, the character exploits iconicity by being formed out of 
terms for the very elements that mud is formed out of. (Note, however, that only a 
                                                
56 The fact that Chinese is sometimes mistakenly classified as pictographic in an unrestricted way has 
drawn much scorn and taken on an air of political significance (e.g., Boltz 1986, p. 406; DeFrancis 1984, p. 
xi). In light of this issue, note that I describe Chinese as iconic only in specific and restricted ways. 
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minority of Chinese characters work in this way). Modern Chinese is also interesting 
because its ancestral forms tracing back to the oracle bone script are increasingly 
pictographic, and so we have examples of scripts that are interestingly transitional (Yong 
et al. 2008, pp. 18-21).  
The syntactic principles of these languages are far less iconic than their semantic 
elements. We find pure cases of this in contrived systems of public signs, such the OSHA 
Hazard Communication Standard, in which simple pictures of different kinds of dangers 
are used to represent those very dangers (an explosion for explosive hazards, a fire for 
flammable hazards, etc.). Thus, while cartographic systems rely on iconic syntax and 
non-iconic semantics, pictographic systems rely on iconic semantics and non-iconic 
syntax. 
If emotional experience is iconic, it is usefully compared to pictographic systems 
of representation. On my view, each emotion stands for a specific evaluative property, 
rather than the entire event, object, or state of affairs that instantiates that evaluative 
property. The feeling of fear stands for danger, the feeling of disgust stands for the foul, 
anger for injustice or offenses, awe for the sublime, amusement for the comical, etc. So, 
when you see a growling dog, your visual experience elicits your fear, which then 
attributes DANGER to the object of your visual experience, namely, the growling dog. 
The emotion merely supplies the evaluative property, and together with the visual 
experience, the growling dog is represented as a danger. Of course, it needn’t be 
perception that elicits the emotion; it could also be belief, imagination, or memory. If, 
say, you come to believe by testimony that an imperceptible poisonous gas is filling the 
room, this will elicit fear, even though you do not perceive the gas.  
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This, of course, allows that emotions are about objects in the world. On the face 
of it, such objects include both growling dogs and propositions about growling dogs. But 
this object directedness is not the same as property attribution. Fear and pride can both be 
directed at the growling dog, but they attribute differing evaluative properties. Plausibly, 
the story of how an emotion acquires its object is different than the story of how it comes 
to attribute the evaluative properties it does. Only with respect to the latter do I claim 
iconicity is relevant. 
The point that emotional experience is iconic on the model of pictographic 
systems is important to see for two reasons. First, it fits comfortably with the fact that, 
although emotions are iconic, they are often elicited by non-iconic states such as beliefs. 
Second, it allows for a variety of views about the syntax of “mentalese” (Fodor 1975). On 
my view, the claim that emotions are iconic is entirely compatible with the language of 
thought hypothesis; it only requires that some of the semantic elements of the language of 
thought are pictographic in nature.57   
 
4.2.3 ICONICITY IN THE MIND 
 
 
So far, we have considered maps, pictures, and other public artifacts that sometimes 
represent iconically. It is useful to see, however, that independently of emotions, there are 
plausible—though controversial—instances of mental states that represent iconically. 
                                                
57 This contrasts with recent discussion concerning the extent to which the language of thought could be 
map-like. Camp (2007) argues that some thinking occurs with “mental maps”, and that these are not 
language-like, on account of their essentially spatial syntax, while Blumson (2012) argues that maps and 
languages in fact use the same syntactic principles, and thus a map-like architecture is not a genuine 
alternative to the language of thought. In contrast, I am saying nothing about the syntax of thought, only 
that some of the semantic elements are icons, whatever the syntax is that combines them. 
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This is important to see because the claim that emotions are icons of value is much less 
surprising if a range of other mental states also exhibit iconicity. 
 The first example is analogue magnitude representation (AMR). AMRs offer a 
plausible explanation of the ways in which some animals can assess magnitudes without 
possessing numeric concepts (Beck 2015). For instance, ducks are capable of making 
decisions about food-seeking that seem to factor in the rate of food distribution and the 
number of food competitors (Harper 1982). Importantly, AMRs would be iconic 
representations since they would proportionately replicate the magnitudes they represent. 
 Second, some authors view the content of perception as iconic. For instance, 
Tyler Burge remarks that “the elements in visual perception have something like the form 
of a map or sketch from an egocentric perspective” (2010, p. 540). Similarly, Ned Block 
considers the format of perception to be “map-like or iconic” (2014, p. 560).  
Third, iconicity is also apparent in hallucinatory perception, and in such cases it is 
plausible that visual iconicity is phenomenal. In certain hallucinations, what one 
experiences is image-like. For instance, Oliver Sacks describes the hallucinatory 
experiences of one of his patients with Charles Bonnett Syndrome who  
 
saw little people a few inches high, like elves or fairies, with little green caps, climbing 
up the sides of her wheelchair. There were children, too, “picking up pieces of chapter 
from the floor,” or climbing hallucinatory stairs in one corner of the room (Sacks 2012, p. 
21).  
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Taking such reports at face value, this hallucinatory experience seems to be iconic, and 
iconic in virtue of its phenomenal character.58 
Now, elves and fairies do not really exist, and so it is not quite right to say that the 
patient’s hallucinatory experience replicates the relevant features of elves and fairies. 
Indeed, there is a well known problem here concerning how to allow for 
misrepresentation within iconic systems. For instance, one might want to say that the 
patient’s experience depicts what elves and fairies would look like if they did exist 
(Hyman 2006). But this proposal is not entirely satisfactory, since, for starters, iconic 
representations of non-existent objects can still misrepresent those objects, and in such 
cases it will be false that the icon depicts what the object would look like were it to exist 
(Abell 2009, p. 189). However, it is reasonable to set this complication aside. Since there 
are a range of puzzles raised by fictional entities and other nonexistent objects, this does 
not seem to be a special problem about iconicity (cf. Greenberg 2013, p. 220).  
As a final example, some hold that mental imagery is an iconic form of 
representation. Here, mental imagery is sometimes defined as a form of stable (though 
non-hallucinatory) perceptual phenomenology that persists in the absence of stimuli 
(Kosslyn et al. 2006, p. 3-4). Are roses a darker shade of red than ladybugs? For 
proponents of mental imagery, we can consult mental images to answer such questions. 
On the other hand, mental imagery is sometimes understood as a form of non-conscious 
representation that is somehow picture-like (cf. Block 1983, p. 506-507). Now, the 
existence and nature of mental imagery is fraught with controversy, and some theorists 
opt to explain all mental representation in terms of more language-like formats (Pylyshyn 
                                                
58 I do not assume that genuine perception should be understood in the same way as hallucinations. For all 
I’ve said, the disjunctivist treatment of hallucination is correct (Hinton 1973; McDowell 2008; Snowdon 
1979). 
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1973, 1981, 2003). This issue is highly controversial, followed by a vast literature since 
the 1970s. My point here is not to weigh in, but to note that if there is mental imagery, 
then we have yet another form of iconic representation. 
 The purpose of considering these examples is to see that, in addition to public 
artifacts, there are also mental representations that can reasonably be considered iconic. 
Obviously, nothing I’ve said compels you to take an iconic view of these mental states. 
The point is rather that some reasonable people do take this view, and this lends some 
further credibility to the idea that emotional experience represents iconically.  
 
4.2.4 SUMMING UP: THE PROMISE OF ICONICITY 
 
 
In sum, iconic representations are those whose content is partly explained by the way 
they replicate certain features of what they represent. A range of public artifacts 
exemplify this, such as pictures and maps. But emotions are best thought of on the model 
of pictographic systems: plausibly each emotion is iconic only with respect to specific 
evaluative properties, which allows that emotions can be employed in a language of 
thought whose syntax and other semantic elements are non-iconic. Emotions are iconic 
predicates, rather than a full-fledged system of iconic representation. In addition to public 
artifacts, moreover, many hold there are a range of mental representations that are iconic. 
Thus, the view that emotions are icons of value regards them as part of this broader class. 
Our ultimate aim, recall, is to explain why emotions have a non-arbitrary link 
with value, and to do so in a way that is amenable to value realism. Iconicity has great 
promise here. Indeed, the hallmark feature of iconic formats is their non-arbitrary link to 
what they represent (Kosslyn et al. 2006, p. 12; Giardino and Greenberg 2015, p. 2-4). 
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Icons represent partly in virtue of the properties of the format itself, and so we can see 
why altering the format might impact its semantic value. Accordingly, iconicity is exactly 
the sort of notion we need in order to explain the non-arbitrary link between emotions 
and the values they represent. Thus, we have good reason to seek a view on which 
emotions are icons of value.  
If emotional experience is iconic with respect to value, several further issues need 
to be addressed. My aim here has been only to introduce this view and show that it is 
well-motivated. Still, the most pressing question is, What features do emotions share with 
values such that by sharing those features, they are iconic with respect to values? A 
robust answer to this question is crucial for fully developing the view, and this demands a 
chapter of its own. In the next section, however, I will explore some options I think are 
plausible, in order to display the initial promise of the view. 
 
 
 
4.3 THE ICONICITY OF EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE 
 
 
In this section, I will highlight features of emotions that partly explain why emotions are 
iconic with respect to the values they represent. Although a full account of emotional 
iconicity is too ambitious at present, it is important to see that there are some plausible 
candidates concerning the properties of emotions that can explain their iconicity. Such 
properties I will call Icon Properties, or ICPs for short. Plausibly, there are four 
conditions on identifying ICPs for emotions:  
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1. Commonality: An ICP must be a property that emotions share with the values they 
represent. 
 
2. Efficacy: An ICP must be a property that could plausibly contribute to an 
explanation as to why an emotion represents the value it does.  
 
3. Regularity: An ICP must be a property located in a property space such that all 
emotions have a property located in that space.  
 
4. Specificity: ICPs, taken together, must be such that no two emotions are the same in 
all their ICPs but represent a different evaluative property. 
 
Each of these conditions is intuitively plausible. Commonality and Efficacy fall out of the 
Iconicity Definition, provided that replication can be analyzed in terms of property 
sharing. Regularity is needed in order to achieve an account of emotional content that is 
suitably principled. And Specificity follows from the fact that (i) we are looking for 
properties that are sufficient for emotions to be icons of value, together with the plausible 
claim that (ii) each emotion represents a different evaluative property. 
 In what follows, I will argue that two plausible ICPs are valence and intensity. 
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4.3.1 VALENCE AND INTENSITY 
 
 
One feature of emotional phenomenology is that it can be described in terms of valence 
and intensity (or arousal) (Russell 1980; Kuppens et al. 2013). Here, valence is simply 
pleasantness or unpleasantness. For instance, there is clearly something unpleasant about 
feeling depressed, anxious, angry, or bored, while there is clearly something pleasant 
about feeling joyful, proud, amused, or elated.  
Valence is cross cut by intensity. Terror and elation differ in valence, yet both are 
high in intensity. Contentment and boredom differ in valence, yet both are low in 
intensity. Here, ‘arousal’ would do just as well as ‘intensity’, and is indeed the more 
common term, but ‘intensity’ is useful for emphasizing the felt character of arousal. For 
further examples of how emotions can be assessed for valence and intensity, see Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. Affective circumplex. A chart representing various affective and emotional states along the 
dimensions of valence/pleasure and intensity/arousal. Adapted from Russell (1980). 
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The valence and intensity dimensions of emotion have been the rallying point for  
so-called constructionist theories of emotion (Russell and Barrett 1999), which claim that 
emotions are psychological constructions rather than natural kinds. However, I take no 
stand on this issue. It is only the notions of valence and intensity I want to employ; and 
obviously, emotions can be natural kinds and still be describable in terms of valence and 
intensity. 
One issue here is how valence and intensity are related. A natural idea is that they 
are independent dimensions. However, the balance of evidence at present seems to favor 
that they exhibit a V-shaped relationship (Kuppens et al. 2013), as seen in option (d) from 
figure 4. The idea in (d) seems to be that intensity just is the degree of pleasantness or 
unpleasantness an emotional experience exhibits. This predicts that there will not be 
emotions that are, say, high in intensity but only very mild in pleasantness or 
unpleasantness, a prediction that bears out upon reflection, with a potential exception 
being surprise.  
 
Figure 5. Valence-arousal relations. Six graphs representing possible relations between valence and 
arousal/intensity. Adapted from Kuppens et al. (2013), which argues that the balance of evidence favors 
(d). 
 Ballard, Icons of Value - 113 
4.3.2 VALENCE AND INTENSITY AS ICPS 
 
 
How do valence and intensity fare with respect to the four conditions above? Valence 
appears to satisfy Commonality, since values also can be assessed as positive or negative. 
The prediction here is that negatively valenced emotions will represent negative 
evaluative properties, and positively valenced ones will represent positive evaluative 
properties. This prediction seems exactly correct, if you consider each emotion (for 
instance, see Figure 4). 
Intensity, too, satisfies Commonality. Consider that values admit of degrees. The 
Gowanus Canal is foul but not as foul as an open river of sewage. Since values admit of 
degrees, intensity can be understood as tracking this. So, although the broad category of 
fear represents things as dangers, it’s plausible that, say, mild anxiety represents lesser 
dangers, while sheer terror represents grave dangers. This is especially plausible given 
that the fittingness conditions of an emotion take into account the emotion’s felt intensity. 
It is unfitting to be enraged by something that is only mildly offensive, though some 
lesser degree of anger might have been appropriate. This is just what we should expect, if 
felt intensity partly explains the evaluative content of an emotion, and the evaluative 
content of an emotion explains its fittingness conditions.  
As for Efficacy, it is plausible that valence and intensity can contribute to an 
explanation of emotional iconicity, since, as noted above, fittingness conditions take into 
account valence and intensity in a way that is rather finely grained.  
As for Regularity, it seems that every emotion can be assessed along the valence 
dimension. Perhaps some emotions, such as surprise, are neither positive nor negative, 
but neutral. Still, if surprise is an emotion, it can be located on the valence dimension by 
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placing it in the middle. Accordingly, valence satisfies Regularity. The same holds for 
intensity, since every emotion seems to land somewhere on the intensity dimension.  
Finally, as for Specificity, valence and intensity by themselves fail this test. For 
instance, consider that terror, rage, and despair are each negatively valenced, and each 
can be comparably intense. But plausibly they have differing evaluative contents, since 
their fittingness conditions differ. For instance, rage is fitting when directed at grave 
offenses, while terror fitting when directed at grave dangers.  
This shows that valence and intensity by themselves are not sufficient as ICPs. 
However, it is nevertheless plausible that valence and intensity can be included alongside 
other ICPs, in light of the considerations above. After all, valence and intensity satisfy the 
first three conditions, and though valence and intensity are not exactly fine grained 
enough, they do closely track the fittingness conditions of emotions. Fortunately, 
moreover, it is also true that terror, rage, and despair feel differently. They share their 
phenomenal character with respect to valence and intensity, but there is clearly a sense in 
which terror feels differently than rage does. So, just as valence and intensity are not fine 
grained enough to track the fittingness conditions of emotion, they are also not fine 
grained enough to fully characterize emotional phenomenology. This means there are 
aspects of emotional phenomenology that we might yet appeal to as ICPs. 
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4.3.3 SUMMING UP 
In sum, emotional experience can be characterized in terms of valence and intensity, and 
these phenomenal qualities bear iconic relations to values, and thus begin to furnish us 
with an account of the iconicity of emotion, although the account needs further 
developing, especially with respect to locating a sufficient set of ICPs.  
4.4 CONCLUSION 
We began by noting that there is a deep connection between emotion and value. 
Sentimentalists have a ready explanation of this, but such an explanation is harder to 
achieve for realists. What I have offered is a way for realists to explain the emotion-value 
connection. Along the way, I have also offered the beginnings of a novel semantic theory 
for the evaluative content of emotion, a semantic theory with significant advantages over 
current alternatives. My view is that emotions are icons of value. Emotions represent 
values by replicating crucial features of those values. This view respects the non-arbitrary 
link between emotion and value, and is compatible with robust forms of value realism. 
The crucial next step for this theory is to identify additional features of emotional 
experience that explain its iconicity. As a down payment, I’ve highlighted valence and 
intensity, but as we’ve seen they are not sufficient, although they will plausibly form part 
of any final account. 
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5.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The guiding concern of this dissertation has been to characterize the place of emotional 
experience in the domain of value, and to do so in a way that (i) is compatible with robust 
forms of value realism, and (ii) gives emotional experience a significant and favorable 
role. While the three chapters can be read independently, they progressively defend a 
unified picture, summarized in the following theses: 
1. Emotions provide epistemic benefits with respect to value. (Chapter 2)
2. No account at present has succeeded in saying what those benefits are and how 
emotions provide them. (Chapter 2) 
3. In order to characterize the epistemic benefits of emotion, it will be useful to first 
establish that emotions are representations of value. (I did not claim this explicitly, 
but this links Chapters 2 and 3.) 
4. While many authors hold the fittingness conditions of emotion directly establish 
that emotions are representations of value, this is mistaken. (Chapter 3) 
5. But the fittingness conditions of emotion are relevant in the following way. Each 
emotion has a unique phenomenal character, and is governed by a unique set of 
fittingness conditions. This co-variance between phenomenology and fittingness is 
best explained by saying that emotions are representations of value. (Chapter 3) 
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6. Emotions represent values in a distinctive way: Emotional experience is highly
non-arbitrary with respect to the values it represents. But current theories of content 
determination fail to respect this fact, treating emotions as arbitrary in the way that 
conventional linguistic representations are. (Chapter 4)
7. We can do better by modeling the representational nature of emotion after non-
linguistic forms of representation, such as pictorial and cartographic representations. 
Emotions represent values in part because they resemble them. (Chapter 4)
There are, of course, many further issues to address. The two most pressing are 
the following. First, in light of thesis 7, my account must specify in virtue of which 
features emotional experience bears a resemblance with the values it represents. Second, 
in light of theses 1 and 2, my account must offer a positive view of the distinctive 
epistemic benefit that emotional experience provides. In what follows, I want to suggest 
how we might approach the latter. To address this, we must answer the following two 
questions: 
The Grounding Question: In virtue of what do emotions provide the epistemic benefit 
they do? 
The Value Question: What is the nature of the epistemic benefit that emotions 
provide? 
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The idea that emotions are icons of value offers promising materials for addressing these 
questions. Let’s start with the Grounding Question. Recall, for instance, those theorists, 
such as Roberts and Dancy, who wanted to say that the epistemic benefits of emotion 
result from its being a form of appearance or seeming (Section 2.3.2). The problem, as 
we saw, is that there can be purely intellectual states that are also evaluative seemings, 
but these states do not confer the same epistemic benefits. Thus, we must appeal to a 
property that emotions have but that merely intellectual states do not. Iconicity is 
plausibly such a property. For instance, we saw that the rich phenomenological features of 
emotions, such as valence and intensity, are relevant to their iconicity (Section 4.3). But 
cold intuitions lack any such phenomenology. (They may co-occur with such 
phenomenology, but the connection is not typically regarded as essential.) So, it is 
difficult to see how intuitions could exhibit any interesting degree of iconicity with 
respect to values, while this is much more plausible in the case of emotional experience, 
in light of its rich phenomenal character.  
Moreover, it has been widely noted that iconic representations have different 
epistemic properties than language-like representations. The adage “a picture is worth a 
thousand words” in fact conveys something important about iconic formats. Camp (2007) 
notes that pictures convey information with “rich, multi-dimensional specificity” (p. 
156), and that maps and diagrams can provide more expedient ways of meeting certain 
cognitive demands (p. 161). Dretske (1981) notes that photographs are more 
informationally dense than verbal descriptions (p. 137). And many have noted that the 
non-arbitrary relation between icon and content makes iconic systems easier to learn and 
use (Giardino and Greenberg 2015, p. 8; Bordwell 2008, p. 61-63). On the face of it, 
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then, icons have a unique epistemic profile, and so the idea that emotions are icons of 
value is plausibly relevant to why they provide distinctive epistemic benefits. 
I do not claim, of course, that any iconic representation automatically confers 
epistemic benefits. For instance, I see no epistemic benefit arising from using a mercury 
thermometer rather than a digital one. However, on my account, the iconic relation 
between emotion and value is much tighter, much more profound and intimate than the 
relation between a mercury thermometer and the temperature. At least, the view that 
emotions are icons of value is most compelling if we can develop it in this way. 
Then how exactly should we answer the Value Question? One promising idea is 
that emotional experience acquaints us with values. As Roberts (2013) put it, emotional 
experience provides “more intimate cognitive contact” with values (p. 52), an epistemic 
improvement which can be regarded as a form of “personal acquaintance” (pp. 39-40). 
Now, acquaintance is usually understood to be an unmediated direct cognitive 
access to objects.59 However, the idea that emotions provide this direct form of 
acquaintance faces at least three challenges. First, it is tempting to think acquaintance 
requires some kind of causal efficacy on the part of the objects of acquaintance. It seems 
that the objects of acquaintance, even mental states like pain, would need to be able to 
cause or at least explain our awareness of them. However, many realists do not want to 
say that values are causally or explanatorily efficacious, and the present work seeks to 
accommodate all forms of realism. Second, emotions typically depend on other mental 
59 Bertrand Russell’s definition of acquaintance: “We shall say that we have acquaintance with anything of 
which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of 
truths” (1912, p. 78; see also 1910/11, 1914). Contemporary uses of the notion of acquaintance can be 
found in BonJour (2001), Conee (1994), Fales (1996), Fumerton (2005), Gertler (2012), and Johnston 
(2004). 
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states in a way that seems to mediate the cognitive access they provide. When you see the 
wild horses, your longing in part depends on your visual processing of the wild horses. 
So, there seems to be something standing between you and the beauty. (Note that I say 
visual processing, not visual experience, in order to avoid the suggestion that experience 
is a thing standing between you and the horse.)  
This point is related to the third challenge: Emotions can be elicited by mental 
states that do not require the presence of their objects, such as imagination, belief, and 
memory. When in your old age you remember the wild horse, and your longing returns, it 
is harder to see how you could be experiencing direct unmediated cognitive access to 
their beauty. Even worse, consider emotions in response to fictions and imaginative 
states. You may find it delightful to imagine a lazy afternoon in the Shire, but can you 
really be directly acquainted with the value of a thing that does not exist?  
So, while I agree with Roberts that emotional experience acquaints us with values 
in some way, plausibly it doesn’t do this in the direct way that acquaintance is usually 
understood. Accordingly, perhaps instead emotional experiences provide a kind of 
acquaintance that is indirect and mediated. This may strike one as an absurd proposal. 
Usually, saying that acquaintance is direct and unmediated is the very way the concept is 
introduced! However, consider that familiar examples make vivid a form of acquaintance 
that is not direct in the traditional Russellian sense. Consider the difference between 
reading a biography of Churchill, and meeting the man himself. When you meet him in 
person, perhaps you don’t have direct unmediated cognitive access to him in the 
Russellian sense (of course, a direct realist will hold that you do). However, there is 
clearly also a sense in which meeting him in person gives you far more direct access to 
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him than reading about him does, no matter how thorough the biography. It is correct to 
say that you are acquainted with Churchill, even if the acquaintance is not utterly direct. 
Moreover, it is plausible that this acquaintance is a better epistemic status (all else being 
equal). 
Icons, too, seem to provide a kind of indirect acquaintance. Seeing a picture of 
Churchill acquaints you with his physical appearance in a way that reading about him 
cannot. That’s because the picture itself replicates the appearance of Churchill. Since 
icons replicate features of their contents, icons can indirectly acquaint us with their 
contents by acquainting us with the features they replicate. Imagine, for instance, a 
plaster model of a city you’ve never visited, say, ancient Alexandria. Imagine the model 
is highly detailed and realistic, and is displayed on a large table. You walk around the 
model, peering into its nooks and crannies, studying its vivid colors and spatial details. 
(Suppose the sculptor got all of this right.) Your friend, however, decides to stay home 
instead of seeing the model. But she spends the day reading a book that happens to report 
all and only the propositional information you acquired during your visit. She finishes the 
book, and forms the same beliefs you do about Alexandria’s physical characteristics. It 
seems plausible that, by being acquainted with Alexandria the model, you are acquainted 
with Alexandria the city in a way that your friend is not.  
If you deny this, then imagine a further case. You travel back in time and explore 
the real Alexandria. Clearly now you are better acquainted with the city than your friend 
is. One reason is that you are now acquainted with Alexandria’s visual characteristics, its 
colors, shapes, textures, and spatial layout. You are acquainted with the city by being 
acquainted with its properties. Well, we are imagining that the model of Alexandria 
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replicates all of these visual characteristics. They are not the same token characteristics 
(obviously), but they are copies, and so the model provides acquaintance by proxy. 
More needs to be said here, of course, but the foregoing lends initial credibility to 
the idea that icons provide indirect acquaintance.  
Plausibly, acquaintance is an epistemic good, and one that is not reducible to 
propositional knowledge. After all, we can destroy your knowledge but your 
acquaintance survives. Imagine that when you time traveled a moment ago, you did so by 
choosing one mystery door out of a zillion. All the other doors would have led you to a 
situation in which you non-veridically hallucinate a city that is actually nothing like 
Alexandria, though you would be none the wiser. Luckily, you just happened to choose 
the only door that could lead you right. You enter the real city, and form all kinds of true 
beliefs about it. These beliefs would have been knowledge, but their truth is far too 
accidental. Your acquaintance with the city remains, however, and you are epistemically 
better off for having been so acquainted.60 
If this brief sketch is correct, then we have the materials to answer the Grounding 
and the Value Question. In virtue of its iconicity, emotional experience indirectly 
acquaints us with value by directly acquainting us with the features of value that it 
replicates. Since emotional experience has the power to do this in virtue of its iconicity, 
plausibly, cold intuition cannot offer such acquaintance. Temple Grandin intellectually 
grasped the grandeur of the night sky, but it is we who, in being moved by it, are 
acquainted with its grandeur. 
60 A similar kind of epistemic luck is sometimes used to argue that understanding is distinct from 
knowledge (Pritchard 2009). 
Ballard, Icons of Value - 123 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Abell, Catharine, (2009), “Canny Resemblance”, Philosophical Review 118 (2): 183-223. 
Abell, Catharine, (2005), “Against Depictive Conventionalism”, American Philosophical 
Quarterly 42 (3): 185-197. 
Allen, Keith, (2017), A Naïve Realist Theory of Color, Oxford University Press. 
Allen, Keith, (2010), “In Defence of Natural Daylight”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 
91: 1-18. 
Alston, William P., (1993), The Reliability of Sense Perception, Cornell 
University Press. 
Alston, William P., (1989), “A ‘Doxastic Practice’ Approach to Epistemology”, 
Knowledge and Skepticism, ed. Marjorie Clay and Keith Lehrer, Westview Press. 
Audi, Robert, (2013), Moral Perception, Princeton University Press. 
Audi, Robert, (2005), The Good in the Right, Princeton University Press. 
Bagnoli, Carla, (2011), “Moral Perception and Knowledge by Principles”, The New 
Intuitionism, ed. Jill Hernandez, London: Continuum. 
Bayne, Tim, (2011), “The Sense of Agency”, ed. Fiona Macpherson, The Senses, Oxford 
University Press. 
Bealer, George, (1998), “Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy”, Rethinking 
Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, eds. 
Michael R. Depaul and William Ramsey, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
Beck, Jacob, (2015), “Analogue Magnitude Representations: A Philosophical 
Introduction”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4): 829-855. 
 Ballard, Icons of Value - 124 
Berker, Selim, (2009), “The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience”, Philosophy and  
Public Affairs 37 (4): 293-329. 
 
Binmore, Ken, and Samuelson, Larry, (2006), “The Evolution of Focal Points,” Games  
and Economic Behavior 55: 21-42. 
 
Blackburn, Simon, (2001), “Reason, Virtue, and Knowledge”, Virtue Epistemology, eds.  
Abrol Fairweather & Linda Zagzebski, Oxford University Press.  
 
Blackburn, Simon, (1998), Ruling Passions, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Blackburn, Simon, (1993), Essays in Quasi-Realism, Oxford University Press. 
 
Blackburn, Simon, (1981), “Reply: Rule-Following and Moral Realism”, Wittgenstein:  
To Follow a Rule, eds. S. Holtzman and Christopher M. Leich, Routledge. 
 
Block, Ned, (2014), “Seeing-As in the Light of Vision Science”, Philosophy and  
Phenomenological Research 89 (1): 560-572. 
 
Block, Ned, (1995), “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness”, Brain and  
Behavioral Sciences 18 (2): 227-247. 
 
Block, Ned, (1986), “Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology”, Midwest Studies in  
Philosophy 10 (1): 615-78. 
 
Block, Ned, (1983), “Mental Pictures and Cognitive Science”, Philosophical Review 92  
(4): 499-542. 
 
Blumson, Ben, (2012), “Mental Maps”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85  
(2): 413-434. 
 
Boltz, William, (1986), “Review of The Chinese Language: Fact and Fantasy by John  
DeFrancis”, Journal of the American Oriental Society 106 (2): 405-7. 
 
BonJour, Laurence, (2001), “Toward a Defense of Empirical Foundationalism”,  
Resurrecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism, ed. Michael DePaul, Lanham,  
MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Bordwell, David, (2008), Poetics of Cinema, New York: Routledge.  
 
Boyd, Richard, (1988), “How to Be a Moral Realist”, Essays on Moral Realism, ed.  
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Cornell University Press. 
 
Brady, Michael S., (2014), Emotional Insight, Oxford University Press. 
 
 
 Ballard, Icons of Value - 125 
Brady, Michael S., (2011), “Emotions, Perceptions, and Reasons”, Morality and the  
Emotions, ed. Carla Bagnoli, Oxford University Press. 
 
Brady, Michael S., (2009), “The Irrationality of Recalcitrant Emotions”, Philosophical  
Studies 145 (3): 413-430. 
 
Brady, Michael S., (2007), “Recalcitrant Emotions and Visual Illusions”, American  
Philosophical Quarterly 44 (3): 273-284. 
 
Brandom, Robert, (1994), Making It Explicit, Harvard University Press. 
 
Brentano, Franz, (1874/1973), Psychology From An Empirical Standpoint, English  
language edition, ed. L. McAlister, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
 
Brink, David, (1989), Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge  
University Press. 
 
Brogaard, Berit, and Chudnoff, Elijah, (2016), “Against Emotional Dogmatism”,  
Philosophical Issues 26 (1): 59-77.  
 
Bryson, Norman, (1983), Vision and Painting, Yale University Press. 
 
Burge, Tyler, (2010), Origins of Objectivity, Oxford University Press. 
 
Byrne, Alex, (2001), “Intentionalism Defended”, Philosophical Review 110: 199-240. 
 
Byrne, Alex, and Hilbert, David, (2003), “Color Realism and Color Science”, Behavioral 
 and Brain Sciences 26 (1): 3-21. 
 
Camp, Elisabeth, (2007), “Thinking with Maps”, Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1): 145- 
182. 
 
Campbell, John, (2005), “Transparency vs Revelation in Color Perception”,  
Philosophical Topics 33: 105-115. 
 
Campbell, John, (1994), “A Simple View of Color”, Reality, Representation, and  
Projection, eds. John J. Haldane and Crispin Wright, Oxford University Press. 
 
Cannon, W. B., (1927), “The James-Lange Theory of Emotions: A Critical Examination  
and an Alternative Theory”, American Journal of Psychology 39: 106-124. 
 
Carruthers, Peter, (2011), The Opacity of Mind, Oxford University Press. 
 
Chalmers, David, (2006), “Perception and the Fall from Eden”, eds. Tamar Gendler and  
John Hawthorne, Perceptual Experience, Oxford University Press. 
 
 Ballard, Icons of Value - 126 
Chalmers, David, (2004), “The Representational Character of Experience”, The Future of  
Philosophy, ed. Brian Leiter, Oxford University Press. 
 
Christie, I., and Friedman, B., (2004), “Autonomic Specificity of Discrete Emotion and  
Dimensions of Affective Space a Multivariate Approach”, International Journal  
of Psychophysiology 51: 143-153. 
 
Chudnoff, Elijah, (2013), Intuition, Oxford University Press. 
 
Churchland, Paul, (1985), “Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain  
States”, Journal of Philosophy 82: 8-28. 
 
Cicero, (2002), Cicero on the Emotions: Tuscalan Disputations 3 and 4, trans. Margaret  
Graver, Chicago Unversity Press. 
 
Clore, G. L., Gasper, K., and Garvin, E., (2001), “Affect as Information”, Handbook of  
Affect and Social Cognition, ed. J. P. Forgas, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
 
Conee, Earl, and Feldman, Richard, (2004), Evidentialism, Oxford University Press. 
 
Conee, Earl, (1994), “Phenomenal Knowledge”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72  
(2):136-150. 
 
Cowan, Robert, (2015), “Perceptual Intuitionism”, Philosophy and Phenomenological  
Research 90 (1):164-193. 
 
Cowling, Sam, (2017), “Resemblance”, Philosophy Compass 12 (4): 1-11. 
 
Crane, Tim, (1998), “Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental”, Contemporary Issues in  
the Philosophy of Mind, ed. Anthony O'Hear, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Crisp, Roger, (2005), “Value, Reasons and the Structure of Justification: How to Avoid  
Passing the Buck,” Analysis 65 (1): 80-85. 
 
Cuneo, Terence, (2006), “Signs of Value: Reid on the Evidential Role of Feelings in  
Moral Judgment”, The British Journal for the History of Philosophy 11: 69-91. 
 
Damasio, Antonio R., (1994), Descartes Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain,  
New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons. 
 
Dancy, Jonathan, (2014), “Intuition and Emotion”, Ethics 124 (4): 787-812. 
 
Dancy, Jonathan, (1986), “Two Conceptions of Moral Realism”, Aristotelian Society  
Supplementary Volume 60 (1): 167-205. 
 
 Ballard, Icons of Value - 127 
D'Arms, Justin, (2013), “Value and the Regulation of the Sentiments”, Philosophical  
Studies 163 (1): 3-13. 
 
D'Arms, Justin, and Jacobson, Daniel, (2006), “Anthropocentric Constraints on Human  
Value”, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 1, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford:  
Clarendon Press. 
 
D'Arms, Justin, and Daniel Jacobson, (2003), “The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotions  
(or, Anti-Quasijudgmentalism)”, ed. Anthony Hatzimoysis, Philosophy and the  
Emotions, Cambridge University Press. 
 
D’Arms, Justin, and Jacobson, Daniel, (2000), “Sentiment and Value”, Ethics 110 (4):  
722-748. 
 
DeFrances, John, (1984), The Chinese Language: Fact and Fantasy, Honolulu: The  
University of Hawaii Press. 
 
Deonna, Julien, and Fabrice Teroni, (forthcoming), “Getting Bodily Feelings into  
Emotional Experience in the Right Way”, Emotion Review. 
 
Deonna, Julien, and Fabrice Teroni, (2015), “Emotions as Attitudes”, Dialectica 69 (3):  
293-311. 
 
Deonna, Julien, and Fabrice Teroni, (2014), “In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations?”,  
eds. Cain Todd and Sabine Roeser, Emotion and Value, Oxford University Press. 
 
Deonna, Julien, and Fabrice Teroni, (2012), The Emotions, Routledge: New York, NY. 
 
Dirac, Paul, (1930), “The Proton”, Nature 126: 605-606. 
 
Döring, Sabine A., (2015), “What's Wrong With Recalcitrant Emotions? From  
Irrationality to Challenge of Agential Identity”, Dialectica 69 (3): 381-402. 
 
Döring, Sabine A., (2009), “The Logic of Emotional Experience: Noninferentiality and  
the Problem of Conflict Without Contradiction”, Emotion Review 1 (3): 240-247. 
 
Döring, Sabine A., (2003), “Explaining Action by Emotion”, Philosophical Quarterly 53  
(211): 214-230. 
 
Dreier, James, (2004), “Meta-ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism”,  
Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1): 23-44. 
 
Dretske, Fred, (1995), Naturalizing the Mind, MIT Press. 
 
Dretske, Fred, (1981), Knowledge and the Flow of Information, MIT Press. 
 
 Ballard, Icons of Value - 128 
Enoch, David, (2011), Taking Morality Seriously, Oxford University Press. 
 
Fales, Evan, (1996), A Defense of the Given, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Feldman, Fred, (2004), Pleasure and the Good Life, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Fine, Kit, (2001), “The Question of Realism”, Philosophers’ Imprint 1 (1): 1-30. 
 
Fodor, Jerry, (1984), “Observation Reconsidered”, Philosophy of Science 51: 23-43. 
 
Fodor, Jerry, (1983), The Modularity of Mind, MIT Press. 
 
Foot, Philippa, (1978a), “Hume's Theory of Moral Judgment”, Virtue and Vices and  
Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Foot, Philippa, (1978b), “Moral Beliefs”, Virtue and Vices and Other Essays in Moral  
Philosophy, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Friedman, Michael, (1974), “Explanation and Scientific Understanding”, Journal of  
Philosophy 71: 5-19. 
 
Frijda, Nico, (1986), The Emotions, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Fumerton, Richard, (2001), “Classical Foundationalism”, Resurrecting Old-Fashioned  
Foundationalism, ed. Michael DePaul, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
 
Gallois, Andrè, (1996), The World Without, the Mind Within, Cambridge University  
Press. 
 
Gazzaniga, M. S., and Smylie, C. S., (1984), “What Does Language Do for the Right  
             Hemisphere?”, ed. M.S. Gazzaniga, Handbook of Cognitive Neuroscience, New  
York: Plenum Press. 
 
Gert, Joshua, (2006), “A Realistic Color Realism”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy  
84: 565-589. 
 
Gertler, Brie, (2012), “Renewed Acquaintance”, Introspection and Consciousness, eds.  
Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar, Oxford University Press. 
 
Giardino, Valeria, and Greenberg, Gabriel, (2015), “Varieties of Iconicity”, Review of  
Philosophy and Psychology 6 (1): 1-25. 
 
Gibbard, Allan, (2003), Thinking How to Live, Harvard University Press. 
 
Gibbard, Allan, (1990), Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Harvard University Press. 
 
 Ballard, Icons of Value - 129 
Gigerenzer, Gerd, and Reinhard, Selten, eds., (2002), Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive  
Toolbox, MIT Press. 
 
Gilbert, Margaret, (1989), On Social Facts, New York: Routledge. 
 
Goodman, Nelson, (1968), Languages of Art, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.  
 
Goodman, Nelson, (1967), “Seven Strictures on Similarity”, Experience and Theory, eds.  
L. Foster and J. W. Swanson, University of Massachusetts Press.  
 
Green, O. H., (1992), The Emotions, Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
 
Greenberg, Gabriel, (2013), “Beyond Resemblance”, Philosophical Review 122 (2): 215- 
287. 
 
Greene, Joshua, (2008), “The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul”, Moral Psychology, Vol. 3, ed.  
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, MIT Press. 
 
Greene, Joshua, (2003), “From Neural ‘Is’ to Moral ‘Ought’: What Are the Moral  
Implications of Neuroscientific Moral Psychology?”, Nature Reviews  
Neuroscience 4: 847-50. 
 
Greenspan, Patricia, (1988), Emotions and Reasons, New York: Routledge. 
 
Griffiths, Paul, (1997), What Emotions Really Are, University of Chicago Press. 
 
Grimm, Stephen, (2006), “Is Understanding a Species of Knowledge?”, The British  
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57: 515-36. 
 
Guralnik, O., Schmeidler, J., and Simeon, D., (2000), “Feeling Unreal: Cognitive  
Processes in Depersonalization”, American Journal of Psychiatry 157 (1): 103-
109. 
 
Hacker, P. M. S., (1987), Appearance and Reality, Oxford: Blackwell Publisher. 
 
Haidt, Jonathan, (2012), The Righteous Mind, New York: Random House, Inc. 
 
Haidt, Jonathan, (2001), “The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail”, Psychological  
Review 108 (4): 814-834. 
 
 
Harman, Gilbert, (1990), “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience”, Philosophical  
Perspectives 4, Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind, ed. James Tomberlin, 
Atascadero: Ridgeview. 
 
 
 Ballard, Icons of Value - 130 
Harman, Gilbert, (1987), “(Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics”, Notre Dame  
Journal of Formal Logic, ed. Ernest LePore, Academic Press. 
 
Harman, Gilbert, (1982), “Conceptual Role Semantics”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal  
Logic 28: 242-56 
 
Harman, Gilbert, (1977), The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics, Oxford  
University Press. 
 
Harman, Gilbert, (1973), Thought, Princeton University Press. 
 
Harper, D. G. C., (1982), “Competitive Foraging in Mallards: Ideal Free Ducks”, Animal  
Behaviour 30: 575-84. 
 
Hawthorne, John, (2006), “Plenitude, Convention, and Ontology”, Metaphysical Essays,  
Oxford University Press. 
 
Helm, Bennett, (2001), Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of  
Value, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hilbert, David, (1987), Color and Color Perception: A Study in Anthropocentric  
Realism, Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of Language and Information. 
 
Hill, Christopher S., (2009), Consciousness, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hinton, J. M., (1973), Experiences, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Hopkins, Robert, (1998), Picture, Image and Experience, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Horgan, Terence, (1984), “Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia”, Philosophical  
Quarterly 32: 127-136. 
 
Horgan, Terence, and Tienson, John, (2002), “The Intentionality of Phenomenology and  
the Phenomenology of Intentionality”, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and  
Contemporary Readings, ed. David Chalmers, Oxford University Press. 
 
Huebner, B., Dwyer, S., and Hauser, M., (2008), “The Role of Emotion in Moral  
Psychology”, Trends in Cognitive Science 13 (1): 1-6. 
 
Huemer, Michael, (2008), “Revisionary Intuitionism”, Social Philosophy and Policy 25  
(1): 368-392. 
 
Huemer, Michael, (2005), Ethical Intuitionism, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Huemer, Michael, (2001), Skepticism and the Veil of Perception, Lanham, MD: Rowman  
& Littlefield.  
 Ballard, Icons of Value - 131 
 
Hume, David, (1742/2006), “Of the Standard of Taste”, Essays: Moral, Political, and  
Literary, New York: Cosimo, Inc. 
 
Hume, David, (1738-40/1975), A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge,  
2nd ed. revised by P. H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Hunter, E. C. M., Sierra, M., David, A. S., (2004), “The Epidemiology of  
Depersonalization and Derealisation: A Systematic Review”, Social Psychiatry 
and Psychiatric Epidemiology 39: 9-18. 
 
Hutcheson, Francis, (1726/2004), An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty  
and Virtue, ed. W. Leidhold, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. 
 
Hyman, John, (2006), The Objective Eye, University of Chicago Press. 
 
Inman, Ross, (2014), “Neo-Aristotelian Plenitude”, Philosophical Studies 168 (3): 583- 
597. 
 
Jackson, Frank, (2007), “Colour for Representationalists”, Erkenntnis 66 (1-2): 169-85. 
 
Jackson, Frank, (1998), From Metaphysics to Ethics, Oxford University Press. 
 
Jackson, Frank, (1982), “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32: 127-136. 
 
James, William, (1890), Principles of Psychology, Vol. 2, Harvard University Press. 
 
James, William, (1884), “What Is an Emotion?”, Mind 9: 188-205. 
 
Johnston, Mark, (2004), “The Obscure Object of Hallucination,” Philosophical Studies  
120 (1-3): 113-183. 
 
Johnston, Mark, (2001), “The Authority of Affect”, Philosophy and Phenomenological  
Research 63: 181-214. 
 
Johnston, Mark, (1989), “Dispositional Theories of Value”, Proceedings of the  
Aristotelian Society 63: 113-37. 
 
Kahneman, Daniel, (2011), Thinking Fast and Slow, New York: Farrar, Straus and  
Giroux. 
 
Kant, Immanuel, (1996), Practical Philosophy, trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge  
University Press. 
 
Keightley, David, (1996), “Art, Ancestors, and the Origins of Writing in China”,  
Representations 56: 68-95. 
 Ballard, Icons of Value - 132 
 
Kelly, Thomas, (2005), “Moorean Facts and Belief Revision, or Can the Skeptic Win?”,  
Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1): 179-209. 
 
Kennett, Jeanette, (2006), “Do Psychopaths Really Threaten Moral  
Rationalism?”, Philosophical Explorations 9 (1): 69-82. 
 
Kenny, Anthony, (1963), Emotion, Action, and Will, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul  
Limited. 
 
King, Peter, (2002), “Aquinas on the Passions”, Thomas Aquinas: Contemporary  
Philosophical Perspectives, ed. Brian Davies, Oxford University Press. 
 
Kitcher, Phillip, (1981), “Explanatory Unification”, Philosophy of Science 48 (4): 507- 
531. 
 
Kosslyn, S., Thompson, W., and Giorgio, G., (2006), The Case for Mental Imagery,  
Oxford University Press. 
 
Kriegel, Uriah, (2013), “The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program”, Phenomenal  
Intentionality, ed. Uriah Kriegel, Oxford University Press. 
 
Kriegel, Uriah, (2007), “Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal  
Intentionality”, Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1): 307-340. 
 
Kuhn, Thomas, (1962), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago  
Press. 
 
Kulvicki, John, (2006), On Images: Their Structure and Content, Oxford University  
Press. 
 
Kuppens, P., Tuerlinckx, F., Russell, J., and Barrett, L. F., (2013), “The Relation between  
Valence and Arousal in Subjective Experience”, Psychological Bulletin 139 (4): 
917-40. 
 
Kvanvig, Jonathan, (2003), The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding,  
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Lange, C. G., (1885), “Om Sindsbevaegelser: et Psyko-fysiologisk Studie”, København:  
Jacob Lunds. 
 
Lazarus, Richard, (1991), Emotion and Adaptation, Oxford University Press. 
 
LeDoux, Joseph, (1996), The Emotional Brain, New York: Simon & Schuster.  
 
 
 Ballard, Icons of Value - 133 
Lemos, Noah, (2004), Common Sense: A Contemporary Defense, Cambridge University  
Press. 
 
Leslie, Sarah-Jane, (2011), “Essence, Plenitude, and Paradox”, Philosophical  
Perspectives 25 (1): 277-296. 
 
Levenson, Robert W., (2003), “Autonomic Specificity and Emotion”, Handbook of  
Affective Sciences, eds. R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, and H. H. Goldsmith,  
Oxford University Press.  
 
Levine, Joseph, (2007), “Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint,”  
Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge, eds. Torin Alter and Sven  
Walter, Oxford University Press. 
 
Lewis, C. S., (1964/2012), The Discarded Image, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Lewis, David, (1989), “Dispositional Theories of Value,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian  
Society 63: 113–37. 
 
Lewis, David, (1969), Convention, Harvard University Press. 
 
Livy, (1912), History of Rome, trans. Rev. Canon Roberts, New York: E. P. Dutton and  
Co. 
 
Loar, Brian, (2003), “Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content”,  
Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, eds. Martin  
Hahn and B. Ramberg, MIT Press. 
 
Loar, Brian, (1990), “Phenomenal States”, Philosophical Perspectives 4: 81-108. 
 
Lopes, Dominic, (2005), Sight and Sensibility: Evaluating Pictures, Clarendon Press. 
 
Lopes, Dominic, (1996), Understanding Pictures, Oxford University Press. 
 
Lovejoy, Arthur O., (1936), The Great Chain of Being, Harvard University Press. 
 
Lycan, William, (2007), “Moore's Antiskeptical Strategies”, Themes From G. E. Moore:  
New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, eds. Susana Nuccetelli and Gary 
Seay, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Lycan, William, (2006), “The Meaning of ‘Water’: An Unsolved  
Problem”, Philosophical Issues 16 (1): 184-199. 
 
Lycan, William, (2001), “Moore Against the New Skeptics”, Philosophical Studies 103  
(1): 35-53. 
 
 Ballard, Icons of Value - 134 
Lycan, William, (1996), Consciousness and Experience, MIT Press. 
 
Lyons, William E., (1980), Emotion, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Mackie, J. L., (1977), Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Pelican Books. 
 
Marshall, G. D., (1976), “The Affective Consequences of ‘Inadequately Explained’  
Physiological Arousal”, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University. 
 
Marshall, G. D., and Zimbardo, P. G., (1979), “Affective Consequences of Inadequately  
Explained Physiological Arousal”, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 37: 970-988. 
 
Maslach, C., (1979), "Negative Emotional Biasing of Unexplained Arousal", Journal of  
Personality and Social Psychology 37: 953-969. 
 
Matthen, Mohan, (1988), “Biological Function and Perceptual Content”, The Journal of  
Philosophy 95: 5-27. 
 
Matthews, Robert, (2007), The Measure of Mind, Oxford University Press. 
 
McBrayer, Justin, (2010), “A Limited Defense of Moral Perception”, Philosophical  
Studies 149: 305-320. 
 
 
McDowell, John, (2008), “The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a  
Transcendental Argument”, Disjunctivism, eds. A. Haddock and F. Macpherson, 
Oxford University Press. 
 
McDowell, John, (1998a), “Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World”,  
Mind, Value, and Reality, Harvard University Press. 
 
McDowell, John, (1998b), “Projection and Truth in Ethics”, Mind, Value, and Reality,  
Harvard University Press. 
 
McDowell, John, (1985), “Value and Secondary Qualities”, Morality and Objectivity, ed.  
Ted Honderich, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
 
McDowell, John, (1979), “Virtue and Reason”, The Monist 62 (3): 331-350. 
 
McGinn, Colin, (1996), “Another Look at Color”, The Journal of Philosophy 93: 537- 
555. 
 
McLaughlin, B. P., (2009), “Monothematic Delusions and Existential Feelings”, eds. T.  
Bayne and J. Fernandez, Delusion and Self-Deception, New York: Psychology  
Press. 
 Ballard, Icons of Value - 135 
 
Mendelovici, Angela, (2014), “Pure Intentionalism About Moods and Emotions”, ed.  
Uriah Kriegel, Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind, New York:  
Routledge. 
 
Milona, Michael, (2016), “Taking the Perceptual Analogy Seriously”, Ethical Theory and  
Moral Practice 19 (4): 897-915. 
 
Montague, Michelle, (2009), “The Logic, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of  
Emotion”, Philosophical Studies 145: 171-92.   
 
Moore, G. E., (2013), Philosophical Chapters, New York: Routledge. 
 
Moore, G. E., (1903), Principia Ethica, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Mulligan, Kevin, (1998), “From Appropriate Emotions to Values”, The Monist 81: 161- 
88. 
 
Nagel, Thomas, (1986), The View from Nowhere, Oxford University Press. 
 
Neu, Jerome, (1977), Emotion, Thought, and Therapy, Berkeley and Los Angeles:  
University of California Press. 
 
Nisbett, Richard, and Ross, Lee, (1980), Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings  
in Social Judgment, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Nozick, Robert, (1989), The Examined Life, New York: Simon and Schuster. 
 
Nussbaum, Martha, (2001), Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotion,  
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Oddie, Graham, (2005), Value, Reality, and Desire, Oxford University Press. 
 
Parfit, Derek, (2011), On What Matters, Vol. 2, Oxford University Press. 
 
Peacocke, Christopher, (1987), “Depiction”, Philosophical Review 96 (3): 383-410. 
 
Pelser, Adam, (2014), “Emotion, Evaluative Perception, and Epistemic Justification,”  
Emotion and Value, eds. Sabine Roeser and Cain Todd, Oxford University Press. 
 
Pettit, Philip, (1991), “Realism and Response-Dependence”, Mind 100 (4): 587-626. 
 
Plantinga, Alvin, (1967), God and Other Minds, Cornell University Press. 
 
Prinz, Jesse, (2008), The Emotional Construction of Morals, Oxford University Press. 
 
 Ballard, Icons of Value - 136 
Prinz, Jesse, (2004), Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotions, Oxford University  
Press.  
 
Pritchard, Duncan, (2009), “Knowledge, Understanding, and Epistemic Value”,  
Epistemology (Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures), ed. Anthony O’Hear,  
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Pryor, James, (2000), “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist”, Noûs 34: 517-549. 
 
Pylyshyn, Zenon, (2003), Seeing and Visualizing: It’s Not What You Think, MIT Press. 
 
Pylyshyn, Zenon, (1981), “The Imagery Debate: Analogue Media Versus Tacit  
Knowledge”, Psychological Review (88): 16-45. 
 
Pylyshyn, Zenon, (1973), “What the Mind's Eye Tells the Mind's Brain: A Critique of  
Mental Imagery”, Psychological Bulletin (80): 1-25. 
 
Quine, Willard V., (1969), “Natural Kinds”, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays,  
eds. Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa, Columbia University Press. 
 
Ratcliffe, Matthew, (2008), Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense  
of Reality, Oxford University Press. 
 
Reid, Thomas, (1872), The Works of Thomas Reid, Vol. 1, Edinburgh: Maclachlan and  
Stewart; London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green. 
 
Reisenzein, R., (1983), “The Schachter Theory of Emotion: Two Decades Later”,  
Psychological Bulletin 94 (2): 239-264. 
 
Roberts, Robert C., (2013), Emotions in the Moral Life, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Roberts, Robert C., (2003), Emotions, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Roberts, Robert C., (1988), “What An Emotion Is: A Sketch”, Philosophical Review 97:  
183-209. 
 
Robinson, Jenefer, (1979), “Some Remarks on Goodman's Language Theory of  
Pictures”, British Journal of Aesthetics 19 (1): 63-75. 
 
Ross, W. D., (1930), The Right and the Good, Oxford University Press. 
 
Russell, Bertrand, (1914), “On the Nature of Acquaintance”, Monist 24: 161-187. 
 
Russell, Bertrand, (1912), The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 
 
 
 Ballard, Icons of Value - 137 
Russell, Bertrand, (1910–11), “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by  
Description”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11: 108-128. 
 
Russell, James, and Barrett, Lisa Feldman, (1999), “Core Affect, Prototypical Emotional  
Episodes, and Other Things Called Emotion: Dissecting the Elephant”, Journal of  
Personality and Social Psychology 76 (5): 805-19. 
 
Russell, James, (1980), “A Circumplex Model of Affect,” Journal of Personality and  
Social Psychology 39: 1161-78. 
 
Ryle, Gilbert, (1949), The Concept of Mind, Hutchinsons University Library. 
 
Sacks, Oliver, (2012), Hallucinations, New York: Vintage Books. 
 
Sacks, Oliver, (1995), An Anthropologist on Mars, New York: Vintage Books. 
 
Scanlon, Thomas, (2014), Being Realistic about Reasons, Oxford University Press. 
 
Scarantino, Andrea, (2014), “The Motivational Theory of Emotion”, Moral Psychology  
and Human Agency, eds. Daniel Jacobson and Justin D’Arms, Oxford University  
Press. 
 
Schachter, S., and Singer, J. K., (1962), “Cognitive, Social, and Physiological  
Determinants of Emotional State”, Psychological Review 69: 379-399. 
 
Schafer, Karl, (2013), “Perception and the Rational Force of Desire”, Journal of  
Philosophy 110 (5): 258-281. 
 
Schelling, Thomas, (1960), The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press. 
 
Schnall, S., Haidt, J., Clore, G., and Jordan, A., (2008), “Disgust as Embodied Moral  
Judgment”, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 34: 1096-1109. 
 
Schramme, Thomas, ed., (2014), Being Amoral: Psychopathy and Moral Incapacity, MIT  
Press. 
 
Schwartz, N., and Clore, G. L., (1983), “Mood, Misattribution, and Judgments of Well- 
Being: Informative and Directive Functions of Affective States”, Journal of  
Personality and Social Psychology 45: 513-523. 
 
Searle, John, (1983), Intentionality, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Selden, Daniel, (2013), Hieroglyphic Egyptian, University of California Press. 
 
Shafer-Landau, Russ, (2003), Moral Realism: A Defence, Oxford University Press. 
 
 Ballard, Icons of Value - 138 
Siegel, Susanna, (2017), The Rationality of Perception, Oxford University Press. 
 
Siegel, Susanna, (2011), The Contents of Visual Experience, Oxford University Press. 
 
 
Sierra, Mauricio, (2009), Depersonalization: A New Look at a Neglected Syndrome,  
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Sierra, M., Loperta, F., Lambert, F. V., Phillips, M. L., and David, A. S.,  (2002),  
“Separating Depersonalization and Derealisation: the Relevance of the ‘Lesion  
Method’”, Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, & Psychiatry 72: 530-532. 
 
Simeon, Daphne, (2004), “Depersonalization Disorder: A Contemporary Overview”,  
CNS Drugs 18 (6): 343-354. 
 
Simeon, Daphne, and Abugel, Jeffrey, (2006), Feeling Unreal: Depersonalization  
Disorder and the Loss of Self, Oxford University Press. 
 
Simeon, D., S. Gross, O. Guralnik, D. J., Stein, J. Schmeidler, and E. Hollander,  (1997),  
“Feeling Unreal: 30 Cases of DSM-III-R Depersonalization Disorder”, American  
Journal of Psychiatry 154 (8): 1107-1113. 
 
Simeon, D., Guralnik, O., Hazlett, E. A., Spiegel-Cohen, J., Hollander, E., and  
Buchsbaum, M. S., (2000), “Feeling Unreal: A PET Study of Depersonalization  
Disorder”, American Journal of Psychiatry 157 (11): 1782-1788. 
 
Simon, Herbert, (1957), Models of Man, Oxford: Wiley. 
 
Singer, Peter, (2005), “Ethics and Intuitions”, The Journal of Ethics 9: 331-352. 
 
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, (1991), “Moral Experience and Justification”, The Southern  
Journal of Philosophy 29 (1): 89-96. 
 
Sizer, Laura, (2006), “What Feelings Can’t Do”, Mind and Language 21 (1): 108-135. 
 
Skyrms, Brian, (1996), Evolution of the Social Contract, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Slovic, Paul, (2007), “‘If I Look at the Mass I Will Never Act’: Psychic Numbing and  
Genocide”, Judgment and Decision Making 2 (2): 79-95. 
 
Snowdon, P. F., (1979), “Perception, Vision and Causation”, Proceedings of the  
Aristotelian Society 81: 175-92. 
 
Sober, Elliot, (2015), Ockham's Razors: A User's Manual, Cambridge University Press. 
 
 
 Ballard, Icons of Value - 139 
Sober, Elliot, (2001), “What is the Problem of Simplicity?”, Simplicity, Inference and  
Modeling, eds. A. Zellner, H. Keuzenkamp, and M. McAleer, Cambridge  
University Press. 
 
Sober, Elliot, (1994), From a Biological Point of View, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Solomon, Robert C., (1976), The Passions, Garden City, NY: Anchor Books. 
 
Stampe, Dennis, (1987), “The Authority of Desire”, Philosophical Review 96: 335–81. 
 
Stampe, Dennis, (1986), “Defining Desire”, The Ways of Desire, ed. Joel Marks, 
Chicago: Precedent. 
 
Stich, Stephen, (1996), Deconstructing the Mind, Oxford University Press. 
 
Stich, Stephen, and Warfield, Ted, eds., (1994), Mental Representation: A Reader,  
Blackwell. 
 
Stocker, Michael, (1983), “Psychic Feelings: Their Importance and Irreducibility”,  
Australian Journal of Philosophy 61: 5-26. 
 
Sugden, Robert, (2011), “Salience, Inductive Reasoning, and the Emergence of  
Conventions”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 79: 35-47. 
 
Sugden, Robert, (1986/2004), The Economics of Rights, Co-operation, and Welfare, 2nd  
ed., New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Tappolet, Christine, (2012), “Emotions, Perceptions, and Emotional Illusions”,  
Perceptual Illusions: Philosophical and Psychological Essays, ed. Clotilde  
Calabi, Palgrave-Macmillan. 
 
Tolhurst, William, (1991), “On the Epistemic Value of Moral Experience”, Southern  
Journal of Philosophy 29 (1): 67-87. 
 
Tollefsen, Christopher, (2000), “McDowell’s Moral Realism and the Secondary Quality  
Analogy”, Disputatio: 1-13. 
 
Tye, Michael, (2009), Consciousness Revisited, MIT Press. 
 
Tye, Michael, (2008), “The Experience of Emotion: An Intentionalist Theory”, Revue  
Internationale de Philosophie 62: 25-50. 
 
Tye, Michael, (2000), Consciousness, Color, and Content, MIT Press. 
 
Tye, Michael, (1995), Ten Problems of Consciousness, MIT Press. 
 
 Ballard, Icons of Value - 140 
Tye, Michael, (1986), “The Subjective Qualities of Experience”, Mind 95 (377): 1-17. 
 
Vance, Jona, (forthcoming), “Phenomenal Commitments: A Puzzle for Experiential  
Theories of Emotion”, The Ontology of Emotions, eds. F. Teroni and H. Naar,  
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Vargas, Manuel, and Nichols, Shaun, (2007), “Psychopaths and Moral  
Knowledge”, Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 14 (2): 157-162. 
 
Watkins, Michael, (2002), Rediscovering Colors: A Study in Pollyanna Realism,  
Dordrecht: Kluwer. 
 
Wedgwood, Ralph, (2007), The Nature of Normativity, Oxford University Press. 
 
Wiggins, David, (1987), “A Sensible Subjectivism?”, Needs, Values, and Truth, Oxford  
University Press. 
 
Wiggins, David, (1976), “Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life”, Proceedings of the  
British Academy 62: 332-378. 
 
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (1953), Philosophical Investigations, trans. and ed. G.E.M.  
Anscombe, Basil Blackwell Ltd. 
 
Wollheim, Richard, (1970), “Nelson Goodman's Languages of Art”, Journal of  
Philosophy 67 (16): 531-539. 
 
Wright, Crispin, (2004), “Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?”, Aristotelian  
Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1): 167-212. 
 
Wright, Crispin, (1993), Truth and Objectivity, Harvard University Press. 
 
Wright, Crispin, (1991), “Scepticism and Dreaming: Imploding the Demon”, Mind 100  
(1): 87-116. 
 
Wright, Crispin, (1988), “Moral Values, Projection, and Secondary  
Qualities”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary 63 (1): 1-26. 
 
Wright, Crispin, (1987), “Realism, Antirealism, Irrealism, Quasi-Realism”, Midwest  
Studies in Philosophy 12 (1): 25-49. 
 
Yetter-Chappell, Helen, and Yetter-Chappell, Richard, (2013), “Mind-Body Meets  
Metaethics: A Moral Concept Strategy”, Philosophical Studies 165 (3): 865-878. 
 
Yong, Heming, Peng, Jing, and Tian, Bing, (2008), Chinese Lexicography, Oxford  
University Press. 
 
 Ballard, Icons of Value - 141 
Zagzebski, Linda, (2001), “Recovering Understanding”, Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: 
Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue, ed. Mattheus Steup, 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Zajonc, Robert, (1980), “Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences”,  
American Psychologist 35: 151-75. 
